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BEFORE LOVING:
THE LOST ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO MARRY
Michael Boucai*
Abstract
For almost two centuries of this nation’s history, the basic contours
of the fundamental right to marry were fairly clear as a matter of natural,
not constitutional, law. The right encompassed marriage’s essential
characteristics: conjugality and contract, portability and permanence.
This Article defines those four dimensions of the natural right to marry
and describes their reflections and contradictions in positive law prior to
Loving v. Virginia (1967). In that landmark case, the Supreme Court
enforced a constitutional “freedom to marry” just when marriage’s
definitive attributes were on the brink of legal collapse. Not only did
wedlock proceed in Loving’s wake to lose its exclusive claims to licit sex
and legitimate procreation, personal autonomy in those very domains
gained independent constitutional protection. Drained of its conjugal
essence, today’s constitutional right to marry is thus an anachronism, the
vestige of a bygone consensus about what, if anything, “marriage”
fundamentally is.
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There are . . . in legal consciousness at any moment, concepts that legal
thinkers find in . . . a preceding age, and perhaps themselves mouth
ritualistically, without any confidence that they have a meaning.1
INTRODUCTION
The fundamental right to marry is a paradox in contemporary American
jurisprudence: repeatedly and reverently affirmed by the Supreme Court, but viewed
with puzzlement, skepticism, even outright disbelief by legal scholars. On the
judicial side of the ledger, we encounter a line of precedents stretching from Meyer
v. Nebraska (1923), with its fleeting invocation of a “right . . . to . . . marry, establish
a home and bring up children,” to Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), which extended the
marriage right to same-sex couples.2 The case that definitively identified marriage
as a constitutional right was decided about midway between those two rulings. In
Loving v. Virginia (1967), the Court held that prohibitions of interracial marriage
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, violating both the Equal Protection Clause and
an independent “freedom to marry” anchored in the Due Process Clause.3 Since that
landmark decision, the Court has consistently cast marriage as the most august,
central, and specific among a family of freedoms—privacy, intimate association,
sexual autonomy, the rights to procreate and not to procreate—traveling together
under the banner of “substantive due process.”4 That doctrine is notoriously
1

DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 70 (1975).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2600–01 (2015) (quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399).
3
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
4
See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
726 (1997); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851–
2
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controversial, but Loving has gone to show that it cannot possibly be all wrong.
Justices who quarrel vehemently over the bounds of due-process “liberty” evince
shared faith that marriage, though “nowhere mentioned” in the Constitution, is a
fundamental right thereunder.5
To legal scholars, Loving’s “freedom to marry” comes as a challenge, a riddle.
Our quandary originates in the fact that every decision vindicating the right involves
access to civil matrimony, a state-run institution. Is that really what “the freedom to
marry” guarantees? If so, access to marital status would be one of few unenumerated,
positive entitlements gleaned from a constitution reductively but not unaccountably
styled a “charter of negative liberties.”6 Hypotheticals about marriage abolition are
52 (1992); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 n.18 (1980); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152–54, 159 (1973).
5
Casey, 505 U.S. at 847–48 (referring to marriage and citing Loving); cf. id. at 951–53
(1992) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Loving’s right to marry from the right to
abortion). For similarly competing uses of Loving’s right to marry, compare Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 503 (1977) with Moore, 431 U.S. at 535–56 (Stewart,
J., dissenting); compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191, 204–05 (1986) with
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 210 n. 5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); and compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct.
at 2598, 2602–03 (2015) with Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2614–15, 2619 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting). In 1978, Justices Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist expressed doubt as to
whether the marriage right was properly called “fundamental,” but less than a decade later
they joined an opinion holding a Missouri prison regulation to violate “the fundamental right
to marry.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 396–403, 407–11 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring and Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 81, 94–99 (1987). Since
Turner, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, has come closer than any
member of the Court to flatly repudiating the constitutional right to marry. His discussion of
the right assumes only arguendo that “the ‘liberty’” protected by the Due Process Clause
embraces anything beyond “freedom from physical restraint.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2634
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
6
Judge Richard Posner coined the phrase “charter of negative liberties” and had a hand
in popularizing it. See Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982); Richard A.
Posner, The Constitution as Mirror: Tribe’s Constitutional Choices, 84 MICH. L. REV. 551,
558 (1986). Commitment to a “negative” understanding of constitutional rights was evident
in the Obergefell dissents, which stressed the distinction between entitlement to “privileges
. . . that exist solely because of . . . government” and rights to engage in conduct long
“associated with marriage,” like “making vows, . . . raising children, and otherwise enjoying
the society of one’s spouse.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2636 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original); Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“refus[ing]
to . . . convert the shield provided by constitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive
entitlements from the State”). For criticism of the Obergefell dissenters’ adherence to a strict
“negative/positive binary,” see Susan Frelich Appleton, Obergefell’s Liberties: All in the
Family, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 919, 922, 929 (2016) (arguing that the binary “obscures
complexities” that partly derive from the “distinctive features” of marriage and endorsing
scholarship that has more broadly “exposed the distinction as specious”) (citing Susan
Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2292–93 (1990) and
Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
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adduced to test this possibility—to locate the institution’s definitive and
indispensable characteristics. Usually it is a fruitless search. Most scholars find no
attribute of marriage that cannot be altered or jettisoned, though they assure us that
Loving and its progeny could have yielded the same desirable results on grounds
other than the right to marry.7 Others, defending the notion of a positive right to
marry, offer subtle and philosophically rich explanations tethered at varying lengths
to judicial precedent.8 Compelling or not, their theories grapple creatively with the
problem at the heart of this constitutional matter: the meaning of marriage itself.
This Article approaches the puzzle of our modern right to marry from the
standpoint of legal history. Rather than trying to rationalize what the Supreme Court
has said and done since “the freedom to marry” gained constitutional bite in Loving,
it asks what American lawyers said and did (and did not say or do) about the right
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1506 (1983)). For an endorsement of the negative-positive distinction’s
relevance in this context (from a scholar otherwise known for deconstructing such stark
dichotomies), see Louis Michael Seidman, The Triumph of Gay Marriage and the Failure of
Constitutional Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 139 (2015) (crediting the Obergefell dissenters’
argument that “the dominant strain of our constitutional tradition emphasizes . . . negative”
rather than “positive” rights).
7
See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27,
50 (1996); Ethan J. Leib, Hail Marriage and Farewell, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 41, 43 (2015);
Martha Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 667, 687 (2010); Joseph A. Pull,
Questioning the Fundamental Right to Marry, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 21, 26 (2006); Cass R.
Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2081 (2005); Nelson Tebbe &
Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1377
(2010); see also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 957 n.14 (D. Mass.
2003) (“[T]he State could, in theory, abolish . . . civil marriage,” though not “without chaotic
consequences.”). Some skeptics construe the “right to marry” to promise scrupulously equal
access to an important but mutable and ultimately disposable civil institution; others see a
proxy for liberties that transcend state-sponsored matrimony, like religious exercise and
intimate association. The two views are not incompatible. See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra, at
671–72, 685–88, 694–96 (endorsing both theories); Sunstein, supra, at 2086–98 (same).
8
One scholar argues that the marriage right guarantees a just framework for
administering the unusually flexible duties characteristic of long-term intimate relationships,
and furthermore that contemporary divorce law’s basic design is exactly the enforcement
regime the Constitution requires. Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot “Abolish Marriage”:
A Partial Defense of Legal Marriage, 90 IND. L.J. 1261, 1310 (2015) (arguing the first
theory); Gregg Strauss, The Positive Right to Marry, 102 VA. L. REV. 1691, 1739 (2016)
(arguing the second theory). Another scholar draws on Hegel to define marriage as a
“uniquely ethical bond” whose “transcendent unity of feeling” depends on “individuals’
particular commitment to each other,” “the state’s commitment to [them], and [their]
commitment to the state.” Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance:
Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1528, 1576 (1997);
see also Peter Nicolas, Fundamental Rights in a Post-Obergefell World, 27 YALE. J.L. &
FEMINISM 331, 360 (2016) (arguing that “States have the power never to extend the right to
its citizens in the first instance, but once they [do so], they cannot subsequently withdraw it”
without violating the Equal Protection Clause).
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to marry in the nearly two centuries before Loving. We will call this period the
classical age of American marriage jurisprudence. The word “classical” here refers
not to the era’s temporal and intellectual imbrications with the age of “Classical
Legal Thought,” but, more colloquially, to the longevity, ubiquity, traditionalism,
and relative coherence of the marital ideology that prevailed from the Revolutionary
War to the Sexual Revolution.9 Whatever other traits that ideology may share with
Classical Legal Thought, by far the most important, so far as this Article is
concerned, is “the very idea that marriage is anything—anything at all.”10
The classical ideology of marriage was rooted in natural law, deeply and
unabashedly. Often dubbed a “contract of natural law,”11 marriage as classically
conceived was an organic human relation “founded on the distinction of sex,”12
9

Duncan Kennedy associates Classical Legal Thought (“CLT”) most strongly with a
period that begins around 1850 and ends around either 1914 or 1935. Noting “a tendency to
identify” CLT “with ‘formalism,’ ‘deduction,’ or ‘conceptual jurisprudence,’” he says its
“most important” features were: (1) the idea that law emanates “either from private or from
public will, with the distinction between the two being of primary importance”; and (2) “the
public/private distinction as the central way of organizing legal rules.” See KENNEDY, supra
note 1, at 28; Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–
2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 21 (David
M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) [hereinafter Kennedy, Three Globalizations]. These
CLT hallmarks related in complex ways to contemporaneous jurisprudence on the family.
See Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 1,
71–74, 81 (using Kennedy’s periodization to describe “how . . . Domestic Relations emerged
as a distinct legal topic” defined against “the law of contract and . . . of the market”). What
the present Article calls the “classical” ideology of marriage preceded and survived CLT’s
heyday, but that ideology shared several habits of the CLT mindset: emphatic concern for
the rights-bearing individual; commitment to formal equality; normative ideas of “will [and]
fault”; and an aspiration to “synthesiz[e] . . . the positivist science of law [and] natural rights
constitutionalism.” Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra, at 20–22; KENNEDY, supra note
1, at 3.
10
Janet E. Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage (I): Status/Contract to the Marriage
System, 6 UNBOUND 1, 1–3 (2010) [hereinafter Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage] (calling
this idea “symptomatically classical” in the sense that it is characteristic of Classical Legal
Thought) (emphasis in original).
11
See, e.g., Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173, 176 (1860) (“[M]arriage is a civil contract.”);
In re Soeder’s Estate, 209 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ohio Prob. 1965); FRANK KEEZER, THE LAW OF
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 6–7 (1906); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 108 (1st ed. 1834) [hereinafter STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834)].
12
1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE,
OF SEPARATIONS WITHOUT DIVORCE, AND OF EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN ALL I SSUES;
EMBRACING ALSO PLEADING, PRACTICE, AND EVIDENCE IN DIVORCE CAUSES, WITH FORMS
§ 3 (4th ed. 1864) [hereinafter 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864)]. Bishop’s definition
appeared in multiple editions of Black’s Law Dictionary. See, e.g., Marriage, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891); Marriage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933); Marriage,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951); see also Sharon v. Sharon, 16 P. 345, 348 (Cal.
1888) (calling marriage an “association [] founded on the distinction of sex”); State v.
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supposedly “[t]he first difference which nature . . . established among persons.”13
Marriage on this understanding derived from sources—God, instinct, moral
necessity—higher than the positive law of any given people or place. As such,
marriage ranked high among “the natural rights of man.”14
The natural right to marry was a multifarious creature, neither wholly negative
nor wholly positive. It encompassed the relation’s essential features: conjugality and
contract, portability and permanence. Where the conjugal right to marry assured
matrimony’s unique and definitive prerogatives—namely, licit sex and legitimate
procreation—the contractual right to marry guaranteed autonomy at the institution’s
threshold.15 Individuals inherently possessed a right against involuntary marriage (in
other words, a right not to marry); a right to marry by mutual agreement, without
permission or formalities (what Americans came to call “common-law marriage”);
and, more contentiously, a right to marry the person of one’s choice.16 Finally,
wedded couples had a right to stay married.17 Natural law promised portability,
meaning that a marriage valid where contracted was valid everywhere; and it
promised permanence, meaning that the relation couldn’t be dissolved unless—
depending whom you asked—at least one of the spouses died, committed adultery,
was guilty of some other fault, or simply wished to part ways.18
Legal culture of the classical period saw a broad, generally stable consensus
around the natural—and Christian, and often markedly Protestant—ideology of
marriage. But the precepts of this higher law were expressed as moral and political
ideals, not constitutional imperatives. No doubt many provisions of positive family
regulation were deemed “agreeable to the order of nature” and were judicially
construed in that light.19 On occasion, the natural right to marry also served as a gapfiller or furnished a default rule. (It played this role, for instance, in the doctrine that
marriage is “a contract so completely of natural and moral law” that it could be
solemnized with literally global effect even in a place “where there are no
established laws,” as might happen between a man and woman “cast away on an

Adams, 78 S.W. 588, 589 (Mo. 1904) (same); Collins v. Hoag & Rollins, 238 N.W. 351, 354
(Neb. 1931) (same).
13
JOHN BOUVIER, INSTITUTES OF AMERICAN LAW 61 (1851).
14
James Wilson, Lectures on Law [1790–1792], in 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 316
(James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896).
15
See infra Part I, Section II.A., and Section II.B.
16
See infra Section II.B.
17
See infra Section II.C.
18
Id.
19
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 18 (1985) (quoting JESSE ROOT, REPORTS OF CASES
ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT AND SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS FROM JULY, A.D. 1789,
TO JUNE, A.D. 1793 xxvii (1898)).
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unknown island.”20) Yet it was not until the turn of the twentieth century, in the
heady atmosphere of Lochner-style judicial review,21 that the natural right to marry
began its slow, sporadic ascent into our constitutional pantheon.
Loving’s enforcement in 1967 of a “fundamental freedom” to marry took place
in a legal context still permeated with the ideology of natural marriage. Even at that
late date, the likeness between marriage’s natural- and positive-law forms remained
close enough, in abstract principle and juridical fact, that Loving’s “right to marry”
could pass as the constitutional incarnation of an ancient idea. But that resemblance,
already under considerable strain by the mid-1960s, went on to deteriorate with
breathtaking speed. True, nearly forty long years passed before Lawrence v. Texas
(2003) ratified a universal “liberty . . . in matters pertaining to sex”;22 in hindsight,
however, the game probably was up in 1972, when Eisenstadt v. Baird declared that
any right of married people to engage in contracepted intercourse “must be the same
for the unmarried.”23
Eisenstadt’s precise holding was sufficiently narrow, and the Court’s reasoning
sufficiently fractured, to obscure the decision’s radical implications.24 But canny
observers, mainly unhappy conservatives, saw where the wind was blowing. In
1976, Mary Ann Glendon remarked that the constitutional “ideologizing of the
freedom to marry” appeared to hit its stride “just when . . . legal distinctions between
the married and unmarried are being blurred or erased.”25 Three years earlier, John
Noonan had expressed bewilderment at “[h]ow quickly . . . the vital personal right
recognized in Loving”—that is, “the right to be immune to the legal disabilities of
the unmarried and to acquire . . . the unique legal privileges of heterosexual
monogamy”—was becoming “constitutionally obsolete.”26 Though partial in any
sense of the word, Noonan’s definition stands among the most incisive post-Loving

20

STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at § 122; Note, Tug-Boat
Marriages and the Lex Domicilii, 12 HARV. L. REV. 273, 274 (1898) [hereinafter Tug-Boat
Marriages].
21
See infra note 494.
22
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
23
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (extending Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
24
Three Justices joined William Brennan’s majority opinion. Justice Byron White,
joined by Justice Harry Blackmun, concurred separately. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438, 460
(White, J., concurring).
25
Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62
VA. L. REV. 663, 664–65 (1976); see also Homer H. Clark, Jr., The New Marriage, 12
WILLAMETTE L.J. 441, 445, 450 (1975) (describing judicial decisions “significantly reducing
the legal importance of marriage or . . . drastically altering its definition” and worrying that
same-sex marriage would upend “the most fundamental of all characteristics of marriage.”).
26
John T. Noonan, Jr., The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 255,
273 (1973) (emphasis added).
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descriptions of the marriage right’s pre-Loving content.27 To appreciate its truth is
not to endorse it. To acknowledge its demise is not to mourn it.28
***
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains in broad strokes how
participants in classical American legal culture understood the ideal of natural
marriage. Part II turns squarely to the natural right to marry. It describes each of the
right’s subsidiary guarantees—conjugality, contract, portability, and permanence—
and it documents how those entitlements were and were not inscribed in positive
law. Part III traces the right’s slow, spotty, and sometimes tentative introduction into
constitutional discourse in the first half of the twentieth century. Part IV discusses
the right’s apparent triumph in Loving and the subsequent collapse of its original
meanings. A concluding section summarizes the Article’s main descriptive claims
and flags some of their doctrinal and political implications. Above all, it affirms that
Loving’s “right to marry,” forged out of a bygone consensus about the fundamental
meaning of “marriage,” now hides a jurisprudential void that, a priori, we have no
cause to fill.

27

Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that
“not to discriminate” between fornication and sex within marriage “would entirely
misconceive” why marriage has a preferred constitutional status).
28
For some scholars, recognition that the marriage right’s foundations have crumbled
beneath it prompts (or at least predicates) valiant efforts to reconstruct it on new grounds.
See Nicolas, supra note 8, at 361 (arguing that, although “the negative . . . right to marry
disappeared when the Court decided Lawrence, . . . the Due Process Clause protects the right
of existing couples to retain their marriages, while the Equal Protection Clause guarantees
existing unmarried couples the right to enter such marriages on an equal basis with those
who . . . previously . . . exercise[d] the right”) (emphasis added); Strauss, supra note 8, at
1699 (recognizing that “the rights to procreate and form a family [formerly] entailed a right
to marriage” that became “obsolete” when those rights came to “receive independent
constitutional protection,” but positing a constitutional right to marry along the lines
described in note 8 above). Other scholars appear content to retire the right to marry entirely
now that “modern developments in constitutional law,” most importantly Lawrence v. Texas,
have “completely eroded” its “natural law justification.” Pull, supra note 7, at 75; see also
Tucker B. Culbertson, The End of Marriage, in LOVING V. VIRGINIA IN A POST-RACIAL
WORLD: RETHINKING RACE, SEX, AND MARRIAGE 253, 254–57 (Kevin Noble Maillard &
Rose Cuison Villazor eds., 2012) (proposing that “fundamental rights to sex, family, and the
other ends of marriage” more generously uphold Loving’s ideals of “liberty and equality”)
(emphasis added); Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 7, at 1399 (“[U]nder modern constitutional
principles, a right to enter marriage is no longer necessary to protect . . . liberty interests
associated with . . . sexual intimacy [and] child rearing.”).
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I. NATURAL MARRIAGE
Natural law, like marriage, is a concept with ancient roots and myriad, tangled
branches. Among the variants most influential on and in American legal culture prior
to the twentieth century, nearly all claimed a divine origin. “There is a law of nature,
or in more proper words, a law of God, the author of nature,” wrote John Quincy
Adams in 1842, and “[b]y this law . . . the human being comes into life, the child of
two parents, male and female, both of one species, but of different constitutions,
adapted to each other for union.”29 Nature’s rules on marriage transcended the
doctrines of particular faiths.30 In the context of American religious pluralism, what
Thomas Jefferson called “the law of nature and of nature’s God”31 tended to be
radically ecumenical—of “absolute, immutable, and . . . universal validity,”32 not
unlike the physical laws of the universe.33
Natural law’s theological meaning was the first of eight usages, notionally
distinct but rarely differentiated in practice, catalogued in Benjamin Fletcher
Wright’s enduring 1931 survey of the concept’s career in American legal and
political thought.34 His remaining definitions encompassed a diverse range of ideas:
“rational or reasonable . . . principles discovered out of the nature of things”; law
consistent with human nature; the law most “appropriate or useful” to human
29

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, THE SOCIAL COMPACT, EXEMPLIFIED IN THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 11 (1842); see also JOHN AUSTIN, THE
PROVINCE OF JUSTICE DETERMINED (1832) (noting that “the law of God” is “frequently
styled the law of nature, or natural law”); James Wilson, Lectures on Law [1790], in 1
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 498 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896) (“[T]his law, natural or
revealed, made for men or for nations, flows from the same divine source: it is the law of
God. . . .”); THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, OR, THE STATE THEORETICALLY
AND PRACTICALLY CONSIDERED 124–25 (1878) (describing natural law as “coeval with the
divine mind”) [hereinafter WOOLSEY, POLITICAL SCIENCE].
30
“In many civilized countries,” where marriage “has . . . the sanctions of religion
superadded, . . . [i]t becomes a religious, as well as a natural and civil contract.” STORY,
COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at § 108 (quoting Dalrymple v. Dalrymple
(1811) 161 Eng. Rep. 665, 669) (emphasis added).
31
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
32
EDWIN W. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE 333 (1982).
33
See Howard Schweber, The “Science” of Legal Science: The Model of the Natural
Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 421, 427
(1999); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *39–42 (comparing God’s “rules
. . . for the perpetual . . . motion” of “matter” to “certain immutable laws of human nature”);
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF LAW 112–13 (1870)
(subsuming within the “Law of Nature . . . those laws which govern the physical universe”
and “the characteristic qualities of mind or spirit as displayed in rational creatures”).
34
BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 1, 338
(1931) (observing natural law’s “indefinite” and “confused . . . mixture of . . . meanings” and
noting “numerous instances” in which “natural law has been given [multiple] meanings by
the same author, sometimes in the same statement.”).
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“happiness” and flourishing; law that is “just or equitable”; “ideal” as opposed to
“actual” law; “ordinal” rather than “conventional” law;35 and finally, anticipating
what would soon become standard judicial speech on the scope of substantive due
process, “laws and customs . . . so firmly established that they are clearly
fundamental.”36
Observe how forthrightly that last usage, equating “firmly established” with
“fundamental” norms, conflates is and ought. As the nineteenth century progressed,
American lawyers became increasingly hesitant to excavate moral truths from an
imagined prehistory (“the state of nature”)37 or to apprehend them through one or
another aspect of “the essential nature of man,”38 be it innate instinct or “right
reason.”39 Under the influence of “historical jurisprudence,” however, they could
still engage the natural-law tradition by seeking the “natural” in what was, in a deep
sense, “conventional.”40 From Hugo Grotius, the Dutch statesman and scholar
credited with founding international law on natural-law principles, they learned to
infer the jus naturale from the jus gentium—rules universally acknowledged by all,
“or at least the more civilized,” human societies;41 and following Edward Coke, the
preeminent jurist of Elizabethan and Jacobean England, they discerned the
predicates of natural justice in the primordial common law, source and safeguard of
the “immemorial rights of Englishmen.”42 The image of that age-old corpus
“mirroring what had existed in a prior state of nature” loomed large in American

35

Id. at 333–38, 342.
Id. at 335; see also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), the first of
many cases interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect
“principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.”
37
WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 333; see also Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights,
Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 926 (1993).
38
FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS 65 (1838).
39
See WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 7–8; see also R.H. HELMHOLZ, NATURAL LAW IN
COURT 2 (2015).
40
WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 338.
41
2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 23–24 (Francis W. Kelsey
trans., 1925); see also WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 7 (reporting that Grotius was “widely read
and utilized in [early] America”).
42
Roscoe Pound, The Revival of Natural Law, 17 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 287, 342, 344,
349 (1942) (describing the “transition” of natural rights’ “theoretical basis from natural law
to history” and noting American lawyers’ identification of common-law rights, “as
expounded by Coke,” with both “the natural rights of man” and “rights guaranteed under
constitutions”); see also Schweber, supra note 33, at 427 (agreeing with Pound that
Blackstone’s “substitution of the authority of custom for natural law” helped to “develop[]
the idea of historical jurisprudence”).
36
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legal consciousness,43 with some thinkers stressing how thoroughly “[t]he Christian
religion is part of our common law, . . . the very texture of which it is interwoven.”44
However much natural law in general may have “lost its hold on . . . most
lawyers” as the nineteenth century wore on,45 classical marriage jurisprudence
continuously and unapologetically reflected the full variety of natural-law
discourses that Wright came to identify in 1931. “Marriage was before human law,”
wrote the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1875, “and exists by higher and holier
authority—the Divine Order, which we call the law of nature.”46 Legal writers
described marriage as an institution “of divine origin,”47 “begun in the garden of
Eden,”48 “established by God himself,”49 who implanted the nuptial ideal as “a
principle in our nature.”50 Marriage was an imperative supported by reason, evident
upon “the most mature and thoughtful reflection,”51 yet knowable equally by

43

Morton Horwitz, Natural Law and Natural Rights, in LEGAL RIGHTS: HISTORICAL
AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 43–44 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996).
44
SIMON GREENLEAF, A DISCOURSE PRONOUNCED AT THE INAUGURATION OF THE
AUTHOR AS ROYALL PROFESSOR OF LAW IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY 24 (1834); see also
Goodrich v. Goodrich, 44 Ala. 670, 673 (1870) (“it has been said, by the highest authority,
that Christianity is a part of the common law”); Roscoe Pound, The Ideal Element in
American Judicial Decision, 45 HARV. L. REV. 136, 139 (1931) [hereinafter Pound, Ideal
Element] (discussing “historical warrant in the old English law books for saying that
Christianity was part of the common law”).
45
R. H. Helmholz, The Law of Nature and the Early History of Unenumerated Rights
in the United States, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 401, 402 (2007).
46
Campbell v. Campbell, 37 Wis. 206, 214 (1875); see also LEONARD SHELFOLD, THE
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 2 (1841) (defining marriage
“according to the primitive law of God and Nature”).
47
JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
AND EVIDENCE IN MATRIMONIAL SUITS § 31 (1st ed. 1852) [hereinafter BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852)]; see also Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (“The
constitution of the family organization . . . is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in
the nature of things.”).
48
EDWARD DEERING MANSFIELD, THE LEGAL RIGHTS, LIABILITIES AND DUTIES OF
WOMEN 235 (1845).
49
State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 402–03 (1871); see also JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 24 (1st ed. 1870) [hereinafter SCHOULER,
DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870)] (marriage was “instituted by God himself, and has its
foundation in the law of nature”).
50
Dickson v. Dickson’s Heirs, 9 Tenn. 110, 112 (1826); see also THEODORE D.
WOOLSEY, ESSAY ON DIVORCE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION 234 (1869) [hereinafter
WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION] (describing marriage “as a divine institution established
both in our nature and by positive precept”).
51
W.C. RODGERS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE § 2 (1899); see also
SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 8 (“Whether we consult
the facts of history or the inspirations of human reason, the family may justly be pronounced
the earliest of all social institutions . . . .”); BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra
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“instinct.”52 It existed, or would exist, “in the state of nature,” as John Locke had
claimed,53 and it was “as much contemplated in the common as in the divine law.”54
Marriage was jus gentium—“in the highest sense, a matter pertaining to the law of
nations,” “applicable in all places, to the entire race of man wherever man is found
on the earth.”55 As with natural-law talk more broadly, these sundry ways of
describing marriage tended to be voiced in combination, as if their differences could
only complement one another.56
Classical American jurists emphasized marriage’s antiquity, especially relative
to the advent of positive law,57 and they insisted with equal vigor that no civilization

note 47, at § 36 (discussing society’s “interest in [marriage] . . . according to the law of nature
and reason”).
52
1 JAMES SCHOULER & ARTHUR W. BLAKEMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 10 (6th ed. 1921)
[hereinafter 1 SCHOULER & BLAKEMORE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921)] (“the
fundamental rights and duties involved in this relation are recognized by something akin to
instinct, so as to require by no means an intellectual insight; intellect, in fact, impairing often
. . . the charm of the relation”); see also JOEL FOOTE BINGHAM, CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE 16
(1871) (marriage “depends on the Divine appointment of sexes [and] on the Divinely
implanted instincts of each”).
53
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 46 (Thomas P. Peardon ed. 1952)
(1689); see also STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at §108 (“It may exist
between two individuals of different sexes, although no third person existed in the world, as
happened in the case of the common ancestors of mankind.”).
54
Nichols v. Nichols, 48 S.W. 947, 954 (Mo. 1898).
55
1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at §§ 6, 167, 351 (“Its
source is the law of nature, whence it has flowed into . . . the general law of nations.”).
56
See, e.g., Wightman v. Wightman, 1 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 861, 861 (Ch. 1820) (explaining
that “the marriage of a lunatic” should be nullified “in the absence of any statutory
prohibition” no less than “a marriage between parent and child,” as both are “criminal and
void by the law of nature, . . . those fit and just rules of conduct which the Creator has
prescribed to man, . . . and which are to be ascertained from the deductions of right reason,
though they may be more . . . explicitly declared by divine revelation”); RODGERS, supra
note 51, at 1 (declaring that marriage was “ordained by the Creator,” has been “practiced and
sanctioned by all civilized people from the earliest times,” is “prompted by [a] natural
instinct,” and is affirmed by “mature and thoughtful reflection”); Wilson, supra note 14, at
316 (“Whether we consult the soundest deductions of reason, or resort to the best information
conveyed to us by history, or listed to the undoubted intelligence communicated in the holy
writ, we shall find, that to the institution of marriage the true origin of society must be
traced.”).
57
See, e.g., In re Estate of McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 30 P. 651, 653 (Wash. 1892)
(“[M]arriage is . . . anterior to all human law.”); SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed.
1870), supra note 49, at 7–8 (naming the marital family “the earliest of all social institutions”
and declaring that “the law of the domestic relations is . . . older than that of civil society”).
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could appear or survive without it.58 Marriage marked humankind’s “first step from
barbarism.”59 One chestnut called marriage “the parent, not the child of society.”60
Judges and scholars strained to convey matrimony’s necessity to the “peace,
happiness, and well-being” of persons and polities.61 In 1869, Theodore Dwight
Woolsey, President of Yale College, declared: “If any relations in human life can be
called natural and necessary, . . . [i]f any are of importance in themselves and for the
conservation of all others, . . . if any show the prevision of the divine mind,” it is
marriage.62 “But for this institution,” admonished a legal scholar of the same era,
“all that is valuable, all that is virtuous, all that is desirable in human existence,
would . . . fade[] away in . . . perilous darkness.”63 The warning was no less fervent
at century’s end. Forsake marriage, wrote William Champ Rodgers in 1899, and
“religion, government, morals, progress, enlightened learning, and domestic
happiness must all fall into most certain and inevitable decay.”64
Underlying professions of marriage’s centrality to the birth and survival of
civilized society was a particular understanding of what that relation—“in an
abstract and general shape,” as a moral category “really existing” prior to any civil
recognition—naturally entails.65 This understanding was so ubiquitously shared and
so far beyond question that it most often went without saying.66 But legal writers
found their words when circumstances required. In 1870, the Alabama Supreme
Court looked to Thomas Rutherford’s celebrated Institutes of Natural Law (1754)
for a definition that “all writers . . . seem to agree in”: “Marriage is a contract
between a man and woman, in which, by their mutual consent, each acquires a right
in the person of the other, for the purpose of their mutual happiness and for the
production and education of children.”67 For a pithier description, the Supreme Court
58

See State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 402–03 (1871) (explaining that “society could not
exist without the institution of marriage”); STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note
11, at § 108 (calling marriage “the very basis of the whole fabric of civilized society”).
59
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (quoting Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480,
485 (Me. 1863)).
60
KEEZER, supra note 11, at 5 (“Marriage . . . is the parent of civil society. . . .”);
SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 24; STORY,
COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at § 108.
61
Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 263, 275 (Ct. App. 1877) (calling marriage
“essential” to these ends); see also 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, JR., THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
556 (1st ed. 1853) (“The relation of marriage is founded upon the will of God, and the nature
of man; and it is the foundation of all moral improvement, and all true happiness.”).
62
WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra note 50, at 84.
63
1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 12.
64
RODGERS, supra note 51, at § 2.
65
WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra note 50, at 132.
66
Cf. THOMAS G. WEST, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 35
(2017) (“One right that all founders accepted, but which was rarely mentioned because no
one questioned it, is the natural right to marry.”).
67
Goodrich v. Goodrich, 44 Ala. 670, 674 (1870) (citing, in accord with this definition,
treatises by Joel Prentiss Bishop, James Kent, and John Bouvier); see also SHELFOLD, supra
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of Missouri relied in 1835 on Matthew Bacon’s New Abridgment of the Law (1768),
calling marriage “a compact between a man and a woman for the procreation and
education of children.”68 Joel Prentiss Bishop and James Schouler, authors of the
nineteenth century’s preeminent treatises on domestic relations, characterized
marriage in part by what it was not; crediting Lord Stowell’s famous opinion in the
Scottish case of Lindo v. Belisario (1795),69 Bishop explained:
a marriage . . . is not every carnal commerce; nor would it be so even in
the law of nature. . . . But when two persons agree to have that commerce
for the procreation and bringing up of children, and for . . . lasting
cohabitation,—that, in a state of nature, would be a marriage, and, in the
absence of all civil and religious institutions, might safely be presumed to
be . . . a marriage in the sight of god.70
The foregoing definitions attest to the two core features of natural marriage as
classically conceived: contract and conjugality. Regarding the contractual aspect, it
suffices for now to state very generally that it refers to the mutual consent by which
a marriage comes into being. “Conjugality” describes the relation’s substance, its
basic content.71 Revivified of late by debates over legal recognition of same-sex
unions and other nontraditional domestic relationships,72 the term “conjugality” is
note 46, at 2 (“From various learned authors, it may be inferred that marriage is, according
to the primitive law of God and Nature, . . . a solemn contract, whereby a man and a woman,
for their mutual benefit, and the procreation of children, engage to live in a kind and
affectionate manner.”). See generally Gary L. McDowell, The Limits of Natural Law:
Thomas Rutherforth and the American Legal Tradition, 37 AM. J. JURIS. 57, 59–61 (1992)
(commenting on American legal culture’s embrace of Rutherford (alternatively rendered as
“Rutherforth”), particularly in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries).
68
State ex rel. Gentry v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120, 151 (1835).
69
Lindo v. Belisario (1797) 161 Eng. Rep. 530 (HC). The listed author of Lindo, Sir
William Scott, is commonly known as Lord Stowell. See William Scott, Lord Stowell (1845–
1836), ROYAL BERKSHIRE HISTORY, http://www.berkshirehistory.com/bios/wscott_ls.html
[https://perma.cc/2FEW-3EU6] (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
70
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 68 (quoting Lord Stowell)
(emphasis in original); see also SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note
49, at 40–41; ALBERT J. FARRAH & JOHN W. DWYER, CASES ON THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND
WIFE 66 (1900).
71
“Marriage is the conjugal union of one man with one woman for life.” RANSOM H.
TYLER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF INFANCY, INCLUDING GUARDIANSHIP AND THE
CUSTODY OF INFANTS, AND THE LAW OF COVERTURE, EMBRACING DOWER MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE, AND THE STATUTORY POLICY OF THE SEVERAL STATES IN RESPECT TO HUSBAND
AND WIFE 805 (2d. ed. 1882).
72
See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718 (2013) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (defining the “‘conjugal’ view” of marriage as one that envisions “an intrinsically
opposite-sex institution . . . inextricably linked to procreation and biological kinship”); LAW
COMMISSION OF CANADA, BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE
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used here to mean the status or condition of matrimony as a supposedly organic
phenomenon, one closely related to cohabitation and parenthood but defined first
and foremost by morally permissible sexual relations and the possibility of
legitimate procreation.73
According to natural law, conjugal marriage was a “natural institution
proceeding necessarily from the organization and the condition of the sexes”;74 it
was “the state of existence ordained by the Creator[,] who . . . fashioned man and
woman expressly” for one another.75 “The universal sentiment of mankind,” wrote
Bishop, “accepts the fundamental doctrine of the law of marriage, that the sexes
should not associate promiscuously as prompted by mere animal instinct, but
[should] ‘pair off,’ . . . [like] the birds of the air.”76 Natural marriage “necessarily”
entailed sexual union;77 this was its “essence.”78 And there could be no sexual union
PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS 3, 34, 131 (2001) (nowhere defining “conjugal” explicitly
but using the word to describe a marital or “marriage-like” relationship—i.e., an
“enduring . . . sexual relationship” between adults); see also Perry Dane, Natural Law,
Equality, and Same-Sex Marriage, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 291, 307–08 (2014) (“[T]he argument
for heterosexual marriage as an institution of natural law . . . resemble[s] . . . arguments
already heard in the same-sex marriage debate.”).
73
This ranking of natural marriage’s most important features is elaborated in Section
II.A. below, but for an influential statement of the primacy of sexual intercourse, see
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 62 (Mary Gregor ed., 1996) (1785)
(“Sexual union in accordance with law is marriage (matrimonium), that is, the union of two
persons of different sexes for lifelong possession of each other’s sexual attributes.”).
74
Elisha Hurlbut, The Rights of Women, in ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR
POLITICAL GUARANTEES 144, 146 (E. P. Hurlbut ed., 1845).
75
RODGERS, supra note 51, at § 2; see also BINGHAM, supra note 52, at 16 (predicting
that marriage would exist “were there no civil law nor civil society” because “it depends on
the divine appointment of the sexes.”); WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra note 50, at
84 (referring to “the formation of the sexes for each other”).
76
1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE,
WITH THE EVIDENCE, PRACTICE, PLEADING, AND FORMS; ALSO OF SEPARATIONS WITHOUT
DIVORCE, AND OF THE EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN ALL ISSUES § 1 (6th ed. 1881) [hereinafter
1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (6th ed. 1881)]. This doctrine “proceed[ed] from the nature of
man, and voic[ed] the wisdom of God.” 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION AS TO THE LAW, EVIDENCE, PLEADING, PRACTICE,
FORMS AND THE EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN ALL ISSUES ON A NEW SYSTEM OF LEGAL
EXPOSITION § 7 (8th ed. 1891) [hereinafter 1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891)];
see also Lyannes v. Lyannes, 177 N.W. 683, 685 (Wis. 1920) (explaining that marriage
provides for “the proper mating of the male and female of the human race”).
77
See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that “the
intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the
institution of marriage”); Grigsby v. Reib, 153 S.W. 1124, 1129 (Tex. 1913) (stating that
“marriage was not originated by human law” and that a marriage without sexual cohabitation
“is in defiance of the commands of God”).
78
KEEZER, supra note 11, at 5; see also Millar v. Millar, 167 P. 394, 396 (Cal. 1917)
(calling sexual intercourse “essential to the very existence of the marriage relation,” an
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without marriage, “the only . . . relation by which Providence has permitted the
continuance of human life.”79
Procreation was thus “the first purpose of matrimony, by the laws of nature and
society.”80 On this point practically all authors agreed. They cast marital procreation
as “a consummation of the Divine command to ‘multiply and replenish the earth,’”81
and marriage itself as “a divine institution . . . ordained for obtaining a legitimate
increase of the human family.”82 That word “legitimate” signals other personal and
social advantages of marriage, most importantly “the proper nurture . . . of
offspring”83 and the familial descent of property—another natural “institution,”
which, “together with . . . matrimony,” secured “the only firm foundation of all
civilization.”84 But the reproduction of individuals and families was not the only
“obligation” of marital status “fixed by society in accordance with the principles of natural
law”); TYLER, supra note 71, at 822 (“Without sexual intercourse, the ends of marriage, the
procreation of children, and the pleasures and enjoyment of matrimony, cannot be
attained.”).
79
2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 76 (John M. Gould ed., 14th ed.
1896) [hereinafter 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (14th ed. 1896)]; see also Raymond v.
Raymond, 79 A. 430, 431 (N.J. Ch. 1909) (“The human race was created male and female
with the manifest purpose of perpetuating the race. Marriage without sexual intercourse
utterly defeats its purpose, as sexual intercourse except in the marital relation is contrary to
divine law.”).
80
Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 87, 103 (1859); see also LOCKE, supra note 53, at 44
(“Conjugal society . . . consist[s] chiefly in such a communion and right in one another’s
bodies as is necessary to its chief end, procreation.”).
81
RODGERS, supra note 51, at § 2; see also BOUVIER, supra note 13, at 102 (“The end
of marriage is the procreation of children and the propagation of the species.”).
82
JOHN H. LIVINGSTON, A DISSERTATION ON THE MARRIAGE OF A MAN WITH HIS
SISTER IN LAW 2 (1816); see also Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100, 108 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
1942) (“The procreation of offspring under the natural law being the object of marriage, its
permanency is the foundation of the social order.”).
83
1 SCHOULER & BLAKEMORE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921), supra note 52, at
§ 10.
84
LIEBER, supra note 38, at 135. For a famous but somewhat unconventional statement
of marriage’s close connection to parenthood, see LOCKE, supra note 53, at 44–45:
[T]he end of conjunction between male and female being not barely procreation
but the continuation of the species, this conjunction . . . ought to last . . . so long
as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones . . . by those that
got them till they are able to . . . provide for themselves.
For echoes of Lieber’s designation of civilization’s two most necessary institutions, see
WILLIAM SLADE, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY AND THE SLAVE TRADE WITHIN THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA 17 (1837) (arguing that slavery’s demise in Vermont “has not dissolved the
natural relations,” for “[n]one who deserve to be named think of . . . abolishing the marriage
institution, or of annulling the laws which protect the acquisition, enjoyment, and inheritance
of property”); J.L. Stocks, Preface to PASCHAL LARKIN, PROPERTY IN THE EIGHTEENTH
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reason for confining sex to marriage. Equally important was a decent “satisfaction
of [humankind’s] most powerful passion.”85 “[T]he avoiding of fornication” was a
vital moral norm in its own right.86 Thus the second of marriage’s “principal ends”
was “a lawful indulgence of the passions to prevent licentiousness.”87
Contract and conjugality weren’t natural marriage’s only attributes, but they
stood among a handful that commanded practically unanimous agreement.88 Aside
from rights of portability and permanence discussed below,89 only the rule of
endogamy—the incest taboo—saw comparable consensus.90 On other questions,
large and small, opinions differed. Many American jurists assumed wifely
“subjugation” to be an aspect of “the conjugal union in . . . a state of nature,”91 but
other authorities, following Locke and his comparably influential contemporary
Samuel von Pufendorf,92 denied that “absolute sovereignty . . . naturally belonged to
the husband” or was “necessary to . . . conjugal society.”93 A few jurists even

CENTURY, at v (1930) (“Property exists, like marriage and the family, antecedently to
government, and belongs to the state of nature on which government is superimposed. . . .”).
85
Félix Esquirou de Parieu, Marriage, in 2 CYCLOPÆDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND OF THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 810, 810
(John J. Lalor ed., 1883).
86
1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76 at § 760; see also Dane,
supra note 72, at 307 (emphasizing that, “given the[] sexual natures” of “[h]eterosexual men
and women,” the natural-law “conception of marriage does not see it as merely the engine
for reproduction.”).
87
Grover v. Zook, 87 P. 638, 641 (Wash. 1906).
88
How striking it is to find the ironic, iconoclastic Karl Llewellyn espousing “the old
truth” that “[m]arriage . . . is built on the fact that there are two sexes, and attraction between
them, and that sexual union has results. On the fact that . . . children are not kittens, and need
long years before they come to handling their own lives.” K.N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law
of Divorce: I, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1932).
89
See infra Sections II.C and II.D.
90
Although incest was generally abhorred, there was widespread uncertainty about the
degree of familial relation “at which the laws of nature have ceased to discountenance the
union.” 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 71 (1st ed. 1827) [hereinafter 2
KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827)]; see also 2 CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON
DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 166 (Nugent trans., A. Donaldson & J. Reid 3d ed.
1762) (1750) (“With regard to the prohibition of marriage between relations, it is a thing
extremely delicate to fix exactly the point at which the laws of nature stop and where the
civil laws begin.”).
91
1 SCHOULER & BLAKEMORE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921), supra note 52, at
§ 10 (suggesting that coverture was a “divine” rather than “human” element of the marriage
contract); see also BOUVIER, supra note 13, at 62 (“By the natural law, the superior control
in a state of marriage belongs to the man rather than the woman.”).
92
See WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 7 (identifying Pufendorf’s De Jure Naturae et
Gentium among “the most important” contributions to “American theories of natural law”).
93
LOCKE, supra note 53, at 46–47; SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE
AND NATIONS 448–49 (L. Lichfield trans., 2d ed. 1710) (1672). In an antebellum contest over
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protested that women’s subordination in marriage was in certain respects contrary
to natural law.94 As to the ideal of lifelong union, some authors argued that nature
imposed an absolute prohibition of divorce,95 others that adultery and perhaps
abandonment gave aggrieved spouses a natural right to dissolution,96 and still others
that marriages contracted in a state of nature could be disbanded at any time for any
reason.97 Some claimed that “miscegenation” bans followed natural law; others said
they violated it.98 Even polygamy, generally deemed “contrary to the spirit of
Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in the Western

which state’s coverture rules dictated ownership of a married woman’s slave, the North
Carolina Supreme Court noted that marriage,
[o]f itself, . . . gives no property to, nor takes any away from, either of the parties:
what alteration it shall make between the parties, in the dominion of the one, or
the subjection of the other, . . . are subjects of municipal regulation. It is the law,
and not the marriage, which confers rights and duties in the relation; if it were the
marriage, the rights and duties would be natural, and should be alike everywhere.
Moye v. May, 54 N.C. 84, 86 (1853) (emphasis in original); see also Allen v. Miles, 36 Miss.
640, 647–48 (1859) (criticizing the English common law’s “idea that it was against natural
right, that [married women] should own property in their own right”).
94
NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 117–19 (1982) (describing Thomas Herttell’s belief that
“the common law deprived wives of their natural, inalienable right to property”).
95
See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 22 Tex. 237, 239 (1858) (“the law of nature requires that
the [marriage] contract should be perpetual”).
96
WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra note 50, at 101 (doubting whether natural
law permits “any . . . ground for divorce” but adultery); 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, OF SEPARATIONS WITHOUT
DIVORCE, AND OF EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN ALL ISSUES; EMBRACING ALSO PLEADING,
PRACTICE, AND EVIDENCE IN DIVORCE CAUSES, WITH FORMS § 167 (4th ed. 1864)
(advocating divorce where “one of the parties . . . is permanently out of the country,” because
such a marriage is “not matrimony, as viewed by the law of nature”).
97
Johnson v. Johnson’s Administrator, 30 Mo. 72, 88 (1860) (“It can hardly be said
that the power of divorce, in one or both of the parties to the contract, at his or her pleasure,
is inconsistent with the law of nature.”); see also BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852),
supra note 47, at § 720 n.3 (rejecting as a “fallacy” the notion that “the dissolubility or
indissolubility of the marriage is an essential part of the contract,” and thus a matter “of
universal obligation,” rather than a locally determined “incident to the status of husband and
wife”) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BURGE, COMMENTARIES ON COLONIAL AND FOREIGN LAWS 680–
95 (1838)).
98
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 409 (1857) (stating that “intermarriages between
white persons and negroes or mulattoes were regarded as unnatural and immoral” by the
legislators who voted to proscribe them); see also infra notes 388–392 and accompanying
text (describing a range of views on interracial marriage’s status under natural law).
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world,”99 was not to all minds unnatural. In classical America no less than in
Pufendorf’s day, “[w]hether or not this Practice be repugnant to the Law of Nature,
[was] a Point not fully settled amongst the Learn’d.”100 Some authors unequivocally
deemed plural marriage unnatural;101 some considered it simply “a legal, not a
natural, disability”;102 some asserted that having multiple husbands, but not multiple
wives, is “intrinsically evil” and “can in no way be reconciled with natural law”;103
and some were ambivalent,104 as Aquinas had been in concluding that “plurality of
wives is in a way against the law of nature, and in a way not against it.”105 Still more
idiosyncratic claims about natural marriage touched on such diverse subjects as

99
Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1, 49 (1890).
100
PUFENDORF, supra note 93, at 455.
101
WOOLSEY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, supra note 29, at 95–96 (calling polygamy “contrary
to nature and an abuse of nature” but acknowledging that, “in all the races of men, except
the Indo-European, . . . [it] has been allowed and practiced from time immemorial.”).
102
MANSFIELD, supra note 48, at 240. There was precedent for this view in 1 HUGO
GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS 196 (Fancis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (scoffing at “those
who . . . labour in the effort to prove that things which are forbidden by the Gospel are not
permissible by the law of nature, as concubinage, divorce, and polygamy.”).
103
JOSEPH J. C. PETROVITS, THE NEW CHURCH LAW ON MATRIMONY 17–19 (1921).
104
Avoiding direct reference to natural law, classical writers on polygamy often relied
instead on the universal “condemnation of all Christendom.” BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st
ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 201; see also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890)
(“Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries. . . .”);
SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 33 (“Polygamy, or
bigamy as it is often termed—since the common law of England could scarcely conceive of
such conjunctions carried beyond a double marriage—is discarded by all Christian
communities.”); STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at § 25 (naming
polygamy among the “institutions . . . adapted to heathen nations” but “totally repugnant to
. . . those which embrace Christianity.”). Striking something of a middle course, courts
regularly referred to “the law of nature, as generally recognized in Christian countries,” to
support departures from the rule of lex loci contractus in cases involving polygamous
marriages valid where celebrated. See, e.g., Wilson v. Cook, 100 N.E. 222, 222 (Ill. 1912);
Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305, 306 (Tenn. 1889); Heflinger v. Heflinger, 118 S.E. 316, 320
(Va. 1923).
105
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE “SUMMA THEOLOGICA” OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,
THIRD PART 331 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province, trans., 1922) (1265–74)
(attempting to reconcile Christian morality with the domestic lives of Abraham, Isaac, and
Jacob).

88

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

spousal support and maintenance,106 doctrines governing marital jurisdiction,107 and
criminal law’s leniency toward men who answer wifely infidelity with homicide.108
Discussion of natural marriage was rarely pursued for its own sake. The “higher
law” of nature was at once a foundation and an aspiration for practical governance.109
According to John Bouvier’s popular survey of American jurisprudence, “marriage
owes its institution to the law of nature, and its perfection to the municipal or civil
law.”110 While it was no secret that “the essential character of the relation of husband
and wife, as determined by the law of nature,” could be “perverted” or
“confused . . . by the positive law,”111 classical jurists generally believed that
“legislation [governing marriage] is ordinarily in accord with the notion of the true
relation.”112
Faith that “positive law . . . enforces the mandates of the law of nature, and
develops rather than creates a system,” was hardly confined to the field of domestic
relations,113 but in the United States a distinctly Protestant theology of marriage lent
this belief special force and meaning.114 As Joseph Story explained in 1834, whereas
106
See, e.g., McClanahan v. Hawkins, 367 P.2d 196, 198 (Ariz. 1961) (“[I]t is generally
agreed that alimony . . . provide[s] for the maintenance and support of the wife and is founded
on the natural and legal duty which marriage imposes. . . .”); Campbell v. Campbell, 37 Wis.
206, 213–15 (1875) (“Judgment of divorce can sever the legal bond of marriage, but it cannot
undo the natural relation . . . and consequent obligation [of] . . . support from the
husband. . . .”).
107
See, e.g., SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 9 (“The
domicile of the wife follows that of the husband; the domicile of the infant may be changed
by the parent. Thus does the law of domicile conform to the law of nature.”); JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 110 (3d ed., 1846) [hereinafter STORY,
COMMENTARIES (3d ed. 1846)] (noting that “every civilized country” locates a marriage’s
“rights, duties, and obligations” in “the law of the domicil”).
108
Howard v. Howard, 51 N.C. 235, 237 (1858) (crediting “nature” as the “origin” of
the doctrine that a husband is guilty of manslaughter, not murder, if he discovers another
man “in the act of adultery with his wife, and instantly kills him”); see also infra note 151
(discussing nature’s provision for self-help in such circumstances).
109
“The traditional view of natural law is that it is a body of immutable rules superior
to positive law. It is ideal law since it consists of the highest principles of morality.” A.G.
Chloros, What Is Natural Law?, 21 MOD. L. REV. 609, 609 (1958).
110
BOUVIER, supra note 13, at 101; see also 1 SCHOULER & BLAKEMORE, DOMESTIC
RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921), supra note 52, at § 13 (“[T]he rights and obligations of [marriage]
are fixed by society, in accordance with principles of natural law.”).
111
Mathewson v. Mathewson, 63 A. 285, 286 (Conn. 1906).
112
Id.
113
SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 5.
114
To stress the especially Protestant character of classical ideas about the
complementarity of natural- and positive-law marriage is not to deny comparable beliefs in
other religions, including Roman Catholicism. See, e.g., Brendan F. Brown, The Natural
Law, the Marriage Bond, and Divorce, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 93 (1955) (“Natural law
sets the minimum requirements of a juridical institution, authorizing Church and State to
establish additional reasonable requirements in the light of specific social conditions of the
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Catholics “consider marriage as a sacrament . . . governed by the Divine law[,] . . .
Protestants . . . have considered it mainly as a civil institution, . . . subject to the
legislative authority.”115 This did not mean that Protestantism’s proliferating
denominations renounced belief in matrimony as a “holy estate.”116 Quite the
opposite. As one treatise put it in 1845, “what the natural law has founded and the
revealed law confirmed, the law of society . . . enforces.”117 Marriage on this view
“was . . . to be administered by . . . civil authorities who had been called as God’s
vice-regents.”118 Far from rejecting the natural law of marriage, this allocation of
responsibility was premised partly on its universality, its manifest transcendence of
religious difference. 119 Civil control was also justified by moral necessity. Marriage
“being essential to the peace, . . . harmony, . . . virtues and improvements of civil
society”—to sexual continence and “the purity of families” above all—its
permissions and prohibitions were best entrusted to a power that could enforce them
against all citizens, not just believers, in this world rather than the next.120
Not coincidentally, it was “only in the light of a civil institution” that American
law claimed to view marriage.121 This was no mere pretense, notwithstanding
constant reference to Christian morality in judicial and scholarly disquisitions on the
time and place.”). But see FAY BOTHAM, ALMIGHTY GOD CREATED THE RACES 70, 72 (2009)
(contrasting, in the context of American disputes over interracial marriage, a typically
Catholic emphasis on the moral force of natural law’s right to marry with the commitment
to civil control that “exemplified the traditional Protestant position”).
115
STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at § 209.
116
CHURCH OF ENGLAND, THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER: THE TEXTS OF 1549, 1559,
AND 1662, 64–65, 434, 436 (Brian Cummings ed., 2011). On the Protestant invention of
marriage as an institution subject to “regulation . . . by the secular political community,” see
MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY L AW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY
IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 26, 30–34 (1989).
117
An 1845 survey of American women’s legal condition found it “proper . . . to recite
a few of the leading principles of Scripture in regard to the duties of husbands and wives, in
order that we may observe hereafter, how far the law of man has grown out of, and been
made in conformity to that of God.” MANSFIELD, supra note 48, at 261–62, 312 (explaining
that, “in Christian countries, human laws . . . may indeed exist without, but not in opposition
to,” God’s law).
118
JOHN WITTE, LAW AND PROTESTANTISM 253 (2002).
119
“That the children of this world, distinctly from the followers of Christ, should
marry, is quite natural. And this shows . . . that it is a civil right and a civil institution, properly
belonging to the citizens of the world, and therefore the privilege of every man who chooses
to use it.” JOHN DUNLAVY, THE MANIFESTO, OR A DECLARATION OF THE DOCTRINE AND
PRACTICE OF THE CHURCH OF CHRIST 317 (1818).
120
BINGHAM, supra note 52, at 14–15, 18–20, n.10 (“[A] matter . . . of an importance
so immense, . . . pervading to every fibre of human rights and happiness, were a thing
impossible to be ignored by the civil law.”).
121
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 31 (emphasis added).
“To distinguish . . . marriage as the law views it from marriage as a religious rite, the courts
and text-writers almost uniformly speak of and describe it as . . . a ‘civil contract.’” Id.
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subject.122 Religious and natural-law tenets rarely (if ever) provided the sole grounds
of decision in matrimonial cases.123 And if, as a rule, classical jurists frowned upon
marital regulation contrary to ecclesiastical teaching, they never questioned its legal
efficacy. It was black-letter law that secular government possessed complete control
over the marital institution. Indeed, Protestantism’s principle of divine delegation
echoed in the classical period’s most important constitutional word on marriage:
“the doctrine of status,” which held that “marriage being a status and in its nature
semi-public, the legislative power over it is nearly, perhaps absolutely,
omnipotent.”124 In some of its most important applications, this doctrine was the
mortal enemy of the natural right to marry, to which we now turn.
II. “A THING OF NATURAL RIGHT”
Classical American jurists described marriage as “a thing of natural right,”125
“one of the natural rights of human nature,”126 a “right of which each individual is
equally possessed,”127 “a natural and civil right pertaining to all persons,”128 a “right

122

“Mid-nineteenth-century judges and other public spokesmen had hardly been able
to speak of marriage without mentioning Christian morality.” NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS
197 (2000).
123
Though theoretically consonant with disestablishment principles, this forbearance
was sometimes facilitated in practice by Christianity’s supposed absorption into English
common law. See, e.g., Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343, 347–50 (N.Y. Ch. 1820)
(“The principles of canonical jurisprudence, and the rules of the common law, are the
same. . . . Prohibitions of the natural law . . . become rules of the common law, . . . sanctioned
by immemorial usage, and, as such, are clearly binding.”).
124
1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at § 824. The phrase
“doctrine of status” refers to the idea that a state has full “sovereign power to regulate the
status of its own domiciled subjects” and therefore has full power to regulate marriage. See
Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 166 (1901); id. at 175 (Peckham, J., dissenting); see also
infra notes 350–352, 354, 484.
125
1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 13.
126
Overseers of the Poor of the Town of Newbury v. Overseers of the Poor of the Town
of Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151, 159 (1829); see also United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. 525, 530
(1854) (quoting appellants’ argument that “Indians were human beings entitled to the rights
of humanity, . . . including the rights of marriage and descent”); Hurlbut, supra note 74, at
147 (counting marriage among “the rights of humanity”).
127
THOMAS HERTTELL, REMARKS COMPRISING IN SUBSTANCE JUDGE HERTTELL’S
ARGUMENT IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, IN THE SESSION OF
1837 29 (1839).
128
Ford v. State, 53 Ala. 150 (1875).
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of personality,”129 and so on.130 As Joel Prentiss Bishop explained, “all persons are
naturally entitled” to marry because marriage “involves the most valued interests of
every class” and “awakens the thoughts and engages the care of nearly every
individual.”131 This truth, he said, was “recognized in all countries, in all ages,
among all people, all religions, all philosophies.”132
Perhaps because the natural right to marry was thought to be eternally and
ubiquitously accepted, classical jurists never bothered to give a full account of it.
None so much as observed that, by their own scattered descriptions, this singular,
undifferentiated “right to marry” consisted of several distinct attributes: conjugality,
contract, portability, and permanence. To agree to become husband and wife
(contract) was to enter an exclusively sexual and ideally procreative relationship
(conjugality) that was both entitled to recognition everywhere (portability) and
immune from dissolution without cause (permanence). The natural right to marry
protected this unity. The following sections explain why it did so and how its
protections fared in positive law before Loving.
A. The Conjugal Right to Marry
Family ties between slaves occasioned some of the classical period’s most
poignant allusions to the conjugal right to marry. Nineteenth-century lawyers took
for granted that enslavement was an absolute bar to civil matrimony, but most
believed that slaves were nonetheless capable of “natural marriage,”133 or what
President Abraham Lincoln described in 1864 as marriage “in fact.”134 During
129
Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100, 105 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1942) (elsewhere describing
marriage as a “natural right . . . not created by law”); see also Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The
Conceptual Transformation of Moral Rights, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 74 (2007)
(characterizing “rights of personality” as those whose “objects . . . are . . . so closely
connected to the individual that [they] cannot be freely alienated, unlike property rights and
contractual rights”) (citing 1 LOUIS JOSSERAND, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL POSITIF FRANÇAIS
74–75 (2d. ed. 1932)).
130
Courtright v. Courtright, 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 413, 413 (Com. Pl. 1891) (“The right
to marry is a natural one, recognized and regulated by the laws of all Christian countries.”);
Cumby v. Garland, 25 S.W. 673, 675 (Tex. 1894) (“Marriage existed before statutes; it is of
natural right. . . .”); BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 719 (calling
marriage “a thing . . . of universal private right”).
131
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at v; 1 BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 13; see also SCHOULER, DOMESTIC
RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 9 (declaring the marital bond of “man and
woman” to be “for all classes and conditions,” with “neither rank, wealth, nor social
influence weigh[ing] heavily in the scales.”).
132
1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 351.
133
Davenport v. Caldwell, 10 S.C. 317, 338 (1878).
134
Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to Senator Charles Sumner (May 19, 1864)
(emphasis in original) (urging Congress to make available to “widows . . . of colored soldiers
who fall in our service” the same “provisions made the widows . . . of white soldiers”),
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Reconstruction, a number of state legislatures adopted procedures for regularizing
slaves’ “quasi marriages” and set evidentiary standards for “recogniz[ing] as a legal
relation that which the parties had constituted a natural one.”135 Pursuant to these
measures, proof that a couple had “cohabitated” or otherwise “associated as husband
and wife” transformed thousands of “de facto” spouses into lawfully wedded
couples—usually voluntarily, sometimes not—and rescued tens of thousands of
“offspring [from] the disgrace of bastardy.”136
“The unhappy condition” of servitude, declared the Alabama Supreme Court in
1870, may have kept slaves’ “marriages from being perfect in the . . . legal sense,”
but it did not and could not extinguish their “natural right” to marry.137 Slaves had
exercised this right, explained the Texas Supreme Court three years later, through a
“sort of contubernium”—an “observance of the matrimonial condition” that often
“resulted in procreation of families” and sometimes incorporated “a certain degree
of continence.”138 Emancipation made these facts of slaves’ family lives newly
salient, not newly visible.139 They were discernable even in an atmosphere congested
reproduced in Roy P. Basler, “And for His Widow and His Orphan,” 27 Q. J. LIB. CONG.
290 (1970).
135
State v. Harris, 63 N.C. 1, 5 (1868); see also TERA W. HUNTER, BOUND IN
WEDLOCK: SLAVE AND FREE BLACK MARRIAGE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 174 (2017)
(quoting Rep. Reverdy Johnson’s 1864 description of slaves who had “lived together but
were never man and wife except in the eye of Heaven.”). Legislators also saw to the
legitimation of children born of such marriages. A Louisiana statute, for example, provided
that
natural fathers and mothers shall have power to legitimate their natural
children . . . provided, that there existed at the time of the conception of such
children no other legal impediments to the intermarriage of their natural father
and mother, except those resulting from color or the institution of slavery.
Marionneaux v. Dupuy, 19 So. 466, 467 (La. 1896).
136
Davenport v. Caldwell, 10 S.C. 317, 337, 344 (1878); KATHERINE FRANKE,
WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY 43 (2015). “Although the process of
regularizing slave marriages began during the Civil War, tens of thousands of marriage
certificates were drawn up in a short period of time soon after.” HUNTER, supra note 135, at
5.
137
Stikes v. Swanson, 44 Ala. 633, 636 (1870).
138
Honey v. Clark, 37 Tex. 686, 708 (1873) (acknowledging that “[t]he laws of slavery
did not forbid the coupling together of man and woman in this manner.”). “Contubernium”
was a doctrine of ancient Roman law that gave retroactive civil effect to the de facto
marriages of emancipated slaves. See ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF
ROMAN LAW 415 (1953) (defining contubernium as a “permanent, marriage-like union
between slaves”).
139
Prior to the Civil War, “leading jurists distinguished between ‘natural law’ and ‘civil
law,’ . . . [and] recognized that slaves were compelled by human impulses, as old as Adam
and Eve, to mate, to procreate, and to form marital bonds.” Significantly, antebellum judges
“typically used the word ‘marriage’” to describe these bonds, sometimes using formulations
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with racist accounts of slaves’ supposedly inferior capacity for virtue.140 Not long
before the Civil War, in a ruling that mitigated to manslaughter a slave’s fatal attack
on the lover of his de facto wife, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed that
“there is in moral contemplation, and in the nature of man, a wide distinction
between the cohabitation of slaves ‘as man and wife’ and indiscriminate sexual
intercourse; and this is recognized among slaves, for as a general rule, they respect
the exclusive rights of fellow slaves who are married.”141
As the preceding descriptions of slave marriages suggest, sex and procreation,
the main elements of marital conjugality, were in turn the definitive privileges of the
conjugal right to marry. Sexual intercourse—the relation’s sine qua non, its
“distinguishing feature”—was unquestionably the right’s most essential attribute.142
An entitlement to procreate both justified the physical union of spouses and followed
from it. By contrast, parenthood and cohabitation were not entitlements belonging
specifically to natural marriage, however strongly they were associated with it.
Parenthood was ideally but not inevitably the province of married couples. Rights to
the custody and control of children traveled with parental obligations—duties of care
and support that natural law (unlike a good deal of positive law) imposed on
procreators regardless of marital status.143 As for “cohabitation” (a constant
reference point in postbellum appraisals of freedmen’s antebellum family lives),144
the dictates of natural law depended on the particular usage at issue. In the bare,
literal sense of living together, “cohabitation” was both an expectation and a right
of natural marriage, but not exclusively so; a man and his wife were hardly the only
combination of individuals who were permitted or indeed entitled to dwell under a
single roof. And in its more metaphorical sense, “cohabitation” was practically
redundant with—and, in effect, a euphemism for—conjugality’s first and most
important prerogative: sexual intercourse.145

like “quasi marriage” and “marriage de facto” to distinguish them from civil marriages.
HUNTER, supra note 135, at 76–77.
140
Id. at 188 (highlighting the contradiction between “assertions that slaves were
immoral and incapable of handling the prerequisites of Christian marriage” and observations
that “slaves formed meaningful conjugal bonds witnessed by and affirmed before God.”).
141
Howard v. Howard, 51 N.C. 235, 237 (1858).
142
Williams v. Williams, 99 S.W. 42, 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1906).
143
See infra notes 186–197 and accompanying text.
144
See, e.g., Washington v. Washington, 69 Ala. 281, 283, 284, 285 (1881); Gregley v.
Jackson, 38 Ark. 487, 490, 493 (1882); Anderson v. Smith, 2 Mackey 275, 275 (D.C. 1883);
Daniel v. Sams, 17 Fla. 487, 492, 496, 497 (1880); United States v. Route, 33 F. 246, 247
(E.D. Mo. 1887); Woodard v. Blue, 9 S.E. 492, 492–94 (N.C. 1889); Baity v. Cranfill, 91
N.C. 293, 299 (1884); Livingston v. Williams, 13 S.W. 173, 173–74 (Tex. 1890); Smith v.
Perry, 80 Va. 563, 565–66 (1885).
145
See infra notes 198–212 and accompanying text.
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1. Sex and Procreation
Marital conjugality—strictly speaking, a redundancy—was a matter of natural
duty as well as natural right. A duty of sexual fidelity was written into the very
definition of marriage as a carnal union between two persons “to the exclusion of all
others.”146 The fundamental promise of “constancy, a virtue demanded by all moral
systems and purer religions,”147 gave each spouse “the right that the other shall be
continent.”148 A 1904 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court called this “a right of the
highest kind, upon . . . which the whole social order rests,”149 and from it a number
of subsidiary rules could be inferred. As Justice Joseph Story wrote in 1836, “[i]f
marriage be an institution derived from the law of nature, then, whatever has a
natural tendency to discourage it, or to destroy its value, is by the same law
prohibited. Hence we may deduce the criminality of fornication, . . . adultery,
seduction, and other lewdness.”150 This web of penal regulation indicates a
conspicuously positive aspect of the natural right to marry: an obligation on the state
to deter sexual infidelity, lest a jealous husband “be left to his natural remedies.”151
The natural-law complement of sexual fidelity was sexual access. For much of
Western history, the expression “conjugal right” referred precisely to “the natural
rights of . . . husband and wife to each other’s person.”152 The concept harked back
to St. Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians, which, “echoing Mosaic and natural law

146

Riddle v. Riddle, 72 P. 1081, 1084 (Utah 1903). Minus the word “two,” this principle
was equally important to conceptions of natural law that permitted polygamy (never
polyandry). See 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (6th ed. 1881), supra note 76, at § 1 (“Even where
polygamy is tolerated, fidelity to and among the family of wives is enjoined, the same as is
the more restricted fidelity in monogamy.”).
147
LIEBER, supra note 38, at 63.
148
State ex rel. Gentry v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120, 181 (1835) (citing 1 THOMAS RUTHERFORD,
INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 314 (1756)).
149
Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 484 (1904).
150
Joseph Story, Natural Law (1836), in JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 313, 316 (James McClellan ed., 1971) [hereinafter Story, Natural Law].
151
Hurlbut, supra note 74, at 129–32 (suggesting that, in the absence of “a due measure
of [public] protection” of marital fidelity, the state has no “right to molest [an] individual
who resorts to self-redress” when his spouse has been unfaithful). Where legal deterrence of
wives’ inconstancy was weak or unavailable, natural law was said to permit a husband “to
take the law into his hands” by killing his wife’s seducer. Hendrik Hartog, Lawyering,
Husbands’ Rights, and the Unwritten Law, 84 J. AM. HIST. 79, 88 (1997) (quoting a defense
attorney who in 1870 called husbands’ right to kill in such circumstances “perfect under
Divine law”).
152
HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 238 (Thomas R. Hanley trans., 1949) (1936). For discussions of
the idea’s development, see Charles Reid, The Conjugal Debt, in WOMEN AND GENDER IN
MEDIEVAL EUROPE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 164 (Margaret Schaus ed., 2006), and Elizabeth M.
Makowski, The Conjugal Debt and Medieval Canon Law, 3 J. MEDIEVAL HIST. 99 (1977).
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precedents,”153 admonished a man to “give to his wife her conjugal rights, and
likewise the wife to her husband.”154 The jus conjugale was a right to payment of
what medieval canonists called “the conjugal debt,”155 “the obligation of a spouse to
engage in sexual intercourse upon the demand of the other.”156 Just as surely as a
man and woman gained by marriage “the right that the other shall be continent,”
each committed “to demean him or herself that the ends proposed by the marriage
shall be accomplished.”157 On this foundation rested the common law’s rule that a
woman could not be raped by her husband, as well as its fixation of ages of
consent—“fourteen in males and twelve in females”158—at points when each sex
was presumed to have attained “natural and corporal ability to perform the duty of
marriage.”159
However draconian in its sanction of forcible intercourse between spouses, the
allegedly mutual right of sexual access expressed a basic interest at the heart of the
conjugal right to marry: the “natural indulgence of natural desire,”160 narrowly
understood as coitus between husband and wife.161 This restrictive view of natural
sexuality indicated the specifically procreative end of marriage and of the sexual
“instinct” itself.162 But marital sex was more than a mere means to reproduction.
“The indulgence of natural cravings” was a purpose distinct from the imperative to
153

John Witte, Jr., The Nature of Family, the Family of Nature: The Surprising Liberal
Defense of the Traditional Family in the Enlightenment, 64 EMORY L.J. 591, 618 (2015).
154
1 Corinthians 7:3 (English Standard Version).
155
See Makowski, supra note 152, at 99.
156
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1135, 1195 (1990).
157
State ex rel. Gentry v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120, 181 (1835) (quoting RUTHERFORD, supra
note 148, at 314).
158
According to Rutherford, because “the law of nature gives each party a perpetual
right to the person of the other,” consummation by force is rape only if the predicate marriage
contract was itself “extorted” against a bride’s will. If the marriage was voluntary, he wrote,
“[c]onsummation is no more than a taking actual possession of what, by the previous
contract, each had a right to.” RUTHERFORD, supra note 148, at 364; see also Mary Becker,
Family Law in the Secular State and Restrictions on Same-Sex Marriage, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 27 (2001) (linking the assumption that “consent . . . had already been given” to the
common law’s “marital rape exemption”); Charles J. Reid, Jr., Rights and the Legal Equality
of Men and Women in Twelfth and Thirteenth-Century Canon Law, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
471, 511 (2002) (noting that “[t]he violence of a forcible consummation was nearly
completely masked by the invocation of rights language” in early medieval Christian
theology and that “[e]ven Thomas Aquinas, who was willing to . . . condemn [as sin] . . . a
husband’s forcible intercourse with his newly wed bride,” determined that the sin “did not
amount to the crime of rape, because [the husband] had some right to take this action.”).
159
1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 144 (internal
quotations omitted).
160
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 232 (quoting Deane v.
Aveling [1845] 1 Rob. Ecc. 279, 299).
161
Even “imperfect coitus” was considered “unnatural.” Id.
162
RUTHERFORD, supra note 148, at 350 (“Now by the contract of marriage each party
has an exclusive right in the person of the other for the purposes of producing children.”).
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“propagate the human family.”163 Apart from “the love of life,” the erotic love of
man and woman was the only “passion[] in the human heart . . . superior to
government and control of reason,” for it was “planted there by a particular
Providence, for the preservation of the species.”164 Recalling the Pauline admonition
that “it is better to marry than to burn,”165 as well as Martin Luther’s teaching that
sex is “as necessary to the nature of man as eating and drinking,”166 classical jurists
evinced a measure of respect, sometimes grudging, for humans’ “baser appetites.”167
They acknowledged that “[t]he passions which draw together the sexes are from
nature, and beyond the control of legislation,” except insofar as “law, aided by
religious and moral teachings, may prescribe for them reasonable limits and
restraints.”168 “To marry is one of the natural rights of human nature,” pronounced
one court in 1829, for it was “instituted in a state of innocence for the protection
thereof.”169
Just as temptation to carnal transgression served throughout the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries as a reason to permit divorce in cases of abandonment and
to abolish prohibitions of remarriage after divorce,170 classical legal discourse
163
SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 31. Under both
natural and civil law, failure to consummate a marriage was cause for annulment; failure to
procreate was not. See RUTHERFORD, supra note 148, at 356; see also John T. Noonan, Tokos
and Atokion: An Examination of Natural Law Reasoning Against Usury and Against
Contraception, 10 NAT. L. F. 215, 228 (1965) [hereinafter Noonan, Tokos and Atokion]
(discussing Christian theology’s recognition of “a purpose other than generation” in marital
intercourse).
164
Debate on Mr. Fox’s Appeal for the Repeal of the Marriage Act, in COBBETT’S
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803,
COMPRISING THE PERIOD FROM THE TWENTY-SIXTH OF MARCH 1781, TO THE SEVENTH OF
MAY 1782, at 398 (William Cobbett ed., 1814); see also HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A FEW
LECTURES ON NATURAL LAW 11 (1844) (“Besides the principle of self-preservation, there
are I conceive some others not less universal. The first of these is the natural inclination
between the sexes.”).
165
1 Corinthians 7:9 (King James).
166
Martin Luther, To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation, in THREE TREATISES
68 (Charles M. Jacobs trans., 1970) (1520).
167
“Marriage is . . . divinely instituted for the natural comfort . . . and happiness of both
man and woman. . . . It affords necessarily a discipline to both sexes; sexual indulgence is
mutually permitted under healthy restraints.” 1 SCHOULER & BLAKEMORE, DOMESTIC
RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921), supra note 52, at § 10.
168
1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at § 51.
169
Overseers of the Poor of the Town of Newbury v. Overseers of the Poor of the Town
of Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151, 159 (1829).
170
1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at § 51 (arguing for
divorce where cohabitation has ceased because “it is the simple fact, growing out of the
natures which for the preservation of the species God has given to men and women, that the
larger part of those who were originally inclined to marry will not submit to what they see to
be a never-ending and childless isolation”); LOUIS FREELAND POST, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 89 (1906) (arguing for a right to remarry after divorce because
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recognized a natural right to marry partly on the ground that perfect continence was
too much to ask of most people—that abstinence was “repugnant to human nature,”
as Grotius had asserted centuries earlier in his defense of “the right to seek . . . and
contract marriages.”171 In 1837, Judge Thomas Herttell reminded the New York
Assembly that, because “the right to marry is a natural right, and the exercise of it is
as imperative as the natural incitements which dictate it are influential and
dominant,” the state lacks power either to “enjoin celibacy” or to forbid “its
constituents to marry.”172 Several years later, Elisha Hurlbut, another New York
lawyer (and later judge), named “the innate love of the opposite sex” among several
attributes that, “spring[ing] from the very existence of a human being,” furnish the
basis of “human rights.”173 “Wherever Nature has ordained desire,” Hurlbut
explained, “she has . . . [supplied] the means of gratification. From this we infer the
right to its indulgence.”174 Of course, the existence of a “right to the gratification,
indulgence, and exercise of every innate power and faculty” was a question separate
from “the manner of its exercise”; when it came to the sexual powers, Hurlbut was
unequivocal: marriage’s “sacred exclusiveness” was the one and only outlet.175
“natural law”—manifest here in the human “passion for sex”—“is stronger than legislation,
stronger even than social institutions.”). Similar arguments were advanced for abolishing
divorce a mensa et thoro (i.e., divorce from bed and board), a mechanism for effecting
permanent physical separation while most marital obligations, including sexual fidelity,
remained intact. See, e.g., 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 108
(calling such “qualified divorces . . . hazardous to the morals of the parties” insofar as they
required spouses “to live chastely and continently”).
171
GROTIUS, supra note 41, at 204. Pufendorf considered it obvious “that a Prince or
State would act most ridiculously, as well as most unjustly, should they in general forbid
Matrimony to all their Subjects: Or should they allow this Privilege to the First born only of
every Family, and enjoin strict Celibacy to all the rest. For it is impossible, that in so great a
number, All should be able to lead a life of Severity and Continence.” PUFENDORF, supra
note 93, at 445.
172
HERTTELL, supra note 127, at 29; see also John A. Ryan, Why Private Land
Ownership Is a Natural Right, 18 CATH. U. BULL. 228, 228–29 (1912) (arguing for a “natural
right to embrace or reject the conjugal condition” given that the “only conceivable
alternatives are free love,” which “is inadequate for any person,” and “celibacy,” which “is
adequate only for a minority”).
173
Hurlbut, supra note 74, at 13.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 13, 146; see also WILLIAM PALEY, PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 170 (Liberty Fund ed., 2002) (1785) (“The passion being natural, proves that it
was intended to be gratified; but under what restrictions, or whether without any, must be
collected from different considerations.”). Cf. DAVID G. RITCHIE, NATURAL RIGHTS: A
CRITICISM OF SOME POLITICAL AND ETHICAL CONCEPTIONS 46–47 (1916) (“Natural rights
have been explained as ‘biological rights,’ by which I understand is meant that there are
certain natural instincts or tendencies in human nature which must be respected by
legislation. This is . . . much less than is meant by ‘rights’ under the law of nature in its old
sense. It is . . . an appeal to fact” that fails to tell us “which instincts deserve our respect and
which do not . . . .”).
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Procreation was the second dimension of the conjugal right to marry. As a
Texas court stated in 1926, “[t]he right of the opposite sexes to mate for the purpose
of becoming husband and wife . . . is, always has been, and always will be, an
inherent, natural right of the highest importance.”176 Why? Because this right was
“indispensable for the propagation of the human family.”177 The idea was not new.
Quoting Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws (1748), the Missouri Supreme Court in
1910 spoke admiringly of ancient Roman laws that had upheld “the natural right
which every one had to marry and beget children,” a right which “could not be taken
away.”178
It would have been easy for classical lawyers to argue, as some did with respect
to sexual intercourse, that the biological capacity to bear and beget offspring is a
near-universal human capacity, that its exercise is therefore a human right, and that
natural law circumscribes such exercise to the institution of marriage.179 But
nineteenth-century jurists apparently found it unnecessary to defend the procreative
aspect of the natural right to marry. The point was obvious enough to go without
saying. It had a self-evidence that marital intercourse, when it was not potentially
procreative, lacked.180 Given Christianity’s mistrust of carnal pleasure, sex within
marriage had to be justified precisely to the extent that spouses didn’t or couldn’t
intend to produce offspring.181 Marital procreation needed no such apology. Rather
it was so widely assumed to be the chief end of marriage that its inclusion within the
right to marry was usually implicit.182 Not until the early twentieth century, when
eugenic regulation endangered procreative freedom in newly troubling ways, did
Americans begin to talk about it in terms of natural right—a natural right to
procreate, yes, but also the natural right to marry.183 Infringements of the latter were

176

Hedrick v. Marshall, 282 S.W. 289, 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
Id.
178
Knost v. Knost, 129 S.W. 665, 666 (Mo. 1910).
179
For judicial endorsement of the first two propositions, see Simpson v. Found. Co.,
95 N.E. 10, 14 (N.Y. 1911) (acknowledging an injured plaintiff’s “natural right to possess
unimpaired the power of procreation during the normal period”).
180
See supra notes 171–175 and accompanying text.
181
Hence Bishop’s sad observation that “persons of mature years who lack the
capabilities on which the matrimonial connection is based, are, for this reason, disqualified
to contract perfect marriage.” 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at §
144 (emphasis added). In Pufendorf’s more vivid explanation, “when an ancient Couple are
link’d together without any Prospect of a Blessing from the Bed, . . . we shall not speak
improperly if we call these Honorary Marriages, as we term those Offices Honorary, in
which a Title only is conferr’d, without Action or Business.” PUFENDORF, supra note 93, at
465.
182
PUFENDORF, supra note 93, at 465.
183
But see EDWARD BLISS FOOTE, PLAIN HOME TALK ABOUT THE HUMAN SYSTEM 758
(1870) (discussing a 1787 Connecticut case in which a woman was “prosecuted . . . for the
fifth time for having illegitimate children” and calling “her defense [at trial] . . . an admirable
vindication of her natural right to bear children”); WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra
177
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asserted whether states pursued their eugenic aims indirectly, by restricting
individuals’ eligibility to secure a marriage license, or directly, through sterilization
schemes like the one successfully challenged in Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942).184 As
the Supreme Court famously said in that case, “We are dealing here with legislation
which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”185 This was no sleight
of hand. To imagine “[m]arriage and procreation” as a single, compound right was
perfectly consonant with the natural-law tradition from which the “rights of man”
emerged.
2. Parenthood and Cohabitation?
Parenthood and cohabitation were no less strongly associated with natural
marriage than sexual intercourse and procreation, but they weren’t quite as strongly
associated with the natural right to marry. Although matrimony was unquestionably
natural law’s preferred context for raising as well as bearing children, it actually
wasn’t a prerequisite for exercising the rights—nor, crucially, the duties—of
parenthood. Cohabitation, on the other hand, was most certainly a natural right of
marriage, in that husband and wife were presumptively entitled to dwell with one
another. Yet unlike sexual intercourse and procreation, two (or more) individuals’
natural freedom to live together wasn’t contingent on marriage—except in the many
instances where “cohabitation” was euphemistic shorthand for sexual intimacy.
In light of parenthood’s close connection to marriage generally and to the
procreative prerogative that natural law reserved to marriage, it may be surprising to
learn that rights to the “care, custody, and control” of one’s child were not also
subsumed under the conjugal right to marry. After all, wasn’t marriage designed to
turn procreators into parents? That’s surely what classical jurists believed. The sex
instinct being indifferent if not inimical to stable family relationships, it was thought
that Providence had supplemented “the natural inclination between the sexes” with
both a moral tendency toward sexual fidelity and the “natural affection” of parents
for their children.186 Were it not so, explained James Schouler in 1870, “the human
race must have perished in the cradle.”187 Through marriage, “the sexual cravings of
nature were speedily brought under wholesome regulations” dictated by “[n]atural
law or the teachings of a divine providence.”188 Thanks to marriage a man could be
note 50, at 136–37 (counting “the right . . . to reproduce and multiply our being” among the
“rights inherent in the nature which God has formed”).
184
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
185
Id. at 541.
186
TUCKER, supra note 164, at 11 (1844); see also MANSFIELD, supra note 48, at 312
(noting that “the ties of natural affection towards offspring” are “so close . . . that if there
were no other laws than those of nature, the majority of mankind would unquestionably
perform all the duties which that relation requires.”).
187
SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 8.
188
Id.
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certain of the paternity of his wife’s children, and then would feel compelled—by
conscience, or in advanced society by positive law—to attend to “the helplessness
of [his] tender offspring, and for their sake [to] put[] a check upon his baser appetites,
and concentrate[] his affection upon the home he has founded.”189
Under natural law, then, marriage, procreation, and parenthood were parts of a
unified whole. Or to put the point more precisely, an exclusive heterosexual
relationship of indefinite duration (“marriage”) was the context to which natural law
relegated the begetting and rearing of offspring.190 Children, indeed, had “a natural
right . . . to be born of a . . . marriage.”191
Despite their close connection to marital reproduction, however, rights to the
care, custody, and control of one’s child were not subsumed under the conjugal right
to marry. Instead the privileges and duties of parenthood derived from, and extended
only so far as to effectuate, the “natural duties” that arose—regardless of marital
status—from procreation.192 According to Rutherford, “[t]he right, which parents
have over their children, arises originally from generation . . . .”193 Echoing
Enlightenment philosophers like John Locke and Moses Mendelssohn,194 Tapping
189
1 SCHOULER & BLAKEMORE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921), supra note 52,
at § 10; see also MONTESQUIEU, supra note 90, at 88 (“The natural obligation of the father
to provide for his children has established marriage, which makes known the person who
ought to fulfill this obligation.”).
190
See, e.g., Story, Natural Law, supra note 150, at 316 (stating that marriage, as “an
institution . . . deemed to arise from the law of nature, . . . tends to the procreation of the
greatest number of healthy citizens, and to their proper maintenance and education”); John
Witherspoon, Lectures in Moral Philosophy, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN WITHERSPOON
195 (Thomas P. Miller ed., 1990) (“[M]arriage is a relation expressly founded upon th[e]
necessity” of providing for offspring who “at their birth are weaker and more helpless than
any other animals.”).
191
POST, supra note 170, at 55.
192
1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 186,
204, 206 (1795) (noting that such duties are “founded in nature, and result from [parents’]
ardent affection towards their offspring” and that even civil law in Connecticut “enjoins on
parents toward their illegitimate offspring” a “duty . . . of maintenance.”). In 1844, Henry St.
George Tucker affirmed that “[t]he natural right of a parent over a child is the obvious
consequence of his duties.” TUCKER, supra note 164, at 106. In the seven pages Tucker
devoted specifically to natural rights of parenthood, marriage is mentioned but once, and
then only respecting the question of whether a parent’s nonconsent invalidates his child’s
marriage under natural law (Tucker said it doesn’t). Id. at 106–13; see also Current Topics,
23 ALBANY L.J. 141, 143 (1881) (noting that, under Austrian law, “the duty of a father to
provide for the maintenance of his child ‘till they can support themselves’ . . . is a natural
one.”).
193
RUTHERFORD, supra note 148, at 159.
194
LOCKE, supra note 53, at 30 (“all parents, were, by the law of nature, ‘under an
obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate the children’ they had begotten”); MOSES
MENDELSSOHN, JERUSALEM 50 (Allan Arkush trans., 1983) (“Whoever helps to beget a
being capable of felicity is obligated, by the laws of nature, to promote its felicity, as long as
it is not yet able to provide for its own advancement.”).
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Reeve similarly wrote in his 1816 treatise on The Law of Baron and Femme that
“whoever has been the instrument of giving life to a being incapable of supporting
itself, is bound by the law of morality to support such being, during such
incapacity.”195 Whereas civil law in most American jurisdictions tended to sharply
distinguish between children born in and out of wedlock so far as parental (especially
paternal) obligations and the descent of property were concerned, natural law
evidently did not.196 In fact, for most of the classical period, it is far from clear that
jurists understood “the Prerogative of Paternal Power” as a fundamental or natural
right at all.197
Compared to parenthood, cohabitation has a much superior claim to protection
under the natural right to marry. What James Schouler called “the universal law” of
matrimony “necessarily suppose[d] a home and mutual cohabitation”; married
couples were expected “to live together—or as the expression sometimes goes, to
adhere.”198 Nature guaranteed each spouse “a right to the society of the other.”199
Although American courts of the classical period viewed joint residence as “the
great central fact” of a relationship “in its nature matrimonial,”200 cohabitation
wasn’t an exclusive right of marriage—except, again, insofar as it implied a sexual
relationship. Very often it did, in social perception no less than in speech. As the
California Supreme Court declared in 1888, “the cohabitation of persons of opposite
sexes, whether legal or illicit, suggests sexual intercourse, and is evidence of it.”201
Considering the commonplace circumstances in which an adult male and an adult
female might chastely cohabit—a mother residing with her grown son, for instance,
or a gentleman bachelor living with his female housekeeper—this was a sweeping
overgeneralization, but no less telling for that.
195

TAPPING REEVE, LAW OF BARON AND FEMME 283 (1816).
Cf. Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332, 337 (1847) (“The great end of matrimony is not
the comfort or convenience of the parties, . . . but the procreation of a progeny having legal
title to maintenance by the father.”). Surely it’s suggestive that, in “the phraseology of the
English or American law” as reported in 1864, “natural children are children born out of
wedlock, or bastards, and are distinguished from legitimate children.” 2 JOHN BOUVIER, LAW
DICTIONARY: ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 200
(1864) (emphasis added).
197
JEFFREY SHULMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARENT 3, 5 (2014). The reference to
paternal prerogative—one of Shulman’s voluminous proofs that twenty-first century belief
in the timelessness of parental rights is “incomplete and anachronistic”—derives in this
instance from John Locke, who called education the “privilege of children, and [the] duty of
parents.” LOCKE, supra note 53, at 36.
198
SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 53.
199
Id.
200
1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at §§ 457, 540 (noting the
interest “of the parties, of the children, and of the community, that all intercourse between
the sexes in its nature matrimonial should be such in fact”); see also JOSEPH R. LONG, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 62 (1905) (“It is the duty of husband and
wife to live together, cohabitation being an essential element of the notion of marriage.”).
201
E.g., Sharon v. Sharon, 16 P. 345, 358 (Cal. 1888).
196
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According to Frank Keezer’s treatise on The Law of Marriage and Divorce
(1906), “cohabitation” could refer to any state of affairs in which “a man and woman
are conveniently situated as to each other,” whether they be in “an open field, or
railroad train . . . .”202 As this pointedly gendered definition suggests, classical legal
discourse on marriage used “cohabitation” to mean sharing not (or not just) a home
but a bed.203 An exception neatly proves the rule. In Cannon v. United States (1885),
an alleged bigamist challenged his conviction for “unlawful cohabitation” under
Utah territorial law.204 He argued that the trial court should have instructed the jury
that sexual intercourse was a necessary element of the crime and should have let him
present evidence of “non-access” to his alleged second “wife.”205 The U.S. Supreme
Court rejected both claims, adopting an unusually broad definition of the key
statutory term. It reasoned that Utah’s ban on polygamous “cohabitation” was less
concerned with “the intimacies of the marriage relation” than with the “outward
appearances” of a “bigamous household,” and therefore that Angus Cannon was
properly convicted even if he did not “occupy the same bed or sleep in the same
room . . . or actually have sexual intercourse with either of” his supposed brides.206
Two Justices dissented, finding “no instance in which the word ‘cohabitation’ has
been used to describe a criminal offense where it did not imply sexual
intercourse.”207 The majority opinion conceded this point. It cited two dictionaries,
both of which defined “cohabit” to mean, first, “to dwell with,” and second, “to live
together as husband and wife”—that is, in a sexual relationship; and the opinion
acknowledged that “[t]he word is never used in its first meaning in a criminal statute
. . . .”208 In short, every Justice on the Cannon Court understood that “cohabitation,”
to the extent it was an exclusive privilege of civil marriage, was “used in the limited
sense of sexual intercourse.”209
The linguistic practice documented in Cannon was equally true of natural law,
which found it not only “agreeable” that “one man should be joined to one woman
in a constant society of cohabiting together” but “necessary for the propagation
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KEEZER, supra note 11, at § 99.
For example, the two words were used interchangeably to mean “sexual intercourse”
in Jewell’s Lessee v. Jewell, 42 U.S. 219, 224 (1843) (addressing “whether, if the contract
be made per verba de presenti, and remains without cohabitation, or if made per verba de
futuro, and be followed by consummation, it amounts to a valid marriage”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also LONG, supra note 200, at § 105 (describing the infidelities
punished by offenses like “alienation of affections” and “criminal conversation” as “wrongs
against the right of marital cohabitation”).
204
Cannon v. United States, 116 U.S. 55, 70 (1885).
205
Id. at 70.
206
Id. at 72–74.
207
Id. at 80 (Miller, J., dissenting).
208
Id. at 74 (majority opinion).
209
Id. at 75.
203
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of . . . their offspring; and to render clear and certain the right of succession.”210 To
take a particularly ubiquitous example: Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries’ heated discussions of the right to informally contract a marriage, the
perennial question of whether “consensus” alone or “consensus et concubitus”
constitutes matrimonium was rendered in English as whether a natural marriage was
made by consent alone or by consent plus intercourse, with the latter denoted by
either “consummation” or (just as often) “cohabitation.”211 The two expressions
were used interchangeably, often in the same text.212 “Cohabitation” was the
signifier; sex is what it signified.
3. The Conjugal Right in Positive Law
The conjugal right to marry had both positive and negative aspects. It obligated
the state to both act and abstain from acting.213 In its positive (and probably more
familiar) guise, the right required a substantial regulatory infrastructure designed to
enforce spouses’ sexual commitments. Mandated by natural justice,214 this body of
strictures was in practice of such a punitive bent that classical jurists occasionally
spoke of marriage as a status belonging fundamentally to penal law.215 The
relegation of sex to matrimony, a norm so fundamental that it was said to govern
even the polygamous marriages of certain “warm countries” and “eastern” lands,216
210

ROOT, supra note 19, at xxvii; see also Campbell v. Campbell, 37 Wis. 206, 214
(1875) (insisting that a judicial decree “may separate husband and wife and set them legally
free; but . . . [it] cannot obliterate their cohabitation in marriage, [n]or the natural and
indelible relation which cohabitation in marriage fixes on them forever.”).
211
PARSONS, supra note 61, at 557.
212
See, e.g., Herd v. Herd, 69 So. 885, 886 (Ala. 1915) (referring to verbal contracts of
marriage “consummated by cohabitation”); Dumaresly v. Fishly, 10 Ky. 368, 372 (1821)
(using “cohabitation” and “consummation” interchangeably); 1 BISHOP, NEW
COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at § 300 (identifying “fornication” and
“marriage” as “the only forms of sexual cohabitation” known to law).
213
Dane, supra note 72, at 321–22 (discussing natural law’s requirement that worldly
governments institute marriage, “including both interpersonal rights [as between spouses]
and [spouses’] rights of liberty against the state”).
214
Story, Natural Law, supra note 150, at 316 (“If marriage be an institution derived
from the law of nature, then, whatever has a natural tendency to . . . destroy its value . . . is
by the same law prohibited.”).
215
See, e.g., Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 260, 265 (1813) (“Regulations on the subject of
marriage and divorce are rather parts of the criminal, than of the civil, code” and are imposed
“with a principal view to the public order . . . and the happiness of the community.”);
Timmins v. Lacy, 30 Tex. 115, 136 (1867) (emphasizing that “the legal rights of husband
and wife” entail “corresponding disabilities, . . . many of which are of a severely penal
character”); Rubin v. Irving Tr. Co., 113 N.E.2d 424, 432 (N.Y. 1953) (noting the “grave
criminal and moral ramifications” of determining the validity of a marriage).
216
1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE, WITH THE EVIDENCE, PRACTICE, PLEADING, AND FORMS; ALSO OF SEPARATIONS
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was secured through criminal sanction of fornication, nonmarital cohabitation,
homosexual conduct, and adultery.217 Civil law had a major role to play as well. To
keep spouses from “defiling and disgracing the marriage bed,” it imposed disabilities
on “illegitimate” children and provided money damages for torts like “alienation of
affections” and “criminal conversation.”218
Classical marriage regulation enforced the duty of sex within marriage less
concertedly—and, excluding the marital rape exception, less harshly—than it
enforced the prohibition of sex outside of marriage. But they did enforce it. For all
their hesitation to find against the existence of an otherwise regular marriage,
American courts were accustomed to granting annulments for impotency, want of
consummation, undisclosed sterility, and fraudulent representation of intent to have
children.219 And in the twentieth century, legislatures increasingly authorized
divorces for “refusal of marital relations,” a species of “constructive
abandonment.”220
In its negative guise, the conjugal right to marry was a strictly bounded freedom
of intimate association—an entitlement to the marital lifestyle, understood as a
monogamous heterosexual relationship (or, more controversially, an internally
exclusive polygamous relationship) that normally but not necessarily embraced
procreation, parenthood, and cohabitation.221 Having been fashioned by nature to
gravitate toward this conjugal pattern, human beings had a right to do so.222 Apart

WITHOUT DIVORCE, AND OF THE EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN ALL ISSUES § 1 (5th ed. 1873)
[hereinafter 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (5th ed. 1873)] (“Even where polygamy is tolerated,
fidelity to and among the family of wives is enjoined, the same as is the more restricted
fidelity in monogamy.”).
217
See Ford v. State, 53 Ala. 150, 150 (1875) (“[A]dultery is offensive to all laws
human and divine, and human laws must impose punishments adequate to the enormity of
the offence and its insult to public decency.”); Story, Natural Law, supra note 150, at 316
(“deduc[ing]” from natural law “the criminality of fornication, incest, adultery, seduction,
and other lewdness”).
218
Alexander H. Robbins, Note, Right of Husband to Maintain an Action for the
Debauchery of His Wife Due to Her Own Improper Advances, 54 CENT. L.J. 61, 71–72
(1902).
219
See H.H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 110
(2d ed. 1988); see also TYLER, supra note 71, at 822 (urging that, “in the case of the
impotence of either of the parties, none of the peculiar ends of matrimony can be
accomplished . . . and a union should be discarded as much as the marriage of two persons
of the same sex.”).
220
See Refusal of Sexual Intercourse as Justifying Divorce or Separation, 148 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS 3d § 329 (2015).
221
On the range of opinion concerning polygamy’s compatibility with natural law, see
supra notes 101–104 and accompanying text.
222
A marvelous study of slave marriages in the British Caribbean cites an 1816 letter
in which an Anglican pastor in the Bahamas argues that
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from restrictions based on natural disqualifications like inability to consummate a
marriage or incapacity to contract one, deprivations of the conjugal right were so
inconceivable that explicit affirmations of it were at once extremely rare and
supremely confident. In 1787, when Connecticut Federalist Oliver Ellsworth argued
against appending a bill of rights to the proposed national constitution, he assured
readers that certain freedoms, enumerated or not, were beyond Congress’s “power
to prohibit”—“liberty of conscience,” for example, “or of matrimony, or of burial of
the dead”223 Four decades later, the Vermont Supreme Court proclaimed that
marriage “was ordained by the great Lawgiver of the universe, and [is] not to be
prohibited by man.”224 Just what would it mean for “man” to prohibit marriage? It’s
hard to tell exactly what kinds of suppression these writers had in mind. On its face,
their language seems broad enough to encompass restrictions fixed upon specific
individuals, particular social groups, or the populace as a whole.225 A passage from
the 1873 edition of Bishop’s famous Commentaries appears to be concerned mainly,
perhaps only, with exclusions of specific individuals:
Matrimony is a natural right and, being such, . . . can be forfeited only by
some wrongful act. Therefore the government is under obligation to permit
every person of mature years to be the husband or wife of another, who
will substantially perform the duties required in the matrimonial
relation.226

[m]arriage was instituted by God himself . . . . Although, therefore, human laws
may, and indeed must regulate many things respecting it, . . . yet it is impossible
that they can have any right to set it aside, or to restrict any class of human beings
from the use and enjoyment of it.
Cecilia A. Green, “A Civil Inconvenience”? The Vexed Question of Slave Marriage in the
British West Indies, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 18 (2007) (citations omitted).
223
“A Landholder” [Oliver Ellsworth], Letter to the Landholders and Farmers, CONN.
COURANT, Dec. 10, 1787, reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 161, 164 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892) (emphasis added).
224
Overseers of the Poor of the Town of Newbury v. Overseers of the Poor of the Town
of Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151, 159 (1829).
225
For further discussion of whether classical jurists understood the Constitution to bar
marriage abolition, see infra Section II.D on the right of marital permanence.
226
1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (5th ed. 1873), supra note 216, at § 33. Two years earlier,
Reverend Joel Foote Bingham went even further than Bishop, arguing that
marriage . . . is not a thing of human institution; nor is it competent for human law
to forbid or do it away. No matter what may be the commands of Caesar, God
Almighty has appointed it; and men may in innocence and duty enter into its holy
union in defiance, even, of any civil mandate.
BINGHAM, supra note 52, at 15–16.
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In practice, did American governments fulfill their “obligation” to make
marriage universally available? Bishop almost certainly would have thought so.
Wholesale denials of the conjugal right to marry were unusual. American law
tolerated such deprivations insofar as slaves had no right in civil law to have sex,
procreate, cohabit, or parent children over their masters’ objection, despite a widely
if not universally acknowledged capacity for natural marriage. 227 When it came to
free persons, however, positive law generally protected subjects against privately
imposed celibacy—refusing, for example, to enforce contracts and testamentary
provisions “in restraint of marriage.”228 Public impositions of lifelong celibacy were
effected primarily through two mechanisms: statutes and common-law doctrines
denying marriage to individuals deemed incapable of consent (a category of
exclusion discussed below in terms of the contractual rather than the conjugal right
to marry);229 and laws and judgments barring the guilty party in a divorce action
(usually a proven adulterer) from remarriage.230 This latter class of prohibition was
widely criticized for withholding the medicine of wedlock from society’s sickest
patients, whose “sexual passion . . . will probably be indulged either licitly or

227
See Davenport v. Caldwell, 10 S.C. 317, 338 (1878) (“There was no law forbidding
marriage among slaves, but the intention of slavery made the right of property in the master
paramount, and natural marriage could not be allowed to interfere with that power. . .”); see
also Howard v. Howard, 51 N.C. 235, 237 (1858) (discussing extralegal “marriages”
between slaves that were “permitted and encouraged by owners”).
228
See Knost v. Knost, 129 S.W. 665, 666 (Mo. 1910) (discussing inheritances
“received . . . on condition of not marrying” and construing legal hostility to such conditions
as a marker of respect for “the natural right which every one had to marry and beget
children”); PARSONS, supra note 61, at 555 (“Contracts in Restraint of Marriage . . . are
wholly void . . . .”); REEVE, supra note 195, at 220–21 (“If the contract by A with B, be, that
he never would marry, this would be a void contract.”). But see 2 JAMES SCHOULER &
ARTHUR W. BLAKEMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION
AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 1270 (6th ed. 1921) (noting “only one main qualification to the
rule against total restraint of marriage, and that is an exception touching widows,” in whose
“viduity” deceased husbands retained “a sort of mournful property right”).
229
See infra notes 252–255 and accompanying text (describing marital disqualifications
based on incapacity to consent).
230
Some bars on remarriage obtained only so long as the innocent ex-spouse was still
living. Others applied for a statutorily or judicially fixed time and/or were limited to
marriages between adulterers and their partners in crime. Strictly speaking, the latter
prohibition would have been a restriction on marital choice, see infra section II(B)(3), not on
the conjugal right to marry. See 3 GEORGE ELLIOT HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL
INSTITUTIONS 18–20, 79 (1964).
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illicitly.”231 Even so, they exemplified Bishop’s principle that revocations of the
right to marry must be based on “some wrongful act.”232
B. The Contractual Right to Marry
Lawyers of the classical period frequently described the relation of husband and
wife as “a contract of natural law.”233 They said that marriage’s eternal form, what
Pufendorf had called “the Principal Contract of true and perfect Matrimony,” was
inscribed in “the Law of Nature”234—devised, “unlike other contracts, by God
himself.”235 In turn they held that “the right to contract a marriage is a natural right,
not a legislatively conferred privilege.”236
Thus “the natural right of marriage”—a right to the relation itself, to a
presumptively lifelong heterosexual union—was thought to entail “freedom of
contract in the exercise of the right.”237 In positive law, this freedom referred to the
civil contract of marriage and was properly styled a “civil right.” As in our own day,
the designation “civil” served mainly to distinguish “marriage as the law views it
from marriage as a religious rite,”238 but it also signaled a quality and quantity of
regulation at odds with the conventional ideal of contract. The state both wrote the

231

BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 211; see also Current
Topics, supra note 192, at 142 (objecting that “the prohibition against remarriage in decrees
for divorce . . . proposes to punish adultery by holding out a premium for more adultery.”).
232
1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (5th ed. 1873), supra note 216, at § 33 (“[W]hether [the
guilty party] . . . should be permitted to marry, or not, is a question, not of right with him,
but of public expediency.”).
233
See, e.g., KEEZER, supra note 11, at 5; STORY, COMMENTARIES (3d ed., 1846), supra
note 107, at § 108.
234
PUFENDORF, supra note 93, at 448–49.
235
SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 24 (locating the
contract’s “foundation in the law of nature”) (quoting PATRICK FRASER, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF SCOTLAND: AS APPLICABLE TO THE PERSONAL AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS:
COMPRISING HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, MASTER
AND SERVANT, AND MASTER AND APPRENTICE: WITH AN APPENDIX OF FORMS (1846)).
236
Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 305 (1953) (emphasis added); see also
Butterfield v. Ennis, 186 S.W. 1173, 1176 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916) (“The contract of marriage
being one of natural right . . . the contract proven in this case [is presumptively] valid . . . .”);
1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at § 44 (invoking “the law of
nature whereby all marriageable persons are entitled to enter [marriage] at will”).
237
Gould v. Gould, 61 A. 604, 613 (Conn. 1905) (Hamersley, J., concurring in result)
(emphasis added).
238
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 31; see also Maynard v.
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 212 (1888) (calling marriage “a civil contract, as distinguished from a
religious sacrament”); MANSFIELD, supra note 48, at 235 (explaining that “the term civil” as
applied to the “civil contract” of marriage refers “to the artificial laws of society and not to
those of nature or revelation”).
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contract and considered itself a “third party” to it.239 To be sure, marriage
“settlements” were fairly common in the nineteenth century; along with wills, trusts,
and other devices, these instruments enabled affianced and wedded couples to opt
out of certain standardized rules.240 But even people with wherewithal to make such
arrangements did so only by the grace of the state. For them, too, marriage remained
primarily a status—a “legal position or condition”241 patterned according to public
rather than private design.242
The contract/status dialectic caused a fair amount of jurisprudential
handwringing in the early-to-mid nineteenth century,243 but one contractual element
of marriage was never doubted: its foundation in mutual agreement.244 The bedrock
requirement that marriage be voluntary—that it be “founded on mutual consent,
which is the essence of all contracts”—was no less a tenet of positive than of natural
law.245 One important effect of this principle was to make marriageability hinge, in
large part, on a person’s capacity to contract in general.246 Certain civil incapacities,
239

See 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, AND
DIVORCE, WITH THE EVIDENCE, PRACTICE, PLEADING, AND FORMS; ALSO OF SEPARATIONS
WITHOUT DIVORCE, AND OF THE EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN ALL ISSUES § 230 (6th ed.
1881).
240
See SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 263–64;
STORY, COMMENTARIES (3d ed., 1846), supra note 107, at §§ 183–88.
241
2 STEWART RAPALJE & ROBERT LINN LAWRENCE, A DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH AND
AMERICAN LAW 1218 (1883) (defining “status”).
242
In substance, of course, civil marriage had always been a “status,” as that term is
defined above. See Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37, 49 (1857) (“At common law, marriage as a
status had few elements of contract about it . . . .”). That being said, the institution’s
nineteenth-century “transformation . . . from contract to status” was no mere rhetorical shift.
See Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage, supra note 10 (explaining this conceptual evolution
and its steep ideological stakes).
243
See generally Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage, supra note 10. For a subtle
disclosure of contract’s decline as the prevailing descriptor of marriage, compare SCHOULER,
DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 22 (“It is frequently said . . . that
marriage is nothing more than a civil contract.”) and JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 22 (5th ed. 1895) [hereinafter SCHOULER, DOMESTIC
RELATIONS (5th ed. 1895)] (“It has been frequently said . . . that marriage is nothing more
than a civil contract.”) (emphases added).
244
“Whatever question or controversy may exist . . . concerning the nature of the
relation subsisting between husband and wife after marriage—whether the[ir] rights and
liabilities . . . are then to be . . . governed by the principles applicable to all civil contracts,
or the contract is to be considered as merged in the higher nature of the status created by the
agreement of the parties—all the authorities concur in this, that marriage has its origin and
foundation in a purely civil contract.” TYLER, supra note 71, at 806.
245
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 31; see also BOUVIER,
supra note 13, at 102 (“As an institution of the law of nature, [marriage] consists in the free
and voluntary consent of both parties. . . .”).
246
See WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra note 50, at 86 (“If either of the parties
is . . . not sui juris, he or she cannot enter into the state” of matrimony); see also RAPALJE &
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like slavery, claimed little or no basis in natural law.247 Slaves were incapable of
legal marriage not because they lacked “moral power to agree to such a contract,”248
but because, as the U.S. Supreme Court explained in 1875, “the slave was incapable
of entering into any contract, not excepting the contract of marriage.”249 Not twenty
years earlier, Justice Benjamin Curtis had seized upon this “inflexible . . . law of
African slavery”250 to argue that Dred Scott’s status as a slave in Missouri had been
extinguished by a civil marriage he contracted in Illinois.251

LAWRENCE, supra note 241, at 1243 (“A person is said to be sui juris if he is not subject to
any general disability,” including the inability “to enter into contracts . . . with the same
freedom as ordinary persons.”).
247
See supra notes 135–142 and accompanying text (describing slaves’ perceived
capacity for natural marriage even in the absence of legal recognition). Well before the period
under study here, Christian theologians who accepted the institution of slavery nonetheless
believed that slaves were naturally entitled to “lawfully contract marriage.” MARRIAGE
CANONS FROM THE DECRETUM OF GRATIAN AND THE DECRETALS, SEXT, CLEMENTINES AND
EXTRAVAGANTES, Case 29 (Question II (C.1.)) (Augustine Thompson, O.P., eds. & John T.
Noonan, trans. 1967) (quoting Pope Julius I (d. 352)); see also THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA, THIRD PART 177 (trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, supp.
1947) (as “slavery is of positive law” and “marriage is of natural and Divine law, . . .
even . . . a slave” may “marry freely, even without his master’s consent or knowledge”); John
T. Noonan, Power to Choose, in 4 VIATOR 419, 430 (1973) [hereinafter Noonan, Power to
Choose] (discussing Gratian’s view that “there is neither slave nor free . . . in the marriage
of Christians”).
248
Girod v. Lewis, 6 Mart. (o.s.) 559, 559–60 (1819) (stating that slaves, by definition
“deprived of all civil rights,” had “no legal capacity to assent to any contract,” including that
of matrimony, but holding that a marriage contracted with “the consent of the master and
moral assent of the slave, from the moment of freedom, although dormant during slavery,
produces all the effects which result from such a contract among free persons”).
249
Hall v. United States, 92 U.S. 27, 30 (1875); see also REEVE, supra note 195, at 341
(affirming that “the rights and duties of a husband are inconsistent with a state of slavery.”);
PARSONS, supra note 61, at 341 (calling the “incidents of marriage . . . so inconsistent with
the condition of slavery, that we do not see how any ceremonies . . . could make such
marriage legal.”). Astonishingly, certain states prior to the Civil War officially declined to
recognize any contract, including one of marriage, entered into by a “free negro.” See Bryan
v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 201 (1853) (“[T]o become a citizen . . . capable of contracting, [or]
of marrying . . . requires . . . more than the mere act of enfranchisement.”); 1 BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 310 (describing a provision of the Indiana
Constitution). Other states appear to have limited civil marriage, if not other contracts, to
white people. See HUNTER, supra note 135, at 101, 104 (describing antebellum laws in
Mississippi and Virginia).
250
Hall, 92 U.S. at 30.
251
Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 600 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting) (“There can be no
more effectual . . . act of emancipation . . . than by the consent of the master that the slave
should enter into a contract of marriage, . . . attended by all the civil rights and obligations
which belong to that condition.”).
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Unlike the condition of slavery, several other marital incapacities were thought
to denote a supposed lack of intellectual or “moral power” to consent.252 As
Chancellor Kent wrote in 1827, “all persons who have not the regular use of the
understanding sufficient to deal with discretion in the common affairs of life,” such
as “idiots and lunatics . . . , are incapable of agreeing to . . . marriage,” just as they
were “incapable of agreeing to any contract.”253 Another important incapacity,
justified mainly by physical immaturity but sometimes also by intellectual
immaturity, was “want of age.”254 Like “idiocy” and insanity, this was “both a
natural and a legal disability.”255
Marital disqualifications based on incapacity obviously limited exercise of the
otherwise “universal” freedom to contract a marriage. 256 In natural law, this freedom
embraced two, arguably three, more specific entitlements. First, marriage’s origin in
free and mutual consent inherently implied a natural right not to marry—a
prohibition against compelling any person to marry against her will. Second, an
otherwise eligible man and woman had a right to marry one another by simple
mutual agreement, without observance of particular formalities and without the
permission or participation of any third parties. To the extent this right placed the
power to marry in individuals’ own hands, it implied a third dimension of the
freedom to contract marriage: a right to marry the person of one’s choice. Rarely
described in so many words, this last was increasingly repudiated after the Civil
War, primarily for the sake of racial segregation in marriage.
The following sections elaborate the three main aspects of the contractual right
to marry, and they show in broad strokes how each aspect was discussed, respected,
and disrespected in classical American marriage law. First, as a matter of principle,
black-letter doctrine consistently and uncontroversially acknowledged a right not to
marry, but courts only found “involuntary” agreement to marry in cases of extreme
fraud or duress.257 Second, in protracted and shifting debates over “common-law
252

This distinction was drawn, for example, in Davenport v. Caldwell, 10 S.C. 317, 344
(1878) (explaining that a slave’s “incapacity to marry [civilly] was not in re, but per lege”—
not “in itself,” but “by law”).
253
2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 65; see also 1 BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at §§ 126, 143 (describing age, “idiocy,” and
insanity as “general” and “universal” impediments).
254
MANSFIELD, supra note 48, at 239. Disqualification for “want of age” didn’t
necessarily encompass everyone yet to reach the usual threshold of adulthood. Following
canon law and common law, many jurisdictions allowed female “infants” to wed if they were
at least twelve years old and males to do so if they were at least fourteen years old. See 1
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at §§ 143–46.
255
MANSFIELD, supra note 48, at 239; see also 2 THOMAS EDLYNE TOMLINS, Marriage,
in THE LAW-DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1820) (counting “age” and “want of reason” as disabilities
“grounded on natural law”); Hurlbut, supra note 74, at 152 (insisting, contrary to provision
for marriage “during a lucid interval,” that “the laws of nature forbid” a “lunatic . . . from
marrying at all times”).
256
1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at § 838.
257
See infra Section II.B.1.
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marriage,” classical lawyers and lawmakers wrestled earnestly with whether and
how civil law should accommodate the natural right to marry by mutual
agreement.258 Finally, although a right to marry the person of one’s choice was but
a small logical step from marriage by private agreement, jurists of the period
generally affirmed the validity, indeed the propriety, of civil constraints on mate
selection.259
1. The Right Not to Marry
Through all the law of marriage runs the principle which puts it in the
power of parties to assume or not, at their own election, the marriage
status, while the status is imposed upon no one who does not accept it
voluntarily.260
The right not to marry, or the principle that “marriage . . . must be the effect of
willingness as well as capacity to contract it[,]”261 operated against state and private
actors alike. While states avowedly “favored” and encouraged marriage, not least by
making nonmarital sex and procreation illegal,262 Joel Prentiss Bishop could
nonetheless assert without qualification in 1864 that “the law compels no one to
assume the matrimonial status.”263 When scholars of our own day speak of a “right
not to marry,” this is exactly what they mean: a “right to be free from state-imposed
marriage, . . . a negative right.”264
With regard to coercion by nonstate actors, all but slaves were protected from
involuntary marriage.265 In cases where A’s marriage to B was challenged for want
of genuine consent, courts worked from a universally accepted premise that “a
marriage procured by force or fraud is . . . void ab initio, and may be treated as null
by every court.”266 This did not mean that arranged marriages were invalid, that
parental consent couldn’t be required by statute, or that parents and guardians had

258

See infra Section II.B.2.
See infra Section II.B.3.
260
1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 121.
261
James Wilson, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON
323 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896).
262
KEEZER, supra note 11, at 5 (1906) (“the law favors and encourages marriage”).
263
1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 218.
264
Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, A Right Not to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1509, 1513
(2016).
265
On owners who compelled slaves into conjugal unions, see Margaret A. Burnham,
An Impossible Marriage: Slave Law and Family Law, 5 LAW & INEQ. 187, 196 (1987).
266
2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 67 (explaining that “the
ingredient of fraud or duress . . . in this . . . as in any other contract” vitiates “the free assent
of the mind”).
259
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to abstain from pressuring children and wards into a favored match. 267 Absent
serious threats of personal and usually physical harm, courts were prepared to find
“free assent of the mind” in all of these circumstances,268 just as they readily
accepted marriages undertaken to avoid prosecution or punishment for criminal
seduction.269 In suits for fraud, moreover, courts gave eager suitors wide berth for
exaggeration and even outright prevarication so long as no misrepresentations went
to the conjugal “essentials of the marriage.”270
Like many classical ideas about marriage, the prohibition of involuntary unions
was attributed to natural law and inferred from many of natural law’s standard
reference points.271 It had analogues in Christian theology and an especially long
heritage in canon law.272 According to Bishop, the rule that marriage is “never . . .
267

See, e.g., WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra note 50, at 86 (“[I]t is flagitious
to force a child or ward into consent without his or her own will confirming it.”).
268
MANSFIELD, supra note 48, at 238 (“If . . . a marriage is forced by imprisonment, or
by threats of the loss of life or limb, such contract is absolutely void.”).
269
See Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23 (2012). In
the same year that Loving v. Virginia was decided, an eminent family law expert
demonstrated that “a great many of our laws dealing with sexual intercourse between
unmarried parties . . . have been consciously oriented toward or have in fact served to
encourage or force marriage between parties who indulge in such conduct.” Walter
Wadlington, Shotgun Marriage by Operation of Law, 1 GA. L. REV. 183, 193 (1967) (finding
thirty-five jurisdictions in which subsequent marriage or “a renewed offer” to marry “will
serve as a defense” to the crime of seduction and noting “several jurisdictions which permit
[the defense] in prosecutions for statutory rape, bastardy, . . . adultery,” and/or fornication).
270
LONG, supra note 200, at §§ 43–52; see also Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100
CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (“Only fraud going to the ‘essentials’ of the marriage—lies about
sex or procreation—qualified a marriage for annulment.”).
271
BOUVIER, supra note 13, at 101 (“As an institution established by nature, [marriage]
consists in the free and voluntary consent of both parties . . . .”); MANSFIELD, supra note 48,
at 238 (explaining prohibitions of involuntary marriage as means of “securing . . . women in
the just exercise of all their natural rights”).
272
Medieval Church doctrine had “create[d] a zone of freedom” around marital choice,
with “the facultus contrahendi matrimonium, the faculty of contracting marriage,” coming
to be considered “a right [that] . . . a person was free to exercise . . . as he or she saw fit,”
without “coercion.” Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Canonistic Contribution to the Western Rights
Tradition, 33 B.C. L. REV. 37, 77–78 (1991). The eminent sixteenth-century theologian
Francisco de Vitoria held that “no pope, prince, or parent can harm or impede th[e] natural
right” to voluntary marriage and that “no one can be coerced, tricked, or otherwise misled
into . . . marriage.” Witte, supra note 153, at 618 (quoting Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio de
Matrimonio, in RELECTIONES THEOLOGICAE XII (1557)). This principle proved no less
important in most Protestant teachings on marriage. See, e.g., DUNLAVY, supra note 119, at
317 (stating the Shaker doctrine that “no one man, or association of men, have any right to
forbid or require anyone to marry”). For an excellent account of the contractarian model’s
development in Protestant thought on the family, see generally JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM
SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION
(1997).
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imposed on parties who do not consent to accept the status . . . runs throughout the
entire extent of that unwritten law which our forefathers brought hither from the
mother country” and which “radiates, too, through all the domains of our reason.”273
Dictated by “the first principles of natural equity,”274 the rule of voluntariness was
also juris gentium, a policy “to which the world long ago assented, and which no
man yet has appeared, either in this country or in any other, with enough folly to
deny.”275
The natural right not to marry was so fervently cherished that, to an unusual
extent, jurists spoke of it in constitutional and quasi-constitutional terms. Quoting
Thomas Cooley, that “most conservative of all commentators on constitutional law,”
the Supreme Court of Mississippi proclaimed in 1931: “For the legislature to marry
parties against their consent, we conceive to be decidedly against the law of the
land.”276 Marriage contrary to the will of one or both parties, the court continued,
“has always been odious to the free people of this country, and, with the abolition of
slavery, the last remnant of it disappeared from among us.”277 Unlike in “oriental
and semibarbarious nations,” it said, such marriages “have never received toleration
here and . . . would be none the less odious if attempted . . . by the state itself instead
of the smaller despotisms of inner circles.”278 Bishop had made a similar point half
a century earlier: “A government which should compel people into matrimony
without their consent, could not be endured.”279 To illustrate, he sketched the
following scenario:
Now, if a man and woman . . . should be brought together by brute force,
and an official person should say a marriage ceremony over them, they not
consenting, this profanation . . . would not make them husband and wife.
And if the legislature should step in and declare them to be, therefore,
married, the act would be a high outrage . . . [and] there would be, at least,
doubt, whether it would be binding under the constitutions of our States.280
273

1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (5th ed. 1873), supra note 216, at § 95.
Natural equity’s first rule held that government should not “adopt any rule which is
inherently oppressive to its subjects.” 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note
12, at § 12.
275
1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (5th ed. 1873), supra note 216, at § 95.
276
White v. Williams, 132 So. 573, 580 (Miss. 1931) (quoting 2 THOMAS M. COOLEY,
A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 778 (Walter Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927)).
277
Id. at 579.
278
Id.
279
1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (5th ed. 1873), supra note 216, at § 94.
280
Id. at § 90a. Borrowing Bishop’s admonition that “the status of marriage is never
superinduced by any government,” the Mississippi Supreme Court imputed a minimum
requirement of implied consent to a law that purported converted extant cohabitations “as
husband and wife” into legal marriages. Dickerson v. Brown, 49 Miss. 357, 373–76 (1873)
(quoting 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1873), supra note 12, at § 218).
274
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Notably, Bishop gave no indication which constitutional provisions a forced
marriage might violate.
2. The Right to Marry by Mutual Consent
Mutual consent is of the essence of marriage; it constitutes of itself . . . a
perfect marriage according to natural law.281
Reciprocal consent, as we have seen, was a necessary condition of marriage
under natural law. In the United States, it has always and everywhere been necessary
to a valid civil marriage. But was consent alone sufficient? Or were further
formalities required?—particular recitations, parental sanction, community notice,
witnesses, “the interposition of person in holy orders, . . . or solemniz[ation] in a
church”?282 Answers to these questions have fluctuated widely over time and across
jurisdictions. Their variation attests to the turbulent rise and unfinished fall of that
peculiarly American doctrine—peculiar in both name and substance—known as
“common-law marriage,”283 broadly defined as “marriage which does not depend
for its validity upon any religious or civil ceremony but is created by the consent of
the parties as any other contract.”284
Common-law marriage was never so uncontroversial an institution as many of
its supporters proclaimed it, and questions regarding its adoption and regulation
generated prolific case law and commentary throughout the nineteenth and early-

281

BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 63.
REEVE, supra note 195, at 196 (railing against mandatory clerical officiation as a
“usurpation of the church of Rome on the rights of the civilian”).
283
English, Scotch, and Irish jurists did not speak of “common-law marriage.” Instead
they described nuptials that failed to adhere to legal formalities as “informal,” “irregular,”
or, where the union was solemnized outside a church, “clandestine.” Substantively,
American common-law marriage differed from its English variants in several respects. For
example, American courts treated such marriages as fully valid, endowing them with all the
same legal incidents as “regular” marriages; and some states refused to recognize informal
marriages not consummated by sexual intercourse. See GROSSBERG, supra note 19, at 69
(describing how post-Revolutionary American law “rechristened ‘irregular marriage’ as
‘common-law marriage’” and “made matrimony much easier for a couple to enter”);
REBECCA PROBERT, MARRIAGE LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE LONG EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
21–69 (2009) (calling common-law marriage a “distinctive[ly] American concept” and
detailing the important ways in which English law differentiated between regular and
irregular marriages, including its limitation of permissible sexual intercourse to the former);
see also supra notes 211–212 and accompanying text and infra note 288 and accompanying
text (discussing American debates on the necessity of sexual consummation to a valid
common-law marriage).
284
OTTO E. KOEGEL, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 7 (1922).
282
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twentieth centuries.285 Those sources interest us here primarily for their bearing on
an important feature of the natural right to marry—namely, the right to wed by
mutual consent, without any formalities except mutual assent to be husband and
wife.
Conflicting and often fervent beliefs about sexual morality and social order
motivated a good deal of both legislative and judicial decision-making on commonlaw marriage.286 Nonetheless, judges and treatise writers spilled less ink on such
policy concerns than on two relatively technical matters: Did the common law of a
given jurisdiction historically respect a right of informal marriage?287 And if so, did
anything of that common-law right survive legislation codifying procedures for
proper solemnization? Both inquiries could prove quite intricate, involving a host of
subtle distinctions: between a marriage forged by words of present assent (a
“contract per verba de praesenti”) and one that arises upon sexual consummation of
an “engagement of matrimony” (a “promise per verba de future cum copula”);288
285

In a 1915 case presenting just one of many subsidiary questions relating to commonlaw marriage (viz., whether a marriage per verba de praesenti could be found where there
was no subsequent “cohabitation as man and wife”), the Alabama Supreme Court
complained that “[i]t would consume too much time and space to attempt to review the textbooks and adjudicated cases on this subject. There is not only lack of unanimity, but great
conflict . . . [that] amounts almost to a state of anarchy.” Herd v. Herd, 69 So. 885, 887 (Ala.
1915).
286
For explicit engagements with the policy implications of common-law marriage, see
REEVE, supra note 195, at 198 (arguing that “it would be very inconvenient” if “the common
law . . . consider[ed] a marriage, celebrated irregularly, as void”); Rodebaugh v. Sanks, 2
Watts 9, 11 (Pa. 1833) (foreseeing that “a rigid execution of [solemnization statutes] would
bastardize a vast majority of the children which have been born within the state for half a
century”); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 100 N.W. 930, 932 (Neb. 1904) (arguing that the “ancient
doctrine” of common-law marriage “tends to weaken the public estimate of the sanctity of
the marriage relation [and] puts in doubt the certainty of the rights of inheritance”); Huard v.
McTeigh, 113 Or. 279, 295 (1925) (citing as reason to strictly apply solemnization statutes
the court’s “opinion” that common-law marriage “is contrary to public policy and public
morals” because it “places a premium upon illicit cohabitation and offers encouragement to
the harlot and the adventuress”); Rubin v. Irving Tr. Co., 113 N.E.2d 424, 432 (N.Y. 1953)
(noting the issue’s “grave criminal and moral ramifications, e.g., the possible bastardization
of issue and [the] existence of a meretricious relationship”).
287
An equivalent question was raised, mutatis mutandis, in states and territories with a
colonial heritage of civil rather than common law. In a case involving a marriage supposedly
celebrated in Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court looked “to the laws in force in the Spanish
colonies previous to their cession” in determining the validity of a union contracted before a
civil magistrate rather than a priest. Hallett v. Collins, 51 U.S. 174, 181 (1850); see also
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 163 (naming ten states in which
“the intervention of a minister in holy orders . . . has been held unnecessary at common law”
and reporting that “the same has been held in Louisiana” even though that state “derived its
common law from Spain”).
288
Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361, 377, 374 (1872); see also Askew v. Dupree, 30
Ga. 173, 189 (1860) (“[I]f the contract is per verba de presenti— that is, I take you to be my
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between an invalid and an illegal marriage;289 between laws preserving and laws
abrogating common-law rights;290 between the great swaths of law that English
colonists imported to America and the portions they left behind;291 “between the
common law of England and the canon law of Europe”;292 between “English canon
law as it stood previous to the Council of Trent” in the mid-sixteenth century and
English canon law after the Council;293 and on and on.294
wife, and I take you to be my husband—though it be not consummated by cohabitation, or
if it be made per verba de futuro, and be consummated, it amounts to a valid marriage, in the
absence of all municipal regulations to the contrary . . . .”).
289
See, e.g., Sharon v. Sharon, 16 P. 345, 352 (Cal. 1888) (citing a unanimous holding
of the House of Lords that, “by the law of England” as it existed prior to Lord Hardwicke’s
Act of 1753, “a contract of marriage per verba de proesenti was indissoluble between the
parties themselves” and enabled one to sue the other for solemnization in ecclesiastical court,
“but such contract never constituted a full and complete marriage”) (quoting Regina v. Millis
(1844) 8 Eng. Rep. 844; 10 Cl. & F. 534); Dumaresly v. Fishly, 10 Ky. 368, 370–71 (1821)
(distinguishing between the informal marriages that English common law had “deemed valid
to most purposes” and a properly solemnized “marriage de jure, . . . valid to every purpose”);
Denison, 35 Md. at 376 (invoking “common law authorities” to the effect that a “contract
per verba de præsenti, or per verba de futuro cum copula, . . . was incomplete, and did not
confer the civil rights incident to the married state until” its solemnization was “duly
performed”).
290
See infra notes 320–332 and accompanying text.
291
See, e.g., Dumaresly, 10 Ky. 368 at 377 (Mills, J., dissenting) (accepting arguendo
that the English common law permitted informal marriage, but maintaining that the
American colonies and then states “adopted the common law of England . . . only so far as
suited our local situation, and was compatible with the genius and spirit of our government”);
1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at § 418 (“assuming,” contrary
to the authors’ own view, “that the English common law did when our country was settled,
render impossible a marriage without a priest,” but doubting that “this impediment to
matrimony [was] adapted to our altered situation and circumstances”); REEVE, supra note
195, at 199 n.1 (arguing that Lord Hardwicke’s Act of 1752, “although . . . passed while we
were colonists of Great Britain,” was “entirely hostile to the spirit of our institutions” and
“could [n]ever be extended here by construction”).
292
Denison, 35 Md. at 375.
293
SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 40; see also
Hallett v. Collins, 51 U.S. 174, 181 (1850) (“That marriage might be validly contracted by
mutual promises alone . . . was an established principle of civil and canon law antecedent to
the Council of Trent,” which declared in 1563 that a marriage not celebrated before clergy
or multiple witnesses was henceforth “ecclesiastically void”).
294
Jurists also deliberated on the differences [1] between the Council of Trent’s initial
statement that marriages by verba de praesenti are “vera matrimonia” and its contrary decree
that such contracts are “null and void,” Hallett, 51 U.S. at 181–82; [2] between recognizing
informal marriage and accepting cohabitation and repute as evidence of a properly
solemnized marriage contract, KOEGEL, supra note 284, at 110; [3] between a marriage
“clandestine” in the specialized sense that it wasn’t witnessed by clergy (or that it lacked
some “other requisite[] of ecclesiastical law”) and a truly “secret” marriage—i.e., one
without witnesses, Sharon v. Sharon, 16 P.345, 377 (Cal. 1888) (McFarland, J., dissenting);
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Throughout 150 years of wrangling over so many fine points of law and legal
history, one background proposition seems to have passed without contradiction.
Time and again, classical writers on “common-law,” “informal,” and otherwise
“irregular” matrimony avowed that two persons’ good-faith agreement to be
husband and wife constitutes a marriage valid “in the sight of heaven.”295 “[B]y the
law of nature the contract is binding.”296 For proponents of informal marriage,
invocations of the “natural right of union between a man and a woman” traded on a
widely perceived kinship between natural and common law.297 But even the
institution’s opponents regularly admitted (and certainly never denied) that, under
“the law of nature, marriage may be constituted by the mutual present consent of
competent persons, without the addition of any formality.”298 Often this principle
was stated by reference to “the state of nature, where no solemnities of marriage are
prescribed.”299 American jurists frequently adopted Lord Stowell’s account in Lindo
v. Belisario (1795)300 of the bilateral consent to cohabitation and procreation that,
“in a state of nature, would be a marriage,”301 and they were still more enamored of
his description in Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (1811) of the “contract of natural law”
that existed between “the common ancestors of mankind.”302 In 1908, a Missouri
court named those ancestors explicitly, stating that “the marriage of Adam and Eve
was not only without a witness, . . . but, so far as the record shows, they married
themselves; he repeating the contract and she acquiescing by silence.”303
[4] between recorded and unrecorded contracts per verba de praesenti, Maryland v. Baldwin,
112 U.S. 490, 495 (1884) (requiring, at least under Pennsylvania law, “some public
recognition” of the union after an unrecorded informal marriage but not after a recorded one).
295
Roberts v. Roberts, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 368, 368–69 (Com. Pl. 1850).
296
TOMLINS, supra note 255, at Marriage (“[T]hough the positive law of man ordains
Marriage to be made by a priest, that law only makes this Marriage irregular, and not
expressly void.”).
297
In re Strauther’s Estate, 29 Pa.C.C. 321, 321 (Orph. 1904) (recapitulating an alleged
widow’s argument that she and the decedent had exercised this right when they “came
together and lived by agreement as husband and wife under the [doctrine of] common-law
marriage.”).
298
Frank Gaylord Cook, Marriage Celebration in the United States, 61 ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 520, 531 (Apr. 1888).
299
State v. Harris, 63 N.C. 1, 4–5 (1868); see also BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed.
1852) supra note 47, at § 42 (“[M]utual agreement is the only thing requisite, in a state of
nature, to constitute marriage”).
300
Lindo v. Belisario (1795) 161 Eng. Rep. 530; 1 Hag. Con. 215.
301
See BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 158 (enthusing that
Lord Stowell’s opinion, though not “universally approved,” was “regarded as a production
of matchless beauty and learning”); see also supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text
(discussing and documenting the opinion’s influence).
302
Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (1811) 161 Eng. Rep. 665, 669; 2 Hag. Con. 54, 63; see
also In re Hulett’s Estate, 69 N.W. 31, 34 (1896) (referring to “the leading case of Dalrymple
v. Dalrymple, . . . which is the foundation of much of the law on the subject”).
303
Davis v. Stouffer, 112 S.W. 282, 283 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908) (citing Genesis 2:23).
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In canon law, it wasn’t the fertile bond of Adam and Eve but the chaste marriage
of Mary and Joseph that had proved decisive as to whether consent alone or “consent
cum copula” was the basis of true matrimony (“verum matrimonium”).304 Since the
twelfth century, the Church generally followed Peter Lombard in rejecting the view
“that without carnal union, matrimony cannot be contracted.”305 To put the point in
positive terms, canon law “adopted,” for largely theological reasons, the adage of
the Roman civil law that “consensus, non concubitus, facit matrimonium”306—that
“it is the contract, . . . not the cohabitation, which makes [a] marriage.”307 In the
American jurisdictions that recognized informal marriage, courts imputed this
doctrine of the medieval Church to the common law of England—and, in turn, to the

304

Regina v. Millis (1844) 8 Eng. Rep. 844; 10 Cl. & F. 534 (Op. of the Lord
Chancellor) (“a mutual promise or contract of present matrimony . . . was considered to be
of the essence of matrimony, and was therefore, and by reason of its indissoluble nature,
styled in the ecclesiastical law verum matrimonium, and sometimes ipsum matrimonium”);
STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY 106 (2005); see also Grigsby v. Reib, 153 S.W.
1124, 1129 (Tex. 1913) (invoking Adam and Eve’s fulfillment of the divine command to
“multiply and replenish the earth” as reason to reject an alleged common-law not perfected
by “cohabitation”).
305
ELIZABETH FRANCES ROGERS, PETER LOMBARD AND THE SACRAMENTAL SYSTEM
246 app. (1917); see also JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN
MEDIEVAL EUROPE 264–65 (1987) (describing the “triumph” of Peter Lombard’s theory that
“consummation was legally irrelevant” where “a couple . . . had exchanged present consent
to marry”).
306
PATRICK IRVINE, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE INEXPEDIENCY OF THE LAW OF
MARRIAGE IN SCOTLAND 13 (1828); see also 12 CORPUS JURIS: BEING A COMPLETE AND
SYSTEMATIC STATEMENT OF THE WHOLE BODY OF THE LAW 514 (William Mack & William
Benjamin Hale eds., 1917) (explaining, with citation to Blackstone, that this “maxim . . . is
adopted by the common lawyers who, indeed, have borrowed (especially in ancient times)
almost all their notions of the legitimacy of marriage from the canon and civil laws”).
307
Bullock v. Bullock, 32 N.Y.S. 1009, 1010 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1895) (calling this “a
maxim as old as the common law”); see also McKenna v. McKenna, 54 N.E. 641, 643 (Ill.
1899) (reciting this “universally accepted maxim”). The maxim stood in tension with the
availability of annulment in certain cases of nonconsummation, including those where one
party had failed before marrying to disclose his or her inability to consummate. Following
Rutherford, some jurists resolved this tension by holding that “want of consummation . . .
rather invalidates by non-performance a marriage, that was otherwise complete, than makes
it a nullity from the beginning by any defect in the marriage itself.” RUTHERFORTH, supra
note 148, at 356–57. Fraud, mistake, and analogous claims offered supplementary
justifications for annulment in such cases; see BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra
note 47, at § 227 (citing the aforementioned lines from Rutherford); Jerosolimski v.
Jerosolimski, 188 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959) (stating that an “assertion of [ ]
sexual potency . . . is [presumptively] implicit in every offer of marriage” and therefore
holding that an annulment on the ground of impotency should have been granted in the trial
court).
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common law of their own states.308 Conformity to “principles of natural law” only
bolstered this lineage.309 An 1821 decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, for
instance, proceeded directly from nature’s barebones model for contracting marriage
to the conclusion that “a marriage thus made without further ceremony, was,
according to the simplicity of the ancient common law, deemed valid to all
persons.”310
Accounts of American common-law marriage often begin with Fenton v. Reed
(1809), a short per curium decision attributed to Chancellor James Kent. Fenton
declared the law in New York to be, first, that “a contract of marriage made per
verba de presenti amounts to an actual marriage, and is as valid as if made in facie
ecclesiae,” and second, that such a contract “may be proved . . . from cohabitation,
reputation, acknowledgment of the parties, reception in the family, and other
[relevant] circumstances . . . .”311 The inaugural edition of Kent’s Commentaries
(1827) elaborated these points. In what proved to be an immensely influential
passage, Kent appealed to natural law and several of its positive-law repositories to
burnish his particular gloss on the common law of marriage:
No peculiar ceremonies are requisite by the common law as to the valid
celebration of [a] marriage. The consent of the parties is all that is required;
and as marriage is said to be a contract jure gentium, that consent is all that
is required by natural or public law. The Roman lawyers strongly
inculcated the doctrine that . . . [n]uptias non concubitus, sed consensus
facit. This is the language equally of the common and canon law, and of
common reason.312
308

See, e.g., In re Hulett’s Estate, 69 N.W. 31, 33 (Minn. 1896) (describing “the
authorities” as “practically unanimous to this effect”); Davis v. Stouffer, 112 S.W. 282, 285
(Mo. Ct. App. 1908) (applying this “maxim of the common law”); Jackson v. Winne, 7
Wend. 47, 50 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1831) (stating that “the maxim of the civil law . . . has ever been
regarded in courts of common law as a good definition of marriage”). A minority of courts
held otherwise. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Hawkins, 142 Ala. 573, 574 (1905) (finding “no
marriage” where “the formal consent to be man and wife was not consummated into that
relation”).
309
See, e.g., Dumaresly v. Fishly, 10 Ky. 368, 370, 372 (1821) (upholding “a marriage
de facto” that “was not consummated by cohabitation” and explaining that “the maxim of
the common law . . . that ‘consensus, non concubitus, facit matrimonium’” may have been
“borrowed, it is true, from the civil law, but [was] founded on the . . . nature of the thing.”);
see also FRASER, supra note 235, at 91 (opining that “the maxim . . . is not so much of positive
law as of natural reason”).
310
Dumaresly, 10 Ky. 368 at 370.
311
Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52, 54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809).
312
2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 75. Kent’s long chain of
mutual corroborations resounded a generation later in another influential volume of
Commentaries. See BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 67 (reporting
that the maxim “consensus non concubitus” was the rule of Roman “civil law, and has
become equally so of the ecclesiastical, of the common, and indeed of all law . . . .”).
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As Kent’s critics protested “from the first,” the learned judge’s liberal take on
“the freedom of the common law” of marriage formation was incomplete and largely
erroneous.313 Even so, within a few decades of its appearance, “the Kent doctrine”
on matrimony had become gospel to many American lawyers, including multiple
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.314 In the unanimous case of Hallett v. Collins
(1850), Justice Robert Cooper Grier acknowledged that, in England, the supposed
birthplace of common-law marriage, “it has been disputed as of late” that a
“marriage might be validly contracted by mutual promises alone”; still he pretended
that this principle was “never doubted here.”315 The latter statement was simply

313

See 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 74 (describing New
York’s permissive stance). “[F]rom the first, there has been a small but respectable body of
judges and writers who have constantly and consistently questioned the Kent doctrine, and
opposed its acceptance. Not only do they deem it pernicious to society, but they also attack
[its] historical premises . . . .” Cook, supra note 298, at 521–23 (alleging that Fenton was not
“borne out by the English cases [it] cited[,] . . . was based on no American authority, and
was . . . inconsistent with the statutory system that had come down from colonial times.”).
Even Bishop, a strong proponent of common-law marriage, could not say with certainty that
“the law of England as it stood” prior to Lord Hardwicke’s Act incorporated the principle
that “mutual consent, . . . constitutes of itself, and without the addition of any ceremonies, a
perfect marriage according to natural law . . . .” BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852),
supra note 47, at § 63 (emphasis added). Bishop’s hesitation was warranted. As Rebecca
Probert has meticulously demonstrated, there were multiple and important ways in which
English common law refused, well before Lord Hardwicke’s Act, to honor a marriage per
verba de praesenti. See generally PROBERT, supra note 283. Interestingly, Probert’s main
findings accord with the much older conclusions of quite a few American jurists; see, e.g.,
PARSONS, supra note 61, at 561 (recommending “Jacop’s Addenda to Roper on Husband and
Wife” for its “elaborate” showing “that a contract of marriage in verba de praesenti, without
ceremony of any kind, did not constitute a valid marriage at common law”); Cheney v.
Arnold, 15 N.Y. 345, 351 (1857) (denying that informal marriage became “the law of [New
York] by force of our adoption of the common law of England, for it was not a part of that
common law”); Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361, 377 (1872) (construing “all the common
law authorities” to mean that a “contract per verba de præsenti, or per verba de futuro cum
copula . . . was incomplete, and did not confer” any of marriage’s civil incidents “until . . .
sanctioned by religious ceremony, duly performed”); Peacock v. Peacock, 26 S.E.2d 608,
614 (Ga. 1943) (summoning “respectable authority” to the effect that the American doctrine
of common-law marriage was based on “misconceptions” of English legal history); In re
Soeder’s Estate, 220 N.E.2d 547, 561 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966) (noting that, in 1684, “the
Colonial Assembly of New York . . . passed an act requiring marriage to be solemnized
formally,” a fact “overlooked by Chancellor Kent” in his account of New York’s law on the
matter).
314
See Cook, supra note 298, at 526 (surveying common-law marriage’s acceptance
across much of the United States and concluding that “the Kent doctrine may be said to be
the prevailing common law” in this country).
315
Hallett v. Collins, 51 U.S. 174, 181 (1850).
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untrue,316 and is nothing short of baffling when one considers that the Court was
“evenly divided” only seven years earlier on a closely related—some said
identical—question.317
The natural, common right to marry reached its doctrinal high-water mark in
Meister v. Moore (1877), where the question presented was whether a union
allegedly contracted in Michigan in 1845 was valid if, contrary to a statute then and
there in force, “neither a minister nor a magistrate was present.”318 Writing for
another unanimous bench, Justice William Strong upheld the marriage. Like Justice
Grier in Hallett, he professed to harbor “no doubt, in view of the adjudications made
in this country, from its earliest settlement to the present day,” that “informal
marriage by contract per verba de praesenti . . . constitutes a marriage at common
law.”319 Following a popular (but not universal) practice among state courts, Justice
Strong treated the Michigan statute as “merely directory”—that is, advisory—
pursuant to the venerable canon of statutory interpretation according to which
legislation “passed in derogation of the common law . . . should be construed
strictly.”320 Although “a statute may take away a common-law right[,]” Meister
explained, “there is always a presumption that the legislature has no such intention,
unless it be plainly expressed” in clear “words of nullity.”321 So rather than
316

See, e.g., Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 53 (1810) (“When our ancestors left
England, and ever since, it is well known that a lawful marriage there must be celebrated
before a clergyman in orders . . . .”).
317
Although the specific question presented in Jewell v. Jewell was “what constituted
marriage, at the time of [the parties’] cohabitation, by the laws of Georgia and South
Carolina,” certain language in the decision could be read to contemplate a more abstract and
universal common law. The Court “express[ed] no opinion” as to whether a “contract . . . per
verba de presenti, . . . or . . . per verba de futuro . . . followed by consummation, . . . amounts
to a valid marriage . . . and is as equally binding as if made in facie ecclesiae.” 42 U.S. 219,
224, 230–34 (1843) (emphasis added). Some readers of the Jewell decision understood the
case to involve only Georgia and South Carolina law, but others opted for the broader
interpretation. For examples of the former, see Jones v. Jones, 48 Md. 391, 401 (1878) and
In re Roberts’ Estate, 133 P.2d 492, 501 (Wyo. 1943). For examples of the latter, see Herd
v. Herd, 69 So. 885, 886 (Ala. 1915); Roberts v. Roberts, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 368, 368–69
(Com. Pl. 1850); and PARSONS, supra note 61, at 561.
318
Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 77 (1877).
319
Id. at 78. Forty years after Meister, the Court invoked this passage in a ruling that
strained to discern a valid marriage in a relationship commenced in Virginia, continued in
Maryland, and ended by the husband’s death in New Jersey, which was the only state among
the three to recognize common-law marriage. See Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U.S. 423, 440
(1907).
320
Ross v. Jones, 89 U.S. 576, 591 (1874); see also Meister, 96 U.S. at 80–81 (avowing
the Court’s adoption of the general “rule deduced . . . from the decided cases . . . ‘. . . in most,
if not all, the United States’”) (quoting 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 514–15 (7th ed. 1858)). On courts’ selectivity in applying the canon, see Pound,
Ideal Element, supra note 44, at 142–43.
321
Meister, 96 U.S. at 79.
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withdrawing the “common-law right to form the marriage relation by words of
present assent,” Michigan’s statute merely “provid[ed] a legitimate mode”—not the
only one—“of solemnizing it.”322
The doctrine of Meister treated informal marriage as a liberty that, if not a
constitutional right, was still no ordinary object of the state’s general police power.
Thanks to the canon that statutes in abrogation of common law are merely advisory
unless a contrary “intention . . . be plainly expressed,” the right to privately contract
marriage long enjoyed a formidable measure of judicial protection.323 The language
in which judges articulated that protection enhanced the doctrine’s quasiconstitutional feel. In Meister, the Court said that legislation may “regulate the mode
of entering into the contract, but they do not confer the right.”324 It held Michigan’s
solemnization “merely directory . . . because marriage is a thing of common right”—
a notable but somewhat ambiguous expression.325 “Common right” was often used
at the time as shorthand for nothing more than a right recognized at common law,326
but it also carried centuries-old connotations of “higher law”: “something
fundamental, something permanent”;327 something that could not be granted or

322

Id.
Id.; see also GROSSBERG, supra note 19, at 74 (recounting how judges’ deployment
of the canon, coupled with “legislative inaction,” long enabled courts in multiple
jurisdictions to “render[] nuptial statutes impotent”); cf. Follansbee v. Wilbur, 44 P. 262, 264
(Wash. 1896) (reading Meister as “a construction of . . . a Michigan statute” and therefore
having scant relevance in other states and territories).
324
Meister, 96 U.S. at 78.
325
Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
326
See, e.g., Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 62 Cal. 69, 107 (1882), aff’d sub
nom. Spring Valley Water-Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347 (1884) (“[T]he common right
refers to the right of citizens generally at common law.”); see also Common Right, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910) (defining “common right” as “the term applied to rights,
privileges, and immunities appertaining to and enjoyed by all citizens equally and in
common, and which have their foundation in the common law”).
327
Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional
Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 365, 370 (1929) (interpreting Coke’s phrase “common right and
reason”).
323
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withheld by the will of the sovereign;328 something, indeed, “of natural law.”329 In
these loftier senses, common rights had conceptual and ethical affinities with
constitutional rights.330 Their infringement might not, like constitutional rights, be
overturned by judicial review,331 but insofar as “common” rights were no less than
328

See, e.g., Arkansas R.R. Comm’n v. Indep. Bus Lines, 285 S.W. 388, 391 (Ark.
1926) (McCulloch, C.J., dissenting) (contrasting “common use” of a state’s highways with
privileged “special use” and stating that only the latter could be “granted or withheld by the
lawmakers at will”); Shaw v. Crawford, 10 Johns. 236, 238 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (describing
“the general sense of mankind” that “the free use of waters which can be made subservient
to commerce” is a common right that “ought to be liberally supported”). As these examples
suggest, “things” said to be “of common right” were often public utilities. While it’s tempting
to consider marriage in that light—the relation itself, after all, was frequently characterized
in divorce litigation as a res—the expression “common right” was almost always used in this
context to refer to getting married, not to the marital status itself. See Coddington v.
Coddington, 20 N.J. Eq. 263, 264 (Ch. 1869) (explaining that divorce actions and
“[p]roceedings with regard to the validity . . . of marriage . . . are . . . proceedings in rem”
because “[t]hey actually operate upon the matter; they affirm, constitute, or dissolve the
marriage relation”).
329
See infra notes 333–336 and accompanying text; see also Massachusetts House of
Representatives, The Massachusetts Resolves (Oct. 29, 1765), reprinted in PROLOGUE TO
REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764–1766 56
(Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959) (referring to “certain essential Rights of the British
Constitution of Government, which are founded in the Law of God and Nature, and are the
common Rights of Mankind”).
330
For an indication of both the distance and the proximity between the two ideas,
consider the argument that plaintiffs in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873),
“butchers claiming a right to pursue a lawful employment,” were essentially “invit[ing] the
Court to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment provided absolute constitutional protection for
all such ‘common rights.’” Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight:
A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 673 (2000); see also
Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Marshall, in COLLECTED L EGAL PAPERS 266, 266 (1920)
(crediting as “one of the foundations for American constitutional law” James Otis’s 1761
invocation of Coke’s argument in Dr. Bonham’s Case that a legislative act “against common
right and reason” is void); Corwin, supra note 327, at 380 (suggesting that “American
constitutional law during the last half century has tended increasingly . . . to return to the
vaguer tests of ‘common right and reason’”); Pound, Ideal Element, supra note 44, at 138
(arguing that judicial interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment continue a tradition of
“ethical natural law with . . . common-law content” that “seemed to have a warrant” in
prominent English jurists’ uses of “common right and reason” and “the nature of justice”).
331
Bennett v. Boggs, 3 F. Cas. 221, 228 (C.C.D.N.J. 1830) (“[W]e cannot pronounce
[a] law void because, in the exercise of an unbounded constitutional power, the
government . . . [has] restrained it within limits narrower than those allowed by common
law, or common right.”). Inklings of such forbearance can be found even in Marbury v.
Madison, where Chief Justice Marshall, lauding our “written constitution” as the nation’s
“greatest improvement on political institutions,” explained that the federal government’s
“powers . . . are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten,
the constitution is written.” 5 U.S. 137, 176–78 (1803) (emphases added). Five years before
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common-law rights, judges keen to preserve them were not without options. As they
did with laws abrogating the right to marry informally, courts could forestall through
vigilant statutory interpretation what they could not forbid by constitutional
decree.332
To the extent that “common right” did mean something more—more
fundamental, more permanent—than “common-law right,” this surplus constituted
an especially compelling reason, or at least an exceptionally high-sounding
justification, to make compliance with solemnization statutes optional. Decisions
holding these laws directory, not mandatory, stressed that a natural as well as a
common-law right was at stake.333 As James Schouler explained the thrust of many
a nineteenth-century judicial decision, it was “out of consideration for what may be
termed the public, or natural and theoretical law of marriage” that “many American
courts have, to a very liberal extent and beyond all stress of necessity, upheld the
informal marriage against even legislative provisions for a formal celebration.”334 In
1861, the Ohio Supreme Court refused to treat such a “statute as restrictive and
prohibitory, as invalidating what, by natural law, the general law of society,
Marbury, however, members of the Court had disagreed about the propriety of nullifying
legislation on extra-constitutional grounds. Compare Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798),
with Calder, 3 U.S. at 399 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
332
On courts’ quasi-constitutional use of the canon that statutes in derogation of
common law should be strictly construed, see Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation,
21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 386–88 (1908) [hereinafter Pound, Common Law and Legislation]
(associating the canon as well as judicial review with the American common-law judge’s
prejudice against legislation and finding the canon generally indefensible where there is a
written constitution); Pound, Ideal Element, supra note 44, at 142–43 (describing a
pronounced strain in American legal thought that posits “the historically given common law
as natural law” and expresses itself both in the canon of strict construction “as applied to
legislation” and in judicial interpretations of “bills of rights” “as applied to constitutions”).
More recent scholarship has suggested that Coke’s famous claim in Dr. Bonham’s Case—
that “common law will controul . . . [and] void” legislation “against common right and
reason”—can either be read “modestly as an example of the canon . . . of . . . strict
construction” or “more broadly” as a harbinger of the canon of constitutional avoidance.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power”
in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1005–06, 1018, 1025,
1027, 1036 (2001).
333
“Marriage existed before statutes; it is of natural right. . . . Hence, . . . it has become
established authority that a marriage good at the common law is good notwithstanding the
existence of any statute on the subject, unless the statute contains express words of nullity.”
1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at §§ 423–24 (emphasis in
original) (citing nineteen cases in support of this proposition); see also In re McLaughlin’s
Estate, 4 Wash. 570, 587 (1892) (summarizing but rejecting the rule of Askew v. Dupree, 30
Ga. 173 (1860), which held “that marriage is a natural right, which always existed prior to
the organization of any form of government, and all laws in restraint of it should be strictly
construed in consequence thereof”).
334
JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 29 (4th
ed. 1889) (citing, inter alia, Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877)).
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independent of statutory prohibition, would be regarded a valid marriage.”335 Thirty
years later, applying the same rule of construction, another Ohio decision began with
a reminder that “statutes neither confer nor abridge the right to enter into marriage.
The right to marry is a natural one, recognized . . . by the laws of all Christian
countries.”336
Appeals to “the general law of society” and “the laws of all Christian countries”
indicate another device by which proponents of informal marriage reinforced the
moral claims of natural law, linked them to the age-old tradition of the common law,
and resisted legislation requiring formalities. Recall Chancellor Kent’s declaration
that “marriage is . . . a contract jure gentium,” the simple “consent of the parties . . .
[being] all that is required by natural or public law.”337 As the phrasing of Kent’s
pronouncement suggests, “public law,” in the sense of public international law or
“the law of nations,” had strong associations with natural law.338 Like the notion of
common right, it offered all the more reason to condemn legislative encroachment
on “contract[s] of marriage per verba de presenti,” which were said to be “valid by
a common law prevailing throughout Christendom.”339 According to Bishop, one
consequence of marriage’s location in the jus gentium was a rebuttable presumption
that informal marriages are valid under the law of any foreign jurisdiction.340
335

Carmichael v. State, 12 Ohio St. 553, 558–59 (1861). Instead the court applied the
“rule of construction, which appears to be established by the authorities, that a marriage good
at the common law is good notwithstanding the existence of any statute on the subject, unless
the statute contains express words of nullity.” Id. at 555.
336
Courtright v. Courtright, 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 413, 413 (Com. Pl. 1891).
337
2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 75; see also SCHOULER,
DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 40 (“Informal celebration constitutes
marriage as known to natural and public law.”).
338
See Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND.
L. REV. 819, 823 (1989) (noting the eighteenth-century “consensus . . . that the law of nations
rested in large measure on natural law”); Pound, Common Law and Legislation, supra note
332, at 394 (“[C]ommon law dicta [to the effect] that legislation cannot change a rule of
international law . . . proceed upon the theory that international law is the law of nature
applied to international relations and hence is of superior authority to positive law.”).
339
Davis v. Stouffer, 112 S.W. 282, 286 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908) (quoting with approval
Voltaire’s belief that “marriage may exist, with all its natural and civil effects,” without
religious solemnization, because “[m]arriage is a contract in the law of nations, of which the
church has made a sacrament”).
340
Bishop’s logic on this point is elaborate. Having established “the well-settled general
principle of the common law, or perhaps more properly of international law,” that a
marriage’s validity is governed by the lex loci contractus, Bishop explains the evidentiary
presumption in favor of informal marriage as follows: “Marriage . . . is a thing of natural
law, and under that law it is entered into by mutual consent alone. . . . From the law of nature
it has ascended through the municipal institutions of all civilized countries into the general
international code. Now,” because “all courts recognize the laws both of nature and of
nations,” even a jurisdiction with mandatory formalities for solemnization must, unless its
own laws expressly hold otherwise, not only honor an informal marriage validly contracted
abroad; it must presume such validity—for “[i]t would not be safe to say that parties had
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Favoring this approach over several alternative rules of decision,341 a Missouri court
reasoned in 1916 that, since “[t]he contract of marriage [is] one of natural right and
recognized by the law of nations,” a couple’s “mutual agreement” only three years
earlier in Nebraska—“he promising her to be a good husband and she promising him
to be a good and faithful wife”—was “valid [in Missouri] in the absence of any
showing . . . that it was invalid where made.”342 A handful of judges pushed the
presumption of validity still further. Faced with the text of a foreign country’s (or
sister state’s) solemnization statutes, they applied an internationalized (or
federalized) version of the canon of strict construction, reading statutory
“restrictions and conditions” as hortatory unless they specifically “declare[d]
marriages void which are not contracted according to their provisions.”343
Common-law marriage’s vulnerability to legislative derogation is one reason
why, especially in the long run, the doctrine’s opponents and skeptics lost little to
concede that natural law encompasses a right to marry by private agreement344—or,
consented to a thing, as marriage, unless the consent were expressed as required by the law
of the place . . . .” BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at §§ 125, 144. For
cases applying the presumption, see, e.g., People v. Loomis, 64 N.W. 18, 18–19 (Mich. 1895)
and Hutchins v. Kimmell, 31 Mich. 126, 132 (1875).
341
See Hynes v. McDermott, 82 N.Y. 41, 41 (1880) (“In the absence of proof it will not
be presumed that the law of marriage of another country is different from that of this State.”);
Fowler v. Fowler, 79 A.2d 24, 26 (N.H. 1951) (“If no evidence of the law of a foreign or
sister state is presented to the trial court, a presumption in favor of the common law will
govern if that law is there in force.”).
342
Butterfield v. Ennis, 186 S.W. 1173, 1174, 1176 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916). As it happens,
Nebraska did recognize common-law marriage, albeit grudgingly, when the couple
exchanged vows in 1913, so the presumption of extraterritorial validity was accurate in that
case. See Sorensen v. Sorensen, 100 N.W. 930, 932 (Neb. 1904). By contrast, in 1896, the
Illinois Supreme Court upheld an interracial marriage contracted per verba de praesenti in
Louisiana in 1869 because “marriage is a contract jure gentium” and there was no evidence
in the record that Louisiana prohibited the marriage at that date—which, in fact, it had. See
Laurence v. Laurence, 45 N.E. 1071, 1072 (Ill. 1896); VIRGINIA DOMINGUEZ, WHITE BY
DEFINITION: SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION IN CREOLE LOUISIANA 26, 28 (1986) (stating that
Louisiana repealed its “miscegenation” ban in 1870, one year after the marriage validated in
Laurence, and did not reenact such a ban until 1894).
343
Overseers of the Poor of the Town of Newbury v. Overseers of the Poor of the Town
of Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151, 160 (1829) (validating a Canadian marriage contract per verba de
proesenti where the statute lacked express words of nullity); see also Hutchins, 31 Mich. at
132 (endorsing “the doctrine of Steadman v. Powell, 1 Add. 58 (1820), where the proof of
an Irish marriage” tended to confirm that it had been celebrated “by a popish priest” and was
therefore illegal under local law).
344
Roberts v. Roberts, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 368, 368–69 (Com. Pl. 1850) (ruling that
“simple agreement between the parties . . . without solemnization . . . may, in the sight of
heaven, be a valid marriage,” but was invalid in Ohio); see also Inhabitants of Town of
Milford v. Inhabitants of Town of Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 55 (1810) (acknowledging that “a
mutual engagement to intermarry, by parties competent to make such contract, would in a
moral view, be a good marriage”). The principle of legislative supremacy in this matter had
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indeed, that mandatory nuptial statutes “invade [a] most sacred right of the
individual.”345 If anything, critics seemed to suggest, appeals to natural law proved
too much: In regulating the solemn business of contracting marriage, “advanced”
societies were entitled and probably wise to forsake the do-it-yourself
permissiveness of stateless nature.346 Who could deny that recognition of informal
marriage was fast becoming anomalous in the “Christian” and “civilized” world?347
The trend was but one of “many ways” in which the “natural rights or privileges of
mankind” were “restrained . . . to promote the welfare of the community and the
government of the many.”348
Ultimately, when legislative push came to shove, the natural right to marry by
private contract and its supposed incarnation in common law proved no match for
statutes mandating formalities. In fact, contests over the fate of this ostensible
common-law right were among American jurists’ earliest opportunities to articulate
the classical period’s most audible and important constitutional idea about
marriage—to wit, that “marriage being a status and in its nature semi-public, the
legislative power over it is nearly, perhaps absolutely, omnipotent.”349 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Maynard v. Hill was the definitive statement of this “doctrine of
pedigree. See, e.g., PUFENDORF, supra note 93, at 476–77 (affirming the duty of “all Subjects
to obey . . . Ordinances” that require certain “ceremonies, annex’d to Matrimony, . . . altho’
the Law of Nature be a Stranger to these Formalities . . . ”).
345
HOWARD, supra note 230, at 184 (arguing that this “right . . . must yield to the higher
claims of society”).
346
JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 31 (3d
ed. 1884) (contrasting “informal marriage” with “formal requirements which human
government imposes at an advanced stage of society” and noting equanimously that laws
“now in force in England and most of the United States render certain solemnities . . .
indispensable [sic]”); see also Inhabitants of Town of Milford, 7 Mass. at 55 (associating
informal celebration with “fraud,” “surprise,” and “the vilest seduction”); In re Roberts’
Estate, 133 P.2d 492, 498 (Wyo. 1943) (suggesting that reliance on “the bare element of
natural law” in “a contractual marriage” has “little regard for the sanctity of marriage”).
347
See, e.g., Herd v. Herd, 69 So. 885, 886–87 (Ala. 1915) (“we know of no civilized
nation or country which has not some civil regulations on the subject”); Cheney v. Arnold,
15 N.Y. 345, 350–51 (1857) (endorsing Lord Mansfield’s 1753 declaration in Parliament
that “enter[ing] into a marriage contract without . . . any religious ceremony whatever . . .
will be a good marriage both by the law of God and the law of nature; yet the law of this
society, and I believe of every other christian [sic] society, has declared it not to be a good
marriage”); BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 42 (“[M]utual
agreement is the only thing requisite, in a state of nature, to constitute marriage. But the laws
of many, perhaps most civilized countries, have added other conditions, though they may,
philosophically, be all resolved into . . . one, since the law does not recognize that as a
contract which is entered into contrary to the provisions of law.”); PARSONS, supra note 61,
at 1853 (“In all Christian countries of which we have any knowledge, and as we suppose in
all civilized countries, certain ceremonies are prescribed for the celebration of marriage,
either by express law, or by a usage which has the force of law . . . .”).
348
Offield v. Davis, 40 S.E. 910, 914 (Va. 1902).
349
1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at § 824.
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status.”350 Rejecting a claim that the Contracts Clause protects some or all of
marriage’s obligations from legislative impairment, the Maynard Court opined that,
apart from the relation’s initial basis in mutual consent, marriage is “simply . . . a
status or institution”:351
Marriage, . . . as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a
people than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of
the legislature. That body prescribes the age at which parties may contract
to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the duties
and obligations it creates, its effects upon the property rights of both,
present and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds for its
dissolution.352
This principle of plenary legislative control wasn’t entirely without limits.
Classical marriage jurisprudence contemplated two situations in which natural
law—in and of itself, or through the medium of international law—might compel
the validity of an informal marriage.353 The first of these was actually a corollary of
the doctrine of status. In places where there was no legislative or other sovereign
power overseeing marriage formation, as “on the high seas, or out of the jurisdiction
of any civilized state, . . . the laws of nature and of nations” furnished the default
rules.354 Thus it was “generally recognized . . . that parties marooned on an island,
where ‘no law’ applies, could marry according to their own forms.”355
350
See supra note 123 and accompanying text, as well as infra notes 354 and 484 and
accompanying text.
351
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 213 (quoting Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37, 50 (1857))
(emphasis in original, perhaps to convey use of a Latin or French term that had not yet been
wholly absorbed into American legal English). For a relevant lexigraphic discussion of
“status,” see Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage, supra note 10, at 36–41.
352
Maynard, 125 U.S. 190, at 205 (emphasis added).
353
See PROBERT, supra note 283, at 21–22, n.3.
354
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 144; see also Fisher v.
Fisher, 165 N.E. 460, 461–62 (N.Y. 1929) (A marriage on the “high seas” is valid unless
clearly condemned “by the common voice of Christendom” or by some law which “follow[s]
the ship . . . .”). On courts’ determinations of which sovereign’s law, if any, follows a
particular vessel onto the high seas, see Clive Parry, A Conflicts Myth: The American
“Consular” Marriage, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1207–09 (1954) and James B. Smith, Tying
the Knot at Sea, 112 MIL. L. REV. 155 (1986).
355
Comment, Marriage on the High Seas, 38 YALE L.J. 1129, 1132–33, n.25 (1929)
(making a similar argument for marriage “on the open sea,” which is either res communis,
“subject only to international law,” or “a place without law,” where the “natural right” to
marry is immediately operative); see also STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note
11, at § 122 (citing Philippe Antoine Merlin and other French jurists who asserted that
marriage “is a contract so completely of natural and moral law, that when celebrated by
savages . . . where there are no established laws, it will be recognised as good in other
countries.”).
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The second natural-law limitation on state control over nuptial solemnization
was more provocative, mainly because it departed from a rule of “comity,” a “jus
gentium,” whereby “the validity of a marriage . . . is referred to the lex loci
contractus” (i.e., the law of the place where it was contracted).356 Here the danger
wasn’t a regulatory vacuum, as with “parties cast away on an unknown island,”357
but exclusionary legislation imposing formalities, typically religious, that a couple
traveling abroad couldn’t or wouldn’t fulfill due to “peculiarities of religious
opinion” or “conscientious scruples.”358 Under such circumstances, otherwise
marriageable individuals were entitled to wed “in their own forms.”359 So long as
they exchanged the requisite consent, their natural marriage would be “recognized
at home as good.”360
3. A Right to Marry the Person of One’s Choice?
The previous section offered something akin to a “constitutional” reading of
Meister v. Moore and of the many cases before and after Meister in which judges
resisted legislative encroachments on the supposed “common-law right” to marry.
That reading stressed two related phenomena: courts’ determination to treat statutes
imposing formalities as directory rather than mandatory; and their justification of
that practice in rhetoric—“common right,” “natural right,” “jus gentium”—redolent
of higher law. Evidently, classical legal culture did see direct access to marriage as
“more than a mere statutory privilege.”361
Nonetheless, drawing a direct line from Meister’s “common right” to contract
a marriage to Loving’s constitutional right to marry is harder than some scholars
have suggested.362 To state the obvious, the canon of construction that charged courts
356

Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18, 37 (1881).
Tug-Boat Marriages, supra note 20, at 274.
358
STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at § 118; see also JOSEPH
JACKSON, THE FORMATION AND ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE 171 (2nd ed. 1969) (affirming
that the lex loci “rule . . . is inapplicable where there is no local form, as in some unoccupied
territory, or where the local form is not of a kind with which, for legal or moral reasons, a
person can conform”).
359
Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143, 145 (Cal. 1898); see also 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES
(6th ed. 1881) supra note 76, at § 392 (citing, inter alia, Kent v. Burgess, 11 Sim. 361). The
principle was often illustrated by reference to foreign authorities; see, e.g., Tug-Boat
Marriages, supra note 20, at 273–74 (citing Lord Campbell’s opinion in Beamish v. Beamish
(1859) 11 Eng. Rep. 735).
360
Norman, 54 P. at 145.
361
See Strassberg, supra note 8, at 1560–61.
362
See, e.g., Mark E. Brandon, Home on the Range: Family and Constitutionalism in
American Continental Settlement, 52 EMORY L.J. 645, 689–90 (2003) (proffering Meister as
“evidence” that, “by the last half of the nineteenth century[,] . . . the marital family was
emerging as an institution partially autonomous from government”); Akiko Kawamura,
Neglected Stories – The Constitution and Family Values, 1 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 89, 92–93
(1999) (invoking Meister for the proposition that “the right to marry under the Fourteenth
357
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to hold out for “express words of nullity”363 conceded on its face “legislative power
to abolish the common-law rule altogether.”364 Moreover, this power was totally
unaffected by the marriage right’s eventual constitutionalization in Loving and in
antecedent cases like Meyer v. Nebraska and Skinner v. Oklahoma.365 Recognition
of common-law marriage declined precipitously over the course of the twentieth
century,366 and even after Loving its abrogation provoked barely a peep of
constitutional concern.367 So whether one looks to the Meister doctrine itself or to
subsequent legal developments, the “common right” to common-law marriage was
constitutional in neither stature nor substance.
And yet . . . in light of Loving’s identification of a right to marry the person of
one’s choice,368 there is something to be said for the suggestion that “a new
American charter,” improved by the Reconstruction Amendments, eventually
“constitutionalize[d] the ‘common’ and ‘common-law’ right to marry.”369 How one
Amendment was recognized earlier and with more confidence than . . . other family rights”)
(emphasis added); Christopher A. Scharman, Note, Not Without My Father: The Legal Status
of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1001, 1027–28 (2002) (“As early
as 1877, the Supreme Court began expressly to affirm, as a matter of constitutional law, the
importance of the family in society . . . .”) (emphasis added) (citing Meister v. Moore, 96
U.S. 78–81 (1877)).
363
Meister, 96 U.S. at 76, 79.
364
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 148; Meister, 96 U.S. at
79.
365
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see also infra Part IV
(discussing Loving’s twentieth-century predecessors).
366
An article published one year after Loving recounted how an erstwhile “prevailing
view” in favor of common-law marriage had by then receded to the point of “general
disfavor,” with only “fifteen American jurisdictions” continuing to recognize the doctrine.
Henry H. Foster, Jr., Marriage: A “Basic Civil Right of Man,” 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 51, 58
(1968). Within half a century, that number had shrunk to eleven. Common Law Marriage by
State, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATORS (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/hum
an-services/common-law-marriage.aspx [https://perma.cc/X4S4-FM5V].
367
A series of searches on Westlaw yielded exactly one counter-example: Anguiano v.
Larry’s Elec. Contracting L.L.C., 241 P.3d 175, 178 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010), which involved
an allegation that Kansas’s Workers’ Compensation agency made it unconstitutionally
difficult “to prove a common-law marriage.” The court dismissed the claim, finding no
authority to support “a constitutional right to a common-law marriage.” But see Foster, supra
note 366, at 60 (speculating that a “constitutional issue” might be presented if “a state that
has abolished common law marriages refuses to recognize the validity of a common law
marriage that was valid where entered into”).
368
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
369
Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories and the Lawfulness of Roe v. Wade, 28
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 313 (1993). Apparently understanding Meister’s “‘common’
and ‘common-law’ right” to mean a right to marry at all, Davis suggests that this
constitutional transformation, prepared by passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, was
formally achieved through ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. Id. But
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may marry has potentially profound implications for whom one may marry. In
jurisdictions that permitted common-law marriage, including those that did so only
for the sake of comity, one of the doctrine’s most significant consequences was its
facilitation of unions contrary to parental preference, community expectation, or the
parties’ better judgment.370
Well before informal solemnization emerged as one of the great obsessions of
American family law, medieval canon lawyers embraced freedom in spousal choice
as a corollary of the right to contract marriage per verba de praesenti (or per verba
de futuro cum copula).371 To be sure, “a giant democracy in which everyone might
marry anyone is not the way the medieval world was customarily perceived by its
inhabitants”; but in theory and somewhat beyond, canon law protected an ample
“power to choose.”372 Likewise “the Kent doctrine,” according to its namesake,
placed “as few checks in the formation of the marriage contract, as in any part of the
civilized world.”373 As the Utah Supreme Court vividly explained in 1895, the
doctrine of common-law marriage effectively held that “a couple may meet on the
highway at any time in the day or night, and there contract a valid marriage.”374 If
this was, as Kent alleged, “the freedom of the common law,” then the common law
was very free indeed.375
Like other champions of marriage by bare present assent, Kent stopped short of
connecting the dots from informal marriage to elopement—an understandable show
of restraint given how strenuously proponents of formalities denounced
“improvident and improper” unions.376 Despite the paucity of causes for which an
unrelated, competent, different-sex couple could be prevented from marrying,
Meister’s “common right” related to how, not whether, one might marry, and that right was
never constitutionalized except insofar as it arguably implied the freedom of spousal choice
vindicated ninety years later in Loving.
370
See, e.g., NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS 128 (2000) (describing late-nineteenthcentury opponents of informal marriage who associated the practice with “irresponsible,
unsuited, or defiant couples”); MORRIS PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 23 (1st ed. 1951)
(lamenting the “matrimonial entanglements” that arise when “two people . . . can marry
themselves” without public notice, state license, or other third-party participation); George
Elliott Howard, Social Control of the Domestic Relations, in AM. SOCIOLOGICAL SOC’Y,
FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 212, 222 (1911) (“[C]ommon law
marriage . . . virtually invites impulsive, impure, and secret unions . . . .”); SCHOULER,
DOMESTIC RELATIONS (5th ed. 1895), supra note 243, at 41 (counting “[t]he consent of
parents and guardians,” though unnecessary “to perfect a marriage at common law,” among
“those formalities which marriage celebration [statutes] now commonly prescribe in the
interest of society, as they do banns or the procurement of a license for better publicity.”).
371
See generally Noonan, Power to Choose, supra note 247.
372
Id. at 419, 430–31, 433 (“[R]ecognizing an area of freedom where parents should
not trespass, the canons acknowledged rights of the individual . . . .”).
373
2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 74.
374
United States v. Simpson, 7 P. 257, 258 (Utah 1885).
375
2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 74.
376
In re McLaughlin’s Estate, 30 P. 651, 658 (Wash. 1892).
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classical jurists were reluctant to follow John Witherspoon’s lead in situating “the
right to marriage” within the individual’s “perfect right[] in a state of natural liberty
. . . to associate, if he so incline, with any person or persons, whom he can persuade
(not force).”377 If anything, jurists were more apt to affirm states’ authority to
stipulate disqualifications beyond the fundamental taboos of nature.378
Prohibitions of interracial marriage occasioned the most audible classical
discourse on the existence and extent of a right to choose one’s spouse. Legal
challenges to these laws saw some success during Reconstruction,379 then
consistently failed, with one exception, between 1878 and 1967.380 Remarkably, in
none of those failed challenges was it claimed that racial endogamy laws violate a
distinct right to marry. Whether based on the Equal Protection Clause, the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, or the Civil Rights Act of 1866, legal protests against
interracial marriage bans focused on invidious racial classification.381 When litigants
did raise arguments about a substantive right to contract marriage, they emphasized
“contract,” not “marriage.”382 They claimed exclusion from one of many domains of

377
Witherspoon, supra note 190, at 69. But see J.C. Bluntschli, Freedom, and Rights of
Freedom, in 2 CYCLOPÆDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 281, 281–84 (John Lalor ed., 1883)
(counting “matrimony” among “the individual rights of freedom” and explaining that “it is a
question of life for the individual, whether he is to be allowed to follow his own inclination
and choice, or . . . is to be prevented from concluding an intended marriage”).
378
See, e.g., SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (5th ed. 1895), supra note 243, at 30–
31 (mentioning “race, color, social rank, [and] religion” as possible “disqualifications of civil
condition” and noting “statutes formerly forbidding marriage between a Roman Catholic and
a Protestant”); see also PUFENDORF, supra note 93, at 445 (“Though Persons are Naturally
free to Marry whom they please, yet a Government, if it seem for the Interest of the State,
may in some Cases . . . limit this Privilege: for instance it may be order’d, that no Subject
shall Marry a Foreigner, none of the Nobility a Plebeian.”).
379
Arguing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was originally understood to
protect a right to interracial marriage, an impressively researched study identifies eleven
cases between 1869 and 1877 in which courts from eight different states held or suggested
in dicta that miscegenation laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment and/or the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. David R. Upham, Interracial Marriage and the Original Understanding of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 267–73 (2015).
380
“Acts . . . prohibiting marriage between members of the white race and persons of
African descent . . . have been universally upheld as constitutional and valid.” Scott v.
Epperson, 284 P. 19, 21 (Okla. 1930) (per curiam); see also infra notes 416–419, 553–558
and accompanying text (discussing Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948)).
381
Courts answered this objection with the doctrine of “equal application,” which was
satisfied so long as one party to an illicit interracial union was punished just as harshly as the
other. The doctrine was definitively rejected in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191
(1964) and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967).
382
Outside the courtroom, legal writers and civil-rights advocates occasionally did
speak of a right of intermarriage under the Fourteenth Amendment that was not subsumed
under a broader liberty of contract. See, e.g., A. O. Wright, Citizenship—State and National,
4 WIS. J. EDUC. 53, 55 (1874).
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contractual freedom, not a special, matrimonial sphere of discretion.383 As a
sympathetic court put in 1872, “[m]arriage is a civil contract, and . . . [t]he same
right to make a contract as is enjoyed by white citizens, means the right to make any
contract which a white citizen may make.”384 Time and again, this logic was defeated
by a very different gloss on the term “civil contract,” which underscored the word
“civil” and stressed marriage’s public, not private, character—the same “doctrine of
status” that entitled legislators to cabin or altogether abolish common-law
marriage.385 So when the Supreme Court pointedly blessed “[l]aws forbidding the
intermarriage of the two races” in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), it explained that such
prohibitions were “universally recognized as within the police power of the state.”386
Only “in a technical sense” did they “interfere with the freedom of contract.”387
Classical jurists differed as to interracial marriage’s permissibility under natural
law. One camp called it positively unnatural, akin to incest, and therefore an
exception to the presumptive, natural right to select one’s spouse.388 Another denied
that such right existed at all.389 A third camp, finally, held that “marriage is a natural
right into which the question of color does not enter except as an individual
preference expressed by the parties . . . .”390 However unpopular with the public, this
last appears to have been the dominant jurisprudential position.391 Miscegenation
383

In one case, counsel for a man imprisoned for marrying a white woman argued that
his client “was deprived of the right to make contracts, which a white man could make; that
is, to contract marriage with a white woman.” The attorney acknowledged that marriage is
also “a civil status, but he insisted that . . . it was within the class of contracts contemplated
in the first section of the Civil Rights Bill.” Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287, 288–89 (1871).
384
Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195, 197 (1872).
385
See, e.g., In re Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. 262, 263–64 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871); State v. Tutty,
41 F. 753, 757–58 (S.D. Ga. 1890); State v. Brown, 108 So.2d 233, 234 (La. 1959); State v.
Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 402 (1871); Lonas, 50 Tenn. at 307–08; Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. App.
263, 275 (1877). On the doctrine of status, see supra notes 124, 349–351 and accompanying
text, as well as infra note 484 and accompanying text.
386
163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896).
387
Id.
388
See, e.g., State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9, 11 (1872) (asserting that neither parent-child
incest nor a “harem” housing “numerous wives . . . are more revolting . . . or more unnatural”
than the marriage of a white man and a black woman); West Chester v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209,
213 (1867) (“The natural law which forbids [the races’] intermarriage . . . is as clearly divine
as that which imparted to them different natures.”).
389
See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883) (“[N]or is it one of the natural
rights of man to marry whom he may choose.”); Lonas, 50 Tenn. at 310 (“[D]iscrimination
as to race and people, in this most important institution, has been observed, even from the
days of the patriarchs, and even as to different people of the same race.”).
390
See, e.g., Gordon A. Stewart, Our Marriage and Divorce Laws, 23 POPULAR SCI.
MONTHLY 224, 234 (1883) (observing that this principle was “recognized by the laws of all
nations except our own”); D.A.S., The Southern Problem, N.Y. GLOBE, Mar. 3, 1883, at 1
(“When a law prohibits a black man from marrying a white woman, because of his color, it
strikes at the root of natural liberty.”).
391
Stewart, supra note 390, at 234.
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statutes, after all, were just that: statutes. Jurisdictions permitting interracial
marriages needed no legislation to do so. In places with statutes prohibiting mixedrace unions, judges held their noses and refused to apply those bans retrospectively,
finding no bar to interracial marriage in whatever law, common or natural, had
governed prior to legislative intervention.392
C. The Right to Stay Married
The natural right to stay married was a matter of respect for marital contracts.
It promised two things: portability and permanence. If a marriage contract was valid
where executed, it could not be gainsaid anywhere; nor could it be terminated, if at
all, without fault or consent.
1. Portability
Marriage . . . [is] of natural and of international law. . . . It could not be
international, unless there was a uniform rule among all nations whereby
to determine whether it exists or not; it could not be treated as resting in
private or natural right, unless the relation lawfully established was
respected everywhere . . . .393
Presumably, in a true state of nature, marriages would have no need of
extraterritorial recognition. Conflicts of law would never arise because there would
be but one global standard, supplied by a universal moral code. Only in a world of
many sovereigns, each with its own nuptial procedures and qualifications, can there
be questions of portability. For instance, if country A sets the age of marital consent
at sixteen and country B sets it at twenty, will eighteen-year old newlyweds from A
become legal strangers when honeymooning in B? Or if country C permits informal
solemnization and D does not, would a couple united in C by clandestine agreement
become fornicators if they live as husband and wife in D? To both questions, “the
jus gentium, the common law of nations, the law of nature as generally recognized
by all civilized peoples” answered no: “the validity of a marriage depends upon . . .
392

“[N]o authority, before or after the [Civil W]ar, made the manifestly false assertion
that interracial marriages were generally recognized as unlawful in the world in general, in
the Christian world, or even the Anglo-American world,” and “no one asserted that in the
absence of some local statute, such marriages were invalid by force of natural law or common
law.” Upham, supra note 379, at 219–20; see also Inhabitants of Medway v. Inhabitants of
Needham, 16 Mass. 157, 159–61 (1819) (denying that “marriage[s] of negroes and mulattoes
with white persons . . . tend to outrage the principles and feelings of all civilized nations”);
Follansbee v. Wilbur, 44 P. 262, 263–64 (Wash. 1896) (implicitly conceding that
miscegenation statutes did not apply retroactively to interracial common-law marriages);
State v. Baltimore, 15 W. Va. 362, 385–86 (1879) (positing that “intermarriage[s] of a white
person with a negro” are neither “mala in se” nor “contrary to religion or abstract morality”).
393
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 719.
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whether it was valid where . . . contracted; if valid there, it is valid everywhere.”394
By this “rule of universal recognition,”395 one of the great “rules of comity,”396
marriage claimed its place as “an international institution.”397
To a great extent, classical American judges upheld the portability principle.
Though “the doctrine, in its broad extent,” had been doubted by some English and
continental jurists of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries,398 Kent’s
Commentaries (1827), Story’s Conflicts of Laws (1834), and Parson’s Law of
Contracts (1853) all held (to quote Kent) that, “as marriage is part of the jus gentium,
. . . the lex loci contractus prevails over the lex domicilii” in ascertaining validity.399
By the middle of the nineteenth century, Bishop considered the rule “well
established in . . . America.”400 By the turn of the twentieth century, treatises
announced its general acceptance with certitude.401
Like other natural entitlements of marriage reflected in positive law, the right
of portability admitted limitations imposed “by the law of nature” itself.402 Such
restraints involved “contracts of marriage . . . which outrage our most fundamental
394
Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 462–63 (1873) (enunciating “the law of
nature as generally recognized by all civilized peoples”).
395
LONG, supra note 200, at § 40.
396
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 85 A.2d 706, 716 (Del. Super. Ct. 1951).
397
LONG, supra note 200, at § 40; see also MANSFIELD, supra note 48, at 244 (stating
“the meaning” of the expression that “the law of marriage is part of the law of nations”).
More often than not, the portability principle is what classical judges had in mind when they
called marriage jus/juris gentium. See, e.g., State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545, 548–549 548
(Ark. 1957); Griswold v. Griswold, 129 P. 560, 561 (Colo. App. 1913); State ex rel. Gentry
v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120, 129 (1835); True v. Ranney, 21 N.H. 52, 55 (1850); Overseers of the Poor
of the Town of Newbury v. Overseers of the Poor of the Town of Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151, 157
(1829); 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 79, at 93.
398
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 125; see also Stevenson
v. Gray, 56 Ky. 193, 207 (1856) (noting “a diversity of opinion among writers and judges”
but calling lex loci contractus “the settled general rule of law in England, and in most, or all,
of the United States.”).
399
2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 78; PARSONS, supra note
61, at 565; STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at §§ 87, 90, 101.
400
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 125. Inhabitants of
Medway v. Inhabitants of Needham, 16 Mass. 157, 160 (1819), was especially influential in
promoting this doctrine in the United States. Courts in sister states cited the case well into
the twentieth century. See, e.g., Smith v. Goldsmith, 134 So. 651, 653, 655 (Ala. 1931);
Graves, 307 S.W.2d at 548–49; In re Miller’s Estate, 214 N.W. 428, 429 (Mich. 1927); In
re May’s Estate, 305 N.Y. 486, 490, 114 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1953).
401
See KEEZER, supra note 11, at § 21; LONG, supra note 200, at § 40.
402
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at §§ 130, 149 (calling it a
“common-law exception[]” to the portability doctrine that “Christian nations” withhold
recognition from “polygamous and incestuous marriages entered into in foreign
countries, . . . though they were there allowed by law.”); see also LONG, supra note 200, at
§ 40 (excluding “marriages deemed contrary to the law of nature as generally recognized in
Christian countries”).
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concepts” and are everywhere deemed “odious.”403 As Kent explained, departures
from the “comity giving effect to the lex loci” were not to be taken lightly, but were
reserved “for gross cases . . . repugnant to the morals and policies of all civilized
nations.”404 A half-century later, James Schouler described these disqualified unions
as “immoral marriages, or such as may be considered prohibited by the law of
God.”405 Thus “[n]o Christian nation would tolerate polygamy within its borders on
the plea that the marriage took place in some Asiatic country. Nor would incest be
permitted. Nor . . . would the marriages of such as are mentally and physically
incapable.”406
Classical jurists viewed statutory departures from the jus gentium of marital
portability much as they viewed statutory departures from the common-law right to
marry by mutual agreement.407 Few went out of their way to affirm, in Bishop’s
words, that “it would . . . be perfectly competent for the legislative power . . . to
refuse to recognize any foreign marriages whether between its own citizens or
foreigners,”408 but even fewer (if any) questioned lawmakers’ final authority to
withhold recognition from marriages legally solemnized abroad but inconsistent
with local policy in “form, ceremony, [or] qualification.”409 Some courts, including
the U.S. Supreme Court, declined to recognize exercises of that authority unless the
legislature spoke in “express words of nullity,” just as they did with statutes
mandating nuptial formalities410—the only difference being that here the governing
presumption was against “a legislative intent to contravene the jus gentium,” not the
common law.411 Other courts enunciated the broader and more frankly subjective
doctrine that the rule of lex loci contractus should yield before a “positive,”
“known,” “manifest and distinctive policy of the state as understood by the
403

McDonald v. McDonald, 58 P.2d 163, 164 (Cal. 1936); Rubin v. Irving Tr. Co., 305
N.Y. 288, 305–06 (1953).
404
2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 78.
405
JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 48 (2d
ed. 1875).
406
Id.
407
See supra notes 271–284 and accompanying text.
408
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 148 (emphasis added).
Bishop explained that, “because it would be not only inconvenient and oppressive[,] but a
violation of the good faith and comity which nations owe each other,” “no government of a
civilized country would . . . [apply such a drastic policy] in respect to persons who were
domiciled in the foreign country at the time their marriages were solemnized . . . .” Id.
409
Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305, 306 (Tenn. 1889) (“The legislature has, beyond all
possible question, the power to enact what marriages shall be void in its own state,
notwithstanding their validity in the state where celebrated.”).
410
Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934) (holding that “marriages not
polygamous or incestuous, or otherwise declared void by statute, will, if valid by the law of
the state where entered into, be recognized as valid in every other jurisdiction”) (emphasis
added); Griswold v. Griswold, 129 P. 560, 562, 563–65 (Colo. App. 1913).
411
Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18, 18 (1881) (demanding a “clear and
unmistakable expression” of legislative intent).
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courts . . . concerning the morals and good order of society.”412 Finally, whether by
judicial decree or legislative command, many states came to reject marriages that
were contracted abroad with “the express purpose of violating the law of the[
parties’] domicile.”413 While “most writers on public law” favored or at least
tolerated recognition of such “evasive” marriages,414 others, more jealous of state
sovereignty, protested that doing so would stretch comity “to an extreme limit.”415
Over the course of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, deviations from
the norm of marital portability were championed with increasing vehemence. One
reason may be that concern about “migratory marriage”—marriages contracted
extraterritorially, in purposeful evasion of the parties’ home-state law—was stoked
by concurrent, more intricate, and ever angrier contests over “migratory divorce,” a
species of forum shopping that pitted jurisdictions with more restrictive divorce laws
against those with less restrictive rules.416 Another reason was surely American
culture’s heightened cathexis onto prohibitions of interracial marriage in the wake
of Emancipation. A large share of the most zealous rhetoric around the portability
doctrine can be found in criminal and civil challenges to mixed-race marriages
solemnized abroad in conformity with the lex loci.417 A minority of judges
grudgingly stayed faithful to the jus gentium in cases of that sort. Dissenting in
Goldman v. Dithrich (1938), for example, Florida Supreme Court Armstead Brown
quoted an 1877 ruling from North Carolina to support his view that, “[h]owever
revolting to us” (i.e., Southern whites) a mixed-race “marriage may appear,” such
disgust could not be called “the common sentiment of the civilized and Christian
412

Pennegar, 10 S.W. at 306–08.
In re Stull’s Estate, 39 A. 16, 17 (Pa. 1898) (refusing to recognize a marriage
celebrated in Maryland in evasion of a Pennsylvania law prohibiting the marriage of an
adulterous couple “during the life of the injured [ex-]wife or husband”); see also Lanham v.
Lanham, 117 N.W. 787, 789 (Wis. 1908) (refusing to recognize a marriage celebrated in
Michigan in evasion of a Wisconsin law prohibiting remarriage within one year of a divorce
decree).
414
SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 48; see also
Horton v. Horton, 198 P. 1105, 1106–07 (Ariz. 1921) (concluding that “the overwhelming
weight of the better reasoned cases on the subject” supported recognizing the marriages of
Arizona “citizens and residents” who “have gone abroad for the purpose of evading our
laws”); PARSONS, supra note 61, at 565 (calling the at-home validity of an “evasive
marriage” the “established . . . law of . . . this country”).
415
Pennegar, 10 S.W. at 307.
416
See Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 388 (2007); Erwin N. Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Divorce Decrees, 65 HARV. L. REV. 193, 210–17 (1951).
417
See, e.g., Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120, 124–25 (1875) (grudgingly accepting the
“intermarriage” of a master and his slave in the Utah Territory); Goldman v. Dithrich, 179
So. 715, 718 (Fla. 1938) (explaining that the lex loci contractus would not control in Florida,
for “[i]n the south miscegenation is socially odious”); Kinney v. Commonwealth, 30 Gratt.
858, 865 (Va. 1878) (articulating the rule of “the southern states” to reject interracial
marriages celebrated out of state “for the purpose of evading the law . . . of the domicile”).
413
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world.”418 Some states foreclosed the portability doctrine’s application to interracial
unions by adopting legislation that specifically banned migratory marriage, while
others added words of express nullity, like “absolutely void,” to existing
miscegenation statutes—even though quite a few courts read those statutes to state
a “strong public policy” regardless of their precise language.419
Notably, the issue of portability played a minor role in Perez v. Lippold (1948),
the first and only ruling between Reconstruction and Loving to hold an interracial
marriage ban unconstitutional.420 Andrea Perez and Sylvester Davis brought the case
after the Los Angeles County clerk had denied them a license. To impugn that
refusal’s rationality, one of their briefs described how they could “reach the Republic
of Mexico within three or four hours, contract a marriage” there, then promptly—
and legally—“resume their domicile” in L.A.421 The argument hit its mark.
According to the state’s highest court, California’s anomalous treatment of mixedrace marriages celebrated elsewhere was one of several indications of an “arbitrary”
and “irrational” policy.422
Nearly twenty years after Perez, in a case involving plaintiffs who actually did
go out of state to marry, the portability issue received no attention whatsoever.
Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving had “married in the District of Columbia pursuant
to its laws” and were charged upon returning home with violations of Virginia’s
“Racial Purity Law,” including the specific offense of “Leaving State to evade
law.”423 Both were sentenced to one year in jail, but the trial judge “suspended the
sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition that” they not set foot again in
Virginia.424 Almost a decade later, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed their
convictions. Like the couple’s attorneys and amici, the Court’s decision said nothing

418

Finding it “impossible” to class interracial marriages alongside the “incestuous or
polygamous marriage[s] admitted to be [objectionable] jure gentium,” Justice Brown felt
“compelled” by “the law of nations” and by “comity to our sister States” to defer to the lex
loci contractus. Goldman, 179 So. at 715, 718 (Brown, J. dissenting) (quoting State v. Ross,
77 N.C. 242, 246 (1877)).
419
An 1878 Virginia decision managed to apply all three approaches simultaneously,
holding that where “a white person and a negro . . . go to another state . . . for the purpose of
evading the law . . . [of] their domicile, [the foreign] marriage is no bar to a criminal
prosecution [at home].” Such was Virginia law as expressly “declared by statute” (albeit a
statute “passed after the marriage of the parties in th[e] case”). And even “without such
statute, the marriage was a nullity. It was . . . prohibited and declared ‘absolutely void.’ It
was contrary to . . . a public policy affirmed for more than a century; and one upon which
social order, public morality, and the best interests of both races depend.” Kinney, 30 Gratt.
at 865–66.
420
Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 29 (Cal. 1948).
421
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8, Perez, 198 P.2d 17 (No. 20305).
422
Perez, 198 P.2d at 18–19; see also id. at 33 (Carter, J., concurring).
423
The statute imposed a prison sentence of one to five years. Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 4 (1967).
424
Id. at 3.
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about portability, comity, jus gentium, or the lex loci contractus. Instead they all
spoke of equal protection—and, more tentatively, of a “fundamental . . . freedom to
marry.”425
2. Permanence
Recall that slaves were widely deemed capable of forming “natural”
marriages.426 What they lacked was legal, not moral, capacity.427 Without de jure
recognition, their de facto unions were vulnerable to all kinds of interference—
including, most infamously, exercises of droit de seigneur and permanent
separations wrought by sale.428 Each of these paradigmatic interferences—
encroachment onto marital exclusivity and forced dissolution—was an evil that
natural law condemned.429 The first we discussed in our survey of the conjugal right
to marry, noting that natural law prohibited adultery and imposed on states a positive
duty to forbid and punish it. The present section looks at the threat of forced
dissolution—a hazard that, for free citizens with bona fide civil marriages, emanated
not from human interlopers but from civil government itself. What limits, if any, did
natural law place on sovereign power to undo extant marriages? And how were such
limits observed in practice?

425
Id. at 12–13; see also infra notes 599–621 and accompanying text (describing rightto-marry arguments in Loving).
426
See supra notes 132–141 and accompanying text.
427
“A slave, being subject to his master’s will, had not the legal capacity to contract
marriage, yet the so-called marriages of slaves had a certain moral force. . . .” LONG, supra
note 200, at § 19.
428
Privation of legally assured permanence goes far in explaining why, in 1865, so
many “enslaved women of Kentucky . . . flooded Northern military and civilian officials with
requests . . . to exchange marital vows with their husbands . . . and be issued a formal marriage
certificate” even though “the Enlistment Act had automatically married . . . couples” who
had “cohabited . . . or associated as husband and wife.” FRANKE, supra note 136, at 43, 49–
50; see also HUNTER, supra note 135, at 7 (arguing that legal marriage “bolstered the ability
of ex-slaves to keep their families together . . . and to stay out of the unscrupulous grasp of
erstwhile masters.”); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR,
MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 39 (1998) (counting
“the right to marry and the ‘sanctity of our family relations’ as badges of freedom”) (quoting
Letter from L. Maria Child, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 5, 1866)); Burnham, supra note 265, at 202
(“[T]he threat of separation . . . hung like a dark cloud over every slave couple and family.”).
429
Davis, supra note 369, at 383–84 (quoting Senator John Sherman’s successful
argument in favor of amending the Civil Rights Act of 1866 “to ‘secure to the freedmen of
the southern States certain rights, . . . including the right . . . to be protected in their homes
and family as a . . . natural right of free men’”).
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Classical marriage jurisprudence harbored a range of views as to whether and
in what circumstances natural law permitted or even compelled divorce.430
Subscribing to the letter of the biblical command that “what . . . God hath joined
together, let no man put asunder,”431 some jurists insisted that the natural ideal of
lifelong union amounted to an absolute prohibition of divorce.432 Arguing from fault,
others called it “the dictate of natural justice” that aggrieved spouses be permitted to
separate for adultery, and perhaps also for desertion and other causes that “frustrate
. . . the ends for which [marriages] were created.”433 Arguing from consent, still other
legal thinkers supposed that, in a state of nature, husband and wife could agree to
dissolve their contract at any time and for any reason, or even that one spouse could
do so unilaterally.434
Amid this diversity of opinion, at least one proposition about divorce claimed
general support. Classical lawyers roundly agreed that there would be something
intolerable—or particularly intolerable, if one opposed divorce across the board—
for the state to dissolve a marriage without cause. Whatever permutations of fault
and consent particular jurists favored, none believed that a just government,
respectful of natural law, would impose divorce in the absence of either.
There was a moment early in the nineteenth century when a limited guarantee
of marital permanence seemed like a contender for constitutional status. The
Contracts Clause offered the necessary textual hook. For if marriage was really a
contract, were not its obligations immune from “impairment”? The Supreme Court
first addressed this question in the famous case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward (1819), a challenge to New Hampshire’s attempt to rewrite Dartmouth’s

430

See 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (5th ed. 1873), supra note 216, at § 33 (predicting
that states’ divorce legislation would be more uniform “[i]f the voice of Christendom
were . . . [as] united on this subject, as it is on [polygamy]”).
431
Mark 10:9 (King James).
432
Moore v. Moore, 22 Tex. 237, 239 (1858) (“[T]he law of nature requires that the
[marriage] contract should be perpetual.”).
433
1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (5th ed. 1873), supra note 216, at § 34 (specifically
mentioning “desertion”). This view was sometimes expressed in the proposition that, “when
divorce makes its appearance” by operation of civil law, “the real union has [already]
ceased,” such that divorce “is not the violent destruction of marriage, but the legal end of a
union, which no longer exists in fact.” LUIGI MIRAGLIA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
§ 469 (John Lisle trans., Macmillan 1921). But see WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra
note 50, at 101 (doubting that natural law permits divorce for any ground but adultery).
434
See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson’s Adm’r, 30 Mo. 72, 88 (1860) (“It can hardly be said
that the power of divorce, in one or both of the parties to the contract, at his or her pleasure,
is inconsistent with the law of nature.”); see also PALEY, supra note 175, at 186 (arguing that
natural law permits “dissolution of the marriage-contract” of a childless couple “by the act,
and at the will, of the husband”); PUFENDORF, supra note 93, at 458 (concluding that it is
“repugnant to the Law of Nature, for either of the married Couple, to depart from the other
unconsenting, . . . without being able to alledge [sic] any Breach of the matrimonial Pact on
the other’s side”) (emphasis added).
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charter so as to reconstitute it as a public institution.435 In the course of holding this
maneuver unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause, Chief Justice Marshall
answered a slippery-slope problem that counsel for New Hampshire had “urged with
great earnestness”: If the Contracts Clause was construed to encompass Dartmouth’s
governmentally-commissioned charter, what would keep it from reaching compacts
of marriage? Could not the state “unquestionably impair the obligation of the nuptial
contract” by granting a divorce “without the consent of both parties”?436 Marshall
disclaimed such a “broad, unlimited” interpretation. First, he said, divorce laws are
remedial. Far from “impairing a marriage contract,” they “liberate one of the parties”
when that contract “has been broken by the other.”437 Second, marriage is a “civil
institution” and hence materially different from the private transactions of property
the Clause was meant to protect.438 “The framers . . . could never have intended . . .
a provision so unnecessary, so mischievous,” explained Marshall, that it would
“render immutable those civil institutions,” like marriage, “which must change with
circumstances . . . , which deeply concern the public, and which . . . the public
judgment must control.”439
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in the Dartmouth College case didn’t totally
foreclose the possibility that the Contracts Clause might place some constraint,
however remote, on civil control over civil marriage: “When any state legislature
shall pass an act annulling all marriage contracts, or allowing either party to annul
it, without the consent of the other, it will be time enough to inquire, whether such
an act be constitutional.”440 The hypothetical is evocative, almost whimsical, and
perplexing if taken literally. Assuming the essentially conjugal definition of
marriage that prevailed at the time,441 just what effect did Marshall think this
imagined “act” would have? Would single people (now everyone) “level up,”
acceding to the once-exclusive privileges of marriage, with nothing but self-restraint
and self-help to prevent “wanton and lascivious cohabitation, . . . a prostration of
morals, and a dissolution of manners”?442 Or would formerly married people “level
down,” and like everyone else face a cruel choice between celibacy and fornication?
The ludicrousness of either alternative amplifies the hint of cheek in Marshall’s tone
and suggests that he may have been having a little fun with his readers—and in
particular with his colleague Joseph Story.
Concurring in Dartmouth College, Justice Story raised points similar to
Marshall’s, but his rhetoric was less extravagant. Like the Chief Justice, Story began
by arguing that divorce is no impairment of contract; rather, he said, it’s a remedy
435

17 U.S. 518, 600 (1819).
Id. at 600.
437
Id. at 629.
438
Id. at 628.
439
Id.
440
Id. at 629.
441
See supra Section II.A.
442
Inhabitants of Town of Milford v. Inhabitants of Town of Worcester, 7 Mass. 48,
52–53 (1810).
436
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for breach of contract.443 New Hampshire’s proposed analogy between a divorce
decree and the new charter it tried to “force upon” Dartmouth only made sense, he
insisted, if the imagined marriage were dissolved “without . . . breach on either side,
against the wishes of the parties, and without any judicial inquiry to ascertain a
breach.”444 Story was “not prepared to admit such a power, or that its exercise would
not entrench upon the . . . constitution.”445 He had difficulty perceiving a
constitutionally meaningful difference between divesting a man, without fault or
consent, of his “right to his wife . . . , her society and her fortune” and “the
confiscation of his own estate.”446
Story was more dogmatic than Marshall in his assumption of a necessary,
causal relation between divorce and breach of marital obligation, but both retreated
from that assumption in their most explicit descriptions of the kinds of divorce that
might be constitutionally problematic.447 At those moments, spousal consent
suddenly joined or replaced marital fault as the ultimate limit on states’ power to
443

Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 696 (Story, J., concurring) (“A general
law regulating divorces, . . . like a law regulating remedies in other cases of breaches of
contracts, is not necessarily a law impairing the obligation of such a contract.”).
444
Id. at 696, 707. This rendition of Story’s argument is indebted to James W. Fox Jr.’s
lucid account in The Law of Many Faces: Antebellum Contract Law Background of
Reconstruction-Era Freedom of Contract, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 61, 102–03 (2007).
445
Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 696 (Story, J., concurring).
446
Id. at 696–97. Story’s assertion that “a man has just as good a right to his wife, as to
the property acquired under a marriage contract” smacks of the same chauvinist entitlement
expressed in his later statement that marriage, as it “arise[s] from the law of nature, . . .
secures the peace of society . . . by assigning to one man the exclusive right to one woman.”
Story, Natural Law, supra note 150, at 316. To be clear, though, the former quotation (from
Dartmouth College) equates a man’s claim “to his wife”—the natural right of every
husband—with any claims a man might have under what Story also calls “a marriage
settlement” (basically, a pre- or postnuptial agreement). As Story saw it, both the marriage
itself and the settlement were “contracts for valuable consideration” that seemed to merit
protection under the Contracts Clause. He wasn’t asserting any natural right of husbands to
their wives’ property. Indeed, the terms of actual marriage settlements varied widely, and the
instruments were often used to give wives greater financial independence than they’d have
possessed under marriage’s default rules. Nor should Story be understood to imply that the
Contracts Clause restrains a state from retroactively applying changes to those default rules.
Although couples may well have wed “under the faith of existing laws,” they had no right to
expect the lex loci contractus in effect on their wedding day to govern anything but the
marriage’s validity. See supra notes 240–246 and accompanying text (on marriage
settlements); STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at § 187 (“[W]here there
is a change of domicil, the law of the actual domicil, and not of the matrimonial domicil, will
govern as to all future acquisitions of moveable property; and as to all immovable property,
the rei sitae.”).
447
See Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARV. L. REV.
512, 517–18 (1944) (citing both opinions to show that “it was recognized at an early time
that, despite the contract clause, laws could . . . provid[e] for the dissolution of an obligation
because of a breach by the other party to the contract.”).
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transform husbands and wives into legal strangers. According to Story, again, the
Contracts Clause might be infringed if a marriage were “dissolved without . . . breach
on either side [and] against the wishes of the parties,” and he considered it “a
violation of the principles of justice” to “divest” a man of his “wife . . . without his
default, and against his will.”448 Taken at face value, these statements suggest that
Story would have permitted divorce where there was breach but no consent and also
where there was consent but no breach, but not where there was neither breach nor
consent—by which he almost certainly meant bilateral consent.449 Meanwhile, in
Marshall’s rendering, fault drops out entirely and a constitutional question is
foreseen only where consent is absent—be it the consent of either spouse under “an
act annulling all marriage contracts” or the consent of both spouses under “an
act . . . allowing either party to annul” the marriage at pleasure.450 Altogether, then,
it sounds as if Marshall, like Story, wouldn’t have interposed the Contracts Clause
against a divorce between two faultless but mutually consenting parties.
Story never recanted the constitutional misgivings about marriage’s
vulnerability to dissolution that he aired in Dartmouth College, but neither did he
flaunt them.451 One imagines he sensed where American law was headed. As early
as 1838, the Supreme Court of Kentucky determined that marriage “is not embraced
by the constitutional interdiction of legislative acts impairing the obligation of
contracts.”452 Not only “could [marriage] not, like mere contracts, be dissolved by
the mutual consent of the contracting parties, but it might be abrogated by the
sovereign will whenever the public good, or justice to both parties, or either of the

448

Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 696–97 (Story, J., concurring).
See Story, Natural Law, supra note 150, at 316 (arguing that “a power on either side
to dissolve the marriage at will[] would rob . . . matrimony of many of its principal blessings
and advantages” and was “prohibited” by “natural law”); see also David P. Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and Congressional Powers, 1801–1835, 49 U. CHI.
L. REV. 887, 975, n.132 (1982) (“Story . . . strongly suggested [in Dartmouth] that a unilateral
divorce without fault would be unconstitutional.”). None of this is to suggest that Story
favored divorce by bilateral consent. He didn’t. But his disapproval apparently sought no
recourse to the Constitution. See STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at §
202 (speaking dismissively of “frivolous” causes for divorce, the Roman civil law’s “almost
unbounded license” of divorce, and of dissolution “even at the pleasure of the parties”).
450
Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 629.
451
Fifteen years later, disavowing any “design to enter into . . . discussion, as to the
general . . . legislative power to authorize directly or indirectly a dissolution of the
matrimonial state, and to release the parties from all future obligation,” Story acknowledged
somewhat coyly that “it is deemed by all modern nations to be within the competency of
legislation to provide for . . . dissolution and release, in some form and for some causes.”
STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at § 201 (emphases added).
452
Maguire v. Maguire, 37 Ky. 181, 184 (1838).
449
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parties, would thereby be subserved.”453 By 1852, Bishop was stating this principle
as black-letter American law.454
Yet it would take the Supreme Court nearly seventy years after Dartmouth
College to hold unequivocally that the Contracts Clause places no limit on states’
power to divorce lawfully wedded couples. In Maynard v. Hill (1888), a majority
led by Justice Stephen Field flatly stated “that marriage is not a contract within the
meaning of the provision.”455 The permissive implications of this exclusion were
evident from the facts of Maynard itself. As a federal appeals court recalled in 1938,
“in Maynard v. Hill, it was even held that a special act of the Legislature . . . granting
a divorce . . . for no named cause and where none existed . . . did not infringe any
provision of the Constitution of the United States.”456 The Legislature’s “will” alone
“was . . . sufficient reason for its action.”457 Ironically, it was precisely marriage’s
superlative importance that permitted lawmakers to so casually denigrate its bond:
“Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do with
the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been
subject to the control of the legislature.”458
Maynard’s interpretation of the Contracts Clause effected a categorical
exclusion equally applicable to marriage contracts breached by adultery, renounced
by the consent of one or both parties, or annulled sua sponte “by the will of the
sovereign.”459 There are clues in the opinion that the Court wasn’t entirely
453

Id.; see also Townsend v. Griffin, 4 Del. 440, 442 (Del. Super. Ct. 1846) (“[T]he
marriage contract . . . can be violated and annulled by law, which no other contract
can . . . .”); Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 193 (1877) (“[I]t can be violated and annulled by
law, which no other contract can be; it cannot be determined by the will of the parties, as any
other contract may be . . . .”).
454
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 34 (quoting Maguire, 37
Ky. at 181, 183, as an example of the kind of “language . . . employed in the American
tribunals”). But see PARSONS, supra note 61, at 527–28 (explaining that the Clause’s
“relation to . . . marriage and divorce” remained unsettled, with one view of the matter being
that “this clause may operate on the contract of marriage; leaving only the question as to
what is [its] effect and operation”).
455
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
456
Leon v. Torruella, 99 F.2d 851, 855 (1st Cir. 1938) (emphasis added).
457
Id.
458
Maynard, 125 U.S. at 206; see also Halley, supra note 9, at 52 (arguing that
“marriage-as-status cases” before and after Maynard “intensif[ied] . . . commitment to the
idea that marriage and its stability were fundamental to the social order, while
simultaneously intensifying the exposure of actual marriages to divorce. . . .”).
459
Maynard, 125 U.S. at 211 (quoting Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 481, 483 (1863)).
Mark Strasser finds “language” in Maynard “suggest[ing] that the marital contract might
indeed fall within the protections of [the Contracts C]lause under certain conditions and that
those conditions might well include . . . a legislature[’s attempt] to retroactively nullify a
marriage contrary to the wishes of each of the individual parties.” MARK PHILLIP STRASSER,
THE CHALLENGE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 80–81 (1999). But Maynard says nothing about
divorce contrary to the will of both parties and its holding that marriage “is not embraced”
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comfortable with treating these different scenarios as perfect equivalents.460 Perhaps
it did so because, already, certain Justices could see past the Contracts Clause to
by the Contracts Clause carries no qualification. Professor Strasser appears to read an
implicit limitation in the Court’s statement of the legislature’s prerogative to “prescribe[] the
age at which parties may contract to marry, . . . the duties and obligations [marriage] creates,
its effects upon the property rights of both, . . . and the acts which may constitute grounds
for its dissolution.” Id. at 79–80 (quoting Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205). Is it warranted to infer
from the italicized text that Maynard leaves open a door for Contract-Clause prohibition of
divorce without marital fault? As Strasser appears to recognize, such a prohibition would
necessarily encompass dissolutions by mutual consent, which even Justice Story hadn’t
called into constitutional doubt. See supra notes 240–246 and accompanying text. Moreover,
when read in context, the passage in question simply presents a non-exhaustive list of ways
in which marriage differs from a regular contract; it does not state the outer bounds of divorce
legislation.
Professor Strasser also notes Justice Field’s speculation that, “[i]f the act declaring the
divorce should attempt to interfere with the rights of property vested in either party, a
different question would be presented.” Id. at 80, 86 (quoting Maynard, 125 U.S. at 206).
Whatever Field exactly meant here by “vested” property rights, it suffices for present
purposes to observe that the Contracts Clause wasn’t the only constitutional provision that
might be implicated by those rights’ infringement. For discussions relevant to this question,
see McDuffie v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 170, 176 (2006) (“Any interest a spouse may
have in marital property is an inchoate right that becomes vested only upon entry of a decree
of equitable distribution in a divorce proceeding.”); 25 AM. JUR. 2D Dower and Curtesy § 8
(2014) (citing decisions that distinguish between a legislature’s “extensive authority” to
modify or abolish “inchoate dower . . . and curtesy” rights from its constitutional inability to
modify “vested or consummate dower or curtesy,” the latter interest being protected by
provisions other than the Contracts Clause); BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra
note 47, at § 773, 776–82 (discussing the effect of constitutional prohibitions of
“retrospective laws” and observing that Contract-Clause protection of vested marital
property rights would mean that “nothing could ever be made a ground of divorce which was
not so at the time it was entered into,—contrary to the universal doctrine concerning
marriage, about which there is no dispute”); HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA:
A HISTORY 17 (2000) (noting that the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause both proved
to be “relatively unimportant constraints” on marriage regulation, even though both could
have been construed to protect “valuable property rights vested as a result of marriage”).
460
Regarding consensual divorce, Maynard resignedly acknowledged that upholding
David Maynard’s divorce from his wife Lydia probably meant sanctioning a dissolution that,
in substance if not in form, was obtained unilaterally against a spouse who had committed
no fault. The Court expressed “reprobation” of David’s “loose morals and shameless
conduct,” which included obtaining a divorce without notice to Lydia for an abandonment
more properly attributed to him; and it predicted that, “if the facts stated had been brought to
the attention of congress, that body might and probably would have annulled the [legislative]
act” that had granted the divorce. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 208–10. As to divorces imposed
without either fault or consent, the evidence of the opinion is less explicit, but, if witting,
only more suggestive of the Court’s unease with its own holding. Discussing state-level
rulings to the same effect as Maynard, the Court invoked a fifty-year-old Kentucky case and
quoted from it verbatim—almost. See id. at 212 (discussing Maguire v. Maguire, 37 Ky. 181
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other constitutional bulwarks against the most extreme insults to marital
permanence. 461 Or maybe the wholly involuntary dissolutions that Marshall and
Story conjured in Dartmouth College were so fantastical that Maynard’s bright-line
rule seemed to pose no genuine threat. Both rationalizations, evidently, could inhabit
the same judicial brain.462
While no state ever passed legislation “annulling all marriage contracts,”463
there did arise after Maynard a fair number of cases involving petitions to apply
retroactively, without the consent of either spouse, statutes prohibiting certain
matches: common-law marriages, interracial marriages, marriages between a man
and his niece, etc. In all such cases, courts refused to void the challenged marriages;
in all but one, they reached that result on the ground that retroactivity, though
constitutionally permissible, wouldn’t be found without “plain and unmistakable”
statutory language to that effect.464 Most courts took roughly the same approach to
divorce petitions based on a fault ground unavailable when the alleged breach took
(1838)). Aside from transposing the original passage from the present to the past tense, the
Court’s only alteration was to omit the text that here appears in italics: “[M]arriage . . . is
regulated and controlled by the sovereign power of the State, and can not, like mere contracts,
be dissolved by the mutual consent only of the contracting parties, but may be abrogated by
the sovereign will either with or without the consent of both parties, whenever the public
good, or justice to both or either of the parties, will be thereby subserved.” Maguire v.
Maguire, 37 Ky. 181, 184 (1838) (emphasis added).
461
See infra notes 491–493 and accompanying text (discussing a hint of due-process
protection of marriage in Citizens’ Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1874)).
462
About thirty years after Maynard, Alabama Supreme Court Justice J.J. Mayfield
authored a totally advisory concurring opinion in which he both contested Maynard’s
interpretation of the Contracts Clause and proffered “due process of law” as an alternative
constitutional ground on which to prohibit divorce without fault. Like Chief Justice Marshall
in the Dartmouth College case, Mayfield illustrated his concerns by way of a hypothetical
statute “divorc[ing] all married persons” in one fell swoop. Could a government do this? No,
he answered, “but . . . I do not think the courts will ever be called upon to decide the question,
because there is no possibility that the Legislature will ever pass such a bill. . . .” Barrington
v. Barrington, 7670 So. 81, 90 (1917) (Mayfield, J., concurring). Fifteen years earlier,
speaking of yet another hypothetical involving forced marital dissolution, the Supreme Court
of Virginia had called the imagined scenario “extreme, . . . remote and improbable,” but
conceded that it might be unconstitutional even in the absence of a “precise [textual]
limitation.” Farmville v. Walker, 43 S.E. 558, 561 (Va. 1903).
463
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 629 (1819).
464
Scott v. Epperson, 284 P. 19, 21 (Okla. 1930) (per curiam) (speaking of an interracial
marriage ban); see also Succession of Yoist, 61 So. 384, 385 (La. 1913) (finding “nothing in
the provisions” of a miscegenation statute to indicate that it should have “retroactive effect”);
Collins v. Hoag & Rollins, 241 N.W. 766, 767 (Neb. 1932) (“[W]here . . . a state ha[s]
recognized common–law marriages as valid[,] no new statute should be held to invalidate
such marriages, unless upon clear language in the statute nullifying [them].”); Weisberg v.
Weisberg, 98 N.Y.S. 260, 262 (1906) (holding, without mention of Maynard or any other
relevant precedent, that a statute prohibiting marriage between a man and his niece could not
be applied retroactively without violating the Contracts Clause).
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place,465 to say nothing of grounds available under the original lex loci contractus.466
Eventually, of course, the “no-fault revolution” of the latter half of the twentiethcentury made divorce by bilateral consent available everywhere and divorce by
unilateral consent available almost everywhere.467 These schemes’ constitutionality
was unsuccessfully challenged on multiple occasions and today seems irrevocably
settled.468 If anything, the constitutional needle points in the opposite direction.
Relying largely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Boddie v. Connecticut (1971),469
a number of legal scholars have argued that access to unilateral divorce is, may be,
or ought to be a constitutional right.470
Meanwhile, in a separate line of decisions beginning with Cheever v. Wilson
(1870),471 the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence proved only more
465

See, e.g., McGinley v. McGinley, 295 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)
(acknowledging but diverging from “certain jurisdictions where . . . constitutional provisions
against retrospective and retroactive laws . . . have been held to restrain retrospective
operation of” new or amended divorce laws).
466
HARTOG, supra note 459, at 17 (asserting that the Contracts and Takings Clauses
failed to place “limits on the powers of states to change the terms of marriage or divorce, on
the theory that when couples married, each spouse relied on [the specific] marital regime”
that then existed).
467
See Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An
Overview, 22 FAM. L.Q. 367, 385–86 (1989); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family
Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1445, 1471–72, 1477 (1992).
468
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Walton, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472, 476 (Ct. App. 1972)
(upholding California’s no-fault divorce law); Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So.2d 266 (Fla. 1973)
(upholding Florida’s law); Cowsert v. Cowsert, 259 N.W.2d 393 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977)
(upholding Michigan’s law); Saltarelli v. Saltarelli, 670 S.W.2d 785 (Tx. Ct. App. 1984)
(upholding Texas’s law).
469
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971) (invaliding a law that required
anyone seeking a divorce, including indigents, to pay fees and costs).
470
See, e.g., Laura Bradford, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals
to Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607, 609, 621–32 (1997); Pearl Berg,
Are Fault Requirements in Divorce Actions Unconstitutional?, 16 J. FAM. L. 265 (1977–78);
Cathy J. Jones, The Rights to Marry and Divorce: A New Look at Some Unanswered
Questions, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 577 (1985); Theodore F. Haas, The Rationality and
Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on Divorce, 66 N.C. L. REV. 879, 897–98 (1988);
Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 671 (1980). The
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, the only American tribunal to have specifically considered
the question, held in 1978 that the “right of privacy” under the Commonwealth’s constitution
guarantees prompt access to divorce by mutual—and perhaps also unilateral—consent.
Although the decision speaks mainly of “mutual consent divorce,” some of its language
could be construed to admit a right to divorce pursuant to only one’s spouse’s “declaration
of the irretrievable breakdown of the[] marriage.” Figueroa Ferrer v. E.L.A., 107 D.P.R. 250,
292–93, 296–98, 300–03 (1978); cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2707 (2013)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution neither requires nor forbids our society . . . to
approve of no-fault divorce . . . .”).
471
Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. 108 (1870).
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hostile to the natural right of marital permanence. Affirming the “well settled”
principle that a wife could, in certain circumstances, establish a domicile in a
different state than her husband’s, Cheever held that a divorce judgment obtained in
that new domicile was secure nationwide under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.472
The phenomenon enacted in Cheever was hardly new,473 but it was only in the midto-late nineteenth century that it earned the moniker “migratory divorce.”474 From
that point it proceeded to stimulate more Supreme Court rulings on marriage than
any other issue—by a long shot.475 Most of those cases involved people who
obtained a divorce in one state without the participation or even the knowledge of a
spouse located in another state.476 Superficially, the doctrine governing such
domestic disputes was unremarkable: A judgment warrants full faith and credit so
long as it issues from a court with proper jurisdiction. But therein lay the rub. The
rules of matrimonial jurisdiction were and remain distinctive. “Under our system of
law,” wrote Justice Felix Frankfurter in 1945, “judicial power to grant a divorce . . .
is founded on domicil. The framers of the constitution were familiar with this
prerequisite, and since 1789 . . . [no] court in the English-speaking world has
questioned it.”477
Domicile-based jurisdiction posed no problem in the ordinary case. Divorcing
spouses overwhelmingly tended to live in the same state (if not the same dwelling);
even when they did not, the marriage was still presumptively subject to the commonlaw rule that a wife’s domicile follows her husband’s.478 Admit exceptions to that
rule (as Cheever did), and migratory divorce suddenly becomes possible; liberalize
472

Id. at 123–24.
For some early American cases, see Richardson v. Richardson, 2 Mass. 153, 153
(1806) and Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns. 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806).
474
Thomas Charles Carrigan, The Law and the American Child, in THE LEGAL RIGHTS
OF CHILDREN 121, 178 (Robert H. Bremner ed., 1974) (referring to “recommendations of the
Commissioners on Uniformity relative to migratory divorce”).
475
In 1948, one commentator likened the Supreme Court’s opinions on the matter to
“episodes in some long judicial soap opera, each one advancing the plot to a degree, but also
posing a new set of questions to be resolved upon the next occasion.” Monrad G. Paulsen,
Migratory Divorce: Chapters III and IV: The Appearance of Sherrer and the Ghost of
Haddock, 24 IND. L.J. 25, 25 (1948). In addition to Cheever, the Court’s migratory divorce
decisions included Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957), Johnson v. Muelberger,
340 U.S. 581 (1951), Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541
(1948), Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949), Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945),
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906),
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903), Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901), and
Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901).
476
See, e.g., Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. at 416–17; Rice, 336 U.S. at 674–75.
477
Williams, 325 U.S. at 229–30.
478
See generally Comment, Capacity of a Married Woman to Acquire Separate
Domicil, 38 YALE L.J. 381, 381 (1929) (“The domicil of the wife, both in England and in the
United States, is, in general, determined by that of the husband, even [if] the wife has never
lived at her husband’s domicil.”) (internal citations omitted).
473
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residency requirements and substantive grounds for divorce, as happened
spectacularly but unevenly over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
and migratory divorce becomes rampant. At root, however, it was neither the general
command of full faith and credit nor the Cheever rule on separate domiciles that
made marriage more vulnerable to dissolution than other contracts. It was the
domicile rule itself. The principle that matrimonial jurisdiction derives from
spouses’ “residence” in a state, as defined by that state, was and remains a significant
relaxation of the usual due-process standards of personal jurisdiction, whose main
concern has been fairness to those being “hailed into court”—fairness to defendants,
not complainants.479
The Supreme Court specifically blessed a lower standard for matrimonial
jurisdiction in Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), which laid the constitutional foundation of
personal-jurisdiction doctrine for years to come.480 Pennoyer held that a court has
jurisdiction only over defendants who voluntarily appear before it or are served
process within the forum state. This was what the Due Process Clause required—
“except in cases affecting the personal status of the plaintiff.”481 Pennoyer illustrated
the point by reference to marriage, the status par excellence: “The State, for
example, has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage
relation between its own citizens shall be created, the causes for which it may be
dissolved,” and “the conditions on which proceedings affecting [it] may be
commenced and carried on within its territory.”482 And what justified this “absolute
right”? Why were parties to a marriage contract due less process than ordinary
479
See Rice, 336 U.S. at 680 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (admonishing the majority for
exempting divorce cases from “the usual requirements of procedural due process”); see also
Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and Minimum
Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1676–77 (2011) (finding the domicile rule “increasingly
difficult to square . . . with contemporary principles of personal jurisdiction” and calling for
its “abandonment”); Rhonda Wasserman, Divorce and Domicile: Time to Sever the Knot, 39
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (characterizing the domicile rule as “the precise opposite”
of the jurisdictional principles “that apply in all other cases” and urging its abolition).
480
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); see also STEPHEN C. YEAZELL & JOANNA C.
SCHWARTZ, CIVIL PROCEDURE 67 (9th ed. 2016) (calling Pennoyer “the great-grandparent
of personal jurisdiction”).
481
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733 (“[W]e do not mean to assert, by any thing we have said,
that a State may not authorize proceedings to determine the status of one of its citizens
towards a non-resident, . . . though [commenced] without service of process or personal
notice to the non-resident.”).
482
Id. at 734–35. Marriage was sometimes said to fall into the only other category of
litigation that Pennoyer specifically exempted from its rule of personal service in the state
claiming jurisdiction—namely, cases where “the action is in the nature of a proceeding in
rem.” Id. at 715. For much of the nineteenth century and for part of the twentieth, courts and
commentators commonly spoke of marriage as a “res,” referring not to the specific property
interests associated with it but to the marital status itself: the state, the legal condition, of
being married. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942) (disavowing “the
historical view that a proceeding for a divorce was a proceeding in rem”).
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litigants? For the same reason that marriage deserved no protection under the
Contracts Clause: because it was so important; because it “gives rights and imposes
duties and restrictions upon the parties, affecting their social and moral
condition, . . . of which every civilized state, and certainly every state of this Union,”
must be “the sole judge, so far as its own citizens or subjects are concerned.”483 Far
from qualifying spouses to heightened constitutional protection against government
interference, matrimony’s unique significance entailed, as one angry Justice put it in
1945, that “family relationships may be destroyed by a procedure that . . . would not
[pass muster] if the suit were to collect a grocery bill.”484
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RISE OF THE NATURAL RIGHT TO MARRY
The previous Part sorted classical understandings of the natural right to marry
into several specific entitlements: a right to “conjugality,” or a mode of relationship
defined by exclusive privileges as to sex and procreation and strongly associated
with cohabitation and parenthood; a right to contract marriage voluntarily, without
formalities, and with the willing partner of one’s choice; and finally a right to remain
wedlocked, such that a marriage valid at its inception would be valid worldwide and
could not be dissolved without fault or consent.
In the nineteenth century, constitutional argumentation about these natural
rights was unusual and, from today’s vantage point, conspicuously devoid of appeals
to specifically marital entitlements. Challenges to interracial marriage bans invoked
not a fundamental right to marry the person of one’s choice but rather broad rights
of equality and contract under the Fourteenth Amendment. Challenges to out-ofstate divorce decrees relied not on any natural right to marital permanence but to
procedural due process and the generic protection of the Contracts Clause. Claims
of this sort rarely reached the Supreme Court and found little sympathy when they
did. In the Dartmouth College case, John Marshall and Joseph Story both toyed with
the thought of affording extant marriage contracts some degree of protection against
impairment, but their successors on the bench unequivocally rejected that possibility
in Maynard v. Hill, where it was the permissive “doctrine of status,” not a wronged
wife’s failed argument from contract, that stressed the distinctiveness of marriage.485
For American lawyers of the nineteenth century, the notion of a fundamental
right to marry belonged almost entirely to natural law.486 Witness the famous case of
483

Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 166–67 (1901).
Williams, 317 U.S. at 316 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
485
See supra notes 103, 301–306, 332, and 420, and accompanying text.
486
For a paradigmatic formulation of positive marriage law’s latitude to diverge from
natural law, see BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 150 (“[B]y the
laws of all civilized countries, as marriage is a natural right, all subjects may marry at
pleasure, except when specifically inhibited or restrained by statute.”) (emphasis added).
Indeed, two respected scholars of family law argue that, “[b]efore Loving, the Supreme Court
. . . had never suggested that individuals had some kind of right to marry, nor that states faced
constitutional limits.” JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE
484
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Reynolds v. United States (1878).487 Plaintiff George Reynolds, a Mormon,
challenged his conviction for bigamy as a violation of the First Amendment’s Free
Exercise Clause.488 That was his sole ground of constitutional complaint. Reynolds’s
attorneys, plucky enough to deny that bigamy defies natural law,489 said nothing of
a natural right to marry—even though this was, as we have seen, a familiar concept
at the time, and even though Reynolds’s second marriage easily could have been
cast as an exercise of that liberty. A constitutional right-to-marry claim was simply
“off the wall” in 1878; even a weak free-exercise claim, rejected by a unanimous
Court, seemed to have a better chance of sticking.490 This state of affairs changed
drastically in the century to follow.
A. Before Skinner
The present Part describes how the right to marry came to be conceived as an
independent substantive right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This progression would have been hard to foresee from the perspective
of the nineteenth century, but the Supreme Court started clearing a path for it a full
fourteen years before Maynard. The case was Citizens Savings & Loan v. Topeka
(1874), which invalidated a state taxation scheme because it served “private interest”
rather than “public use.”491 That holding was founded on constitutional “limitations
. . . which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments”—“implied
reservations of individual rights, without which,” said the Court, in language
reminiscent of the Due Process Clause, “the lives, . . . liberty, and . . . property of . . .
citizens” would be enslaved to the “absolute disposition and unlimited control of . . .
a despotism.”492 To illustrate the existence of such implicit constitutional limitations,
CASTLE: LAW AND FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 37 (2011). Yet it’s not perfectly
accurate to say that, prior to 1967, the Court “had never invalidated a state’s marriage or
divorce law.” Id. Twelve years before Loving, the Court held that the Virgin Islands
Legislative Assembly had exceeded Congress’s permission to legislate on “subjects of local
application” when it empowered the Territory’s courts to grant divorces regardless of
whether either spouse was domiciled there. Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1,
10–12 (1955). A dissenting judge in the case wondered whether the majority was
“motivated” by “constitutional doubts”—specifically, “doubt that domicile is not a
constitutional requirement” for jurisdiction to grant a divorce. Id. at 26 (Clark, J., dissenting).
487
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
488
Id. at 161–62.
489
“The offence prohibited by sect. 5352 is not a malum in se; it is not prohibited by
the decalogue; and, if it be said that its prohibition is to be found in the teachings of the New
Testament, we know that a majority of the people of this Territory deny that the Christian
law contains any such prohibition.” Id. at 152–53 (summarizing Reynolds’s argument).
490
See Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110
YALE L.J. 1407, 1444 (2001) (using the terms “off the wall” and “on the wall” to differentiate
between arguments that “any well-trained lawyer could [and could not] accept”).
491
Citizens’ Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1875).
492
Id. at 662.
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Justice Samuel Miller proclaimed that “[n]o court . . . would hesitate to declare void
a statute which enacted that A and B who were husband and wife to each other
should be so no longer, but that A should thereafter be the husband of C, and B the
wife of D.”493
Citizens Savings & Loan is remembered as a harbinger of the Lochner era494—
more, of course, for its holding as to property, taxation, and public use than for its
passing allusion to divorce by fiat and remarriage by force.495 But Justice Miller’s
hypothetical carved a niche for marriage in the nursery of modern substantive due
process.496 It was a small niche. Compared to the economic rights identified with
Lochner, the notion of a distinct right to marry under the Due Process Clause
emerged slightly later and developed far more tentatively, coming into its own well
after Lochner was “repudiated.”497 Yet if the idea progressed slowly from dictum to
doctrine, it passed through several of the most iconic decisions of the first half of the

493

Id. Roscoe Pound called this passage a “striking example of the purely personal and
arbitrary character of all natural law theories.” Pound, Common Law and Legislation, supra
note 332, at 392 (contrasting the Supreme Court’s statement with Lord Holt’s assertion in
London v. Wood [1702] 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1603, “that Parliament ‘may make the wife of A
to be the wife of B’”).
494
“The phrase ‘Lochner era’ refers to the period from the late nineteenth century until
1937 in which the Court used economic substantive due process to invalidate state . . .
regulations,” a practice justified as judicial “‘restor[ation of] . . . the natural order.’” Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 50 n.22 (1989) (quoting
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 567–68, 578–79 (2d ed. 1988)). For
accounts of the natural-law background of Lochner and like cases, see HOWARD GILLMAN,
THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF L OCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE 19 (1993); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner
and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 10–11 (2003);
Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 879 (1987).
495
For scholarship situating Citizens Savings & Loan in the development of modern
substantive due process and associating it with Lochner, see generally Bernstein, supra note
493; Chemerinsky, supra note 493, at 65–66; Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner:
Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 622
(1996); Pound, Ideal Element, supra note 44.
496
Because Justice Miller’s example combines a violation of the right to marital
permanence with a violation of the right against involuntary marriage, we can’t know (or at
least can’t tell from the face of the decision) whether he or anyone who joined the opinion
considered the first offense alone unconstitutional.
497
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 761 (1997) (observing that “the more
durable precursors of modern substantive due process” were being decided “[e]ven before
the deviant economic due process cases had been repudiated”) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923)); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 501 n.8 (1977) (noting
that the Constitution’s protection of “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage”
traces its lineage to Lochner-era cases that “have survived and enjoyed frequent
reaffirmance, while other substantive due process cases of the same era have been
repudiated.”).

2020]

BEFORE LOVING

153

twentieth century: Meyer v. Nebraska (1923),498 Skinner v. Oklahoma (1943),499 and
the California Supreme Court’s braver but lesser-known ruling in Perez v. Lippold
(1948).500
Meyer held that the Due Process Clause prohibited states from mandating
English-only instruction in schools.501 Citing Lochner and a dozen other cases,
Justice James McReynolds, like Justice Miller before him, invoked the
Constitution’s language of “life, liberty, or property” and proceeded to declare that
“the liberty thus guaranteed . . . denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right . . . to contract, . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children,
. . . and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”502 Again like Justice
Miller, McReynolds reinforced the doctrine of substantive due process with a
fanciful hypothetical involving marriage—specifically, Plato’s vision for the ideal
republic, where “the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children
are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his
parent.”503 This would not do in America. Here, McReynolds stated confidently, a
government could not “impose such restrictions upon the people of a state without
doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.”504
Meyer’s nomination of constitutional rights to “marry, establish a home and
bring up children” may have been fleeting, but by 1923 a number of state courts had
already paid this set of ideas more concerted attention. The chief impetus to this
development, other than the Lochner-era atmosphere of emboldened judicial review,
was eugenic regulation.505 In the first decades of the twentieth century, marital
disqualifications once stated as precepts of natural law—exogamy as to kin,
endogamy as to race, no marriage by anyone incapable of consent—were
reinterpreted and sometimes revised to comport with a twisted law of natural
selection.506 State-imposed and state-facilitated sterilizations severely damaged
498

Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390.
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
500
198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
501
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
502
Id. at 399.
503
Id. at 401.
504
Whereas other substantive due process cases of the Lochner era avoided “the term
‘natural law’” even as they “continue[d] to use the concept under a different name,” Meyer
explicitly invoked parents’ “natural duty” and “corresponding . . . right” to educate their
children. WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 276–77; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400–02.
505
Between 1895 and 1929, “29 states barred ‘imbeciles,’ ‘idiots,’ ‘lunatics,’ the
‘feebleminded,’ and those of ‘unsound mind’ from marriage.” And of the “19 states [that]
made venereal disease a bar to marriage, . . . 10 . . . required a health certificate from a
physician to obtain a . . . license.” Matthew J. Lindsay, Reproducing a Fit Citizenry:
Dependency, Eugenics, and the Law of Marriage in the United States, 1860–1920, 23 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 541, 542 (1998).
506
See William E. McCurdy, Insanity as a Ground for Annulment or Divorce in English
and American Law, 29 VA. L. REV. 771, 794–98 (1943) (discussing “eugenic reasons,” as
499
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many individuals’ prospects of finding a spouse, and institutionalization could
foreclose that possibility for however long it lasted.507 Many jurisdictions simply
branded certain individuals, or certain permutations of individuals, ineligible to
wed.508
Widely cited as the nation’s first self-consciously “eugenic” law, Connecticut’s
1895 “act concerning crimes and punishments” imposed a minimum three years
imprisonment for marriage, cohabitation, or sexual intercourse with an “epileptic,
imbecile, or feeble-minded” person where the female partner was “under forty-five
years of age.”509 The state supreme court considered the statute’s constitutionality in
Gould v. Gould (1906), which sustained a divorce awarded to a woman who had
been “fraudulently induced” to marry a man with concealed epilepsy.510 As
concurring Justice William Hamersley emphasized, this conclusion didn’t depend
on “the validity of the [1895] act,” as there could have been fraudulent inducement
with or without the criminal statute.511 Nonetheless, in considering whether the
enactment ipso facto rendered the marriage void, the court majority expressly denied
any violation of Connecticut’s constitutional guarantee of “equality . . . in the rights
to ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’”—a guarantee, it said, that included
“the right to contract marriage.”512 The statute was both reasonable in its purpose
(preventing “disease of a . . . serious and revolting character”) and reasonable in its
means (“preclud[ing] such opportunities for sexual intercourse as marriage
distinct from concerns about “capacity or mistake,” for states’ revision of statutes prohibiting
certain “insane” persons from marrying); Edward W. Spencer, Some Phases of Marriage
Law and Legislation from a Sanitary and Eugenic Standpoint, 25 YALE L.J. 58, 63–64 (1915)
(describing how “conscious eugenic” planning supplemented “vague notions of general
morality and social convenience” to rationalize limitations on the right to marry and noting
that “statutes against miscegenation . . . have also been defended on the ground that they save
both races from deterioration, physical and moral”). This ideological shift was already
underway by the mid-nineteenth century, when Bishop explained that “modern opinions” on
incestuous marriage stressed “deterioration of the race” rather than “the quiet and accord of
families, . . . female chastity, and . . . the formation of favorable alliances.” BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 214.
507
Some eugenicists preferred these methods over specifically marital regulation. One
author proclaimed that “no cheap device of a law against marriage will take the place of
compulsory segregation of gross defectives. They should be eliminated from the eugenic
problem by segregation during the reproductive period, or by sterilization as a last resort.”
Spencer, supra note 506, at 73; see also MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL
TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 10–11 (1999) (counting “sexual
segregation” as a primary goal of institutionalization).
508
See Francis X. Shen, The Overlooked History of Neurolaw, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
667, 676 (2016) (discussing laws forbidding epileptics to marry); Spencer, supra note 506,
at 65–70 (discussing laws preventing “marriage of the unfit”).
509
Gould v. Gould, 61 A. 604, 604, 608 (Conn. 1905).
510
Id. at 604, 609.
511
Id. at 613 (Hamersley, J., concurring in result)
512
Id. at 604 (citations omitted) (majority opinion).
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furnishes”).513 Justice Hamersley dissented from this portion of the decision, fearing
that it conceded too broad a “legislative power . . . to exscind . . . persons from . . .
the proper domain of individual right, namely, the natural right of marriage [and]
the freedom of contract in the exercise of the right.”514 Although Hamersley agreed
that all liberty is “protected by the Constitution from arbitrary invasion,” he also
suggested, citing Lochner, that these particular “personal freedom[s]” were
“guarantied” [sic] and could not be “destroyed by legislation merely because such
destruction [is] deemed . . generally useful . . . .”515
The “constitutional right of marriage” met with greater but still qualified
success in Peterson v. Widule (1914), a challenge to Wisconsin’s “Eugenic Marriage
Law.”516 Enacted in 1913, the measure required male applicants for a marriage
license to submit a clean bill of venereal health and fixed at three dollars the
maximum fee a doctor could charge for the necessary examinations.517 Pursuant to
this provision, Alfred Peterson “presented himself to four physicians,” payment in
hand, but was turned away each time.518 Three dollars, the doctors all explained, was
“insufficient” to cover the “delicate and expensive . . . Wassermann test” that was
“specially valuable if not practically indispensible” in detecting a certain type of
syphilis.519 Unable to obtain a license, Peterson filed a complaint alleging, inter alia,
“an unreasonable restriction upon the inalienable right of marriage.”520 The trial
court agreed, finding a violation of “inherent rights” implicit in the state
constitution’s explicit purpose to secure “life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness.”521 On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court awarded Peterson a
narrower victory. It conceded that a law mandating the Wassermann test would lay
“a practical embargo on marriage,” but, rather than assuming so “absolutely
unreasonable” a legislative purpose, it interpreted the law to permit less costly
procedures.522 Two dissenting judges refused to construe the statute so forgivingly
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Id. at 604–05 (majority opinion).
Id. at 612 (Hamersley, J., concurring in result).
515
Id. at 612, 613 (citations omitted) (“[T]he nature and importance of the prohibition
as related to the right it cripples or destroys must determine the validity of the act.”).
516
Peterson v. Widule, 147 N.W. 966, 975 (Wis. 1914) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
517
Id. at 967–68 (majority opinion).
518
Id. at 966–67.
519
Id. at 967, 969, 970.
520
Id. at 968.
521
The trial court also held that the law violated “freedom of worship and liberty of
conscience,” a conclusion that the state supreme court casually dismissed with the assertion
that “no church . . . desires its ministers to profane the marriage tie by uniting a man afflicted
with a loathsome disease to an innocent woman.” Id. at 971 (citing WIS. CONST., art. 1, § 1).
This one-liner likely fails to convey the precise content of Peterson’s argument; a similar
claim in Perez v. Lippold suggests one idea the plaintiff may have had in mind. See infra
notes 554–558 and accompanying text.
522
Regarding Peterson’s equal protection claim, the court concluded that requiring
medical certifications from grooms but not from brides was justified by certain
514
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and voted to hold it unconstitutional.523 “To marry is a natural right,” they argued,
“guaranteed by the purpose and spirit of the constitution,” and the Eugenic Marriage
Act “impose[d] such an oppressive burden” on that right “as to . . . destroy it.”524
One more pre-Meyer case bears mention. Barrington v. Barrington (1917)
involved an Alabama statute enacted in 1915 to authorize divorce “in favor of [any]
wife” who lived five years “without support . . . and separate and apart from the
husband”—a ground that, with patience and independent means, a woman could
satisfy unilaterally, without any fault on her husband’s part.525 In 1916, pursuant to
this provision, Mary Barrington secured a divorce. Her erstwhile husband then
appealed, claiming violations of both due process and equal protection.526 The
Alabama Supreme Court ruled in his favor, but it reached that result on statutory
rather than constitutional grounds. It held that the 1915 law wasn’t retrospective and
therefore that Mary shouldn’t have obtained a divorce based on a separation begun
in 1911.527 Although this interpretation was sufficient to dispose of the case, two
judges wrote concurrences airing their constitutional misgivings. Justice J.J.
Mayfield endorsed the husband’s due process theory, stating, like Justice Story in
Dartmouth College, that he was “not yet willing to hold that either the Legislature
or a court can annul a marriage contract without any breach thereof . . . by one of
the parties.”528 Justice William Thomas endorsed Barrington’s equal protection
argument. In language that vacillated between low and high constitutional
expectations, he called the statute’s sex-based “classification unreasonable,
capricious, and arbitrary,” and he identified the interest at stake as “the natural right
of marriage,” “a fundamental right . . . protected under the equality clause of the
constitution.”529
“discreditable” conduct more prevalent among “the class of unmarried men.” Peterson, 147
N.W. at 968, 969–70.
523
Id. at 975–76 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
524
Id. A note in the Harvard Law Review that appeared between the two Peterson
opinions enthusiastically endorsed legislation like Wisconsin’s on the condition that it
“provide for [medical] examinations at the state’s expanse,” so as not “to deprive a healthy
man of the right to marry merely because he is poorer than his fellows.” Note,
Constitutionality of Eugenic Marriage Laws, 27 HARV. L. REV. 573, 574 (1914) (arguing
that unaffordable requirements for marriage could “deprive [a poor person] wholly of the
legal means of exercising an all-important function of mankind”).
525
Barrington v. Barrington, 76 So. 81, 81 (Ala. 1917).
526
Id. at 81–82.
527
Id.
528
Id. at 92; see also supra note 462 (discussing Justice Mayfield’s belief that,
“abundant authority” to the contrary notwithstanding, the statute ought to be held to violate
the Contracts Clause).
529
Barrington, 76 So. at 93. Four years later, when the Barrington case resurfaced and
the constitutional question was no longer avoidable, a majority of the Alabama Supreme
Court found no violation of equal protection and said nothing about a fundamental or natural
right to marry. The statute’s discrimination between husbands and wives, it said, was “the
exercise of a permissible discretion, operating upon the moral, social, economical, and
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In Gould, Peterson, and Barrington, we see a natural right to marry beginning
to take constitutional form. In none of the three suits did a court majority invalidate
a law on that ground, but at least one judge in each case would have done so, and
only one judge in any of the cases (Peterson) openly doubted the marriage right’s
constitutional stature.530 Every member of the Gould court signed on to one or
another opinion explicitly acknowledging a fundamental right to marry, and at least
three (maybe four) of the seven justices in Peterson were ready to strike Wisconsin’s
Eugenic Marriage Law on that basis if the statute could not be interpreted to “save
it from condemnation.”531 For a liberty whose constitutional status the U.S. Supreme
Court had suggested only passingly in 1874, these pre-Meyer rulings of 1906, 1914,
and 1917 were a pretty decent showing.
The constitutionalization of the natural right to marry slowed considerably after
Meyer. Doctrinally, this deceleration owed mainly to Buck v. Bell (1927), an
infamously ugly decision in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes held that eugenic
ends easily trump any right—none mentioned by name—that a “mental defective”
might have against sterilization.532 After Buck, appeals to Meyer’s liberties “to
marry, establish a home and bring up children” lost much of their promise, especially
in contests over eugenic regulation, where, as we’ve seen, the most auspicious
developments around those rights had taken place.533 Indeed, Buck dismissed with a
sneer the argument that had seen the greatest traction in constitutional litigation
against eugenic policies—namely, that states engaged in arbitrary classification and
thereby violated equal protection when they took eugenic action only against
individuals who were in state custody or otherwise institutionalized.534 In Smith v.
Board of Examiners of Feeble-Minded (1913), for example, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the “particular vice” of that state’s sterilization law dealt
its painful “remedy” to one of two “arbitrarily create[d] classes”: “epileptics . . . in
charitable institutions” and “epileptics . . . not [so] confined.” Given the stature and
magnitude of the personal liberty at stake, Smith explained, evenhanded regulation
physical differences which distinguish the sexes and divide them into natural classes, and
which have always invited or demanded . . . many differences or inequalities in legislative
treatment.” Barrington v. Barrington, 89 So. 512, 514 (Ala. 1921).
530
In Peterson, a single justice appeared to doubt the premise that marriage is a
constitutional right, but even this outlier was willing to “assum[e] for argument’s sake that”
the “pursuit of happiness” mentioned in the state constitution “does guarantee . . . certain
rights which the Legislature may not take away.” Peterson v. Widule, 147 N.W. 966, 973
(Wis. 1914) (Timlin, J., concurring).
531
Id. at 970.
532
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927).
533
Davis v. Walton, 276 P. 921, 923 (Utah 1929) (calling Buck v. Bell “a complete
answer” to the claim that the state’s sterilization law was “against the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
534
See Smith v. Board of Examiners of Feeble-Minded, 88 A. 963, 967 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1913); see also Victoria Nourse, Buck v. Bell: A Constitutional Tragedy, 39 PEPP. L. REV.
101, 115 (2009) (calling the decline of this argument “the ultimate constitutional tragedy of
the [Buck] opinion”).
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was particularly important in this context: “When we consider that such [a law]
necessarily involves . . . constitutional rights, it is not asking too much that [its end]
. . . be accomplished, if at all, by a statute that does not deny to the persons
injuriously affected the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the federal
Constitution.”535
To the extent that Smith and a handful of similar rulings enforced the equality
principle more stringently than usual because of the substantive “constitutional
rights” at stake,536 they prefigured what would become known as the “fundamentalinterest” branch of equal protection jurisprudence. As Gerald Gunther described it
in 1969, this doctrine was a “resurrection” of the kind of “aggressive judicial review
. . . reflected in . . . Lochner,” except that it involved specially important “personal
interests” (as opposed to “economic concerns”) and was presented “under the guise
of equal protection rather than substantive due process.”537 Like later scholars,
Gunther cited Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) as the inaugural decision in this line of
cases.538
B. From Skinner to Loving
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Skinner about a month after the United
States entered World War II.539 By that point, in the brutal light of Nazism, the
eugenic vocabulary employed so enthusiastically in Buck v. Bell—“defective,”
“degenerate,” “socially inadequate,” “manifestly unfit”—sounded more sinister to a
greater swath of the American public.540 This cultural shift goes far in explaining
why the 8-to-1 majority permitting Carrie Buck’s salpingectomy in 1927 gave way,
fifteen years later, to a unanimous rejection of Oklahoma’s power to subject Jack
Skinner to a vasectomy.541
The specific law at issue in Skinner provided for sterilization of “habitual
criminal[s]” who had committed “felonies involving moral turpitude.”542 As defined
by Oklahoma, such felonies included armed robbery and chicken stealing (Jack
535

Id.
See Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge, 166 N.W. 938, 940 (Mich. 1918); Osborn v.
Thomson, 103 N.Y.S. 638, 645 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Cline v. State Bd. of Eugenics, No. 15,442
(Or. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1921), reprinted in HARRY HAMILTON LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL
STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 287–88 (1922).
537
Gerald Gunther, Standards of Review, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1076, 1128–31 (1969).
538
Id. at 1130, 1131; see also Gerald Gunther, Foreword, In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1, 28 (1972) (dubbing Skinner “the grandfather of fundamental interest equal protection
cases”); Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 7, at 1388 (calling Skinner “arguably the first decision”
in “the fundamental interest branch of equal protection law”).
539
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
540
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205, 207 (1927).
541
VICTORIA NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS 111–34 (2008).
542
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
536
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Skinner’s offenses), but they did not include, for instance, embezzlement, though
that too was a theft and a felony.543 As Justice William Douglas put it, the law laid
“an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of
offense.”544 Therefore it violated the Constitution no less “than if it had selected a
particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment.”545
As in the Smith case discussed in the previous section, Skinner’s holding was
unambiguously rooted in the Equal Protection Clause, but its reasoning seemed to
lean only more heavily on the “fundamental” interests at stake: “marriage and
procreation.”546 “Strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a
sterilization law is essential,” Justice Douglas wrote, because such “legislation . . .
involves one of the basic civil rights of man,” a “sensitive and important area of
human rights,” “a basic liberty,” “the right to have offspring.”547 Only Chief Justice
Harlan Stone declined to endorse Douglas’s analysis, preferring to strike the law as
a violation of due process—procedural, not substantive.548 Also concurring
separately, Justice Robert Jackson backed both opinions and hinted at a third
rationale, albeit without abandoning the language of invidious classification. “There
are limits” he noted, “on the power of a legislatively represented majority . . . to
conduct biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and
natural powers of a minority—even those who have been guilty of what the majority
define as crimes.”549 Jackson’s concurrence “reserved judgment” on just what those
limits might be, but he flagged the issue to preempt any “implication that such a
question may not exist because not discussed.”550
Skinner was a milestone for the natural right to procreate—and, derivatively,
for the natural right to marry.551 True, the decision specifically preserved Buck v.
Bell, eschewed any mention of Meyer v. Nebraska, and lodged its own holding in
the constitutional command of equality, not liberty.552 Yet its repeated references to
these “basic . . . rights of man” added more than rhetorical flourish; they fairly
described the interests at stake and significantly, perhaps decisively, shaped the
Court’s standard of review—“strict scrutiny,” the Court called it.553
543

Id. at 541.
Id.
545
Id.
546
Id. For a discussion of Smith v. Board of Examiners of Feeble-Minded, 88 A. 963
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1913), see supra notes 533–535 and accompanying text.
547
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536, 541.
548
Id. at 543.
549
Id. at 546–47 (Jackson, J., concurring).
550
Id.
551
See Ariela R. Dubler, Sexing Skinner: History and the Politics of the Right to Marry,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1351 (2010) (situating Skinner within “the history of the origins
of the right to marry”).
552
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541–43.
553
Interestingly, the phrase “strict scrutiny,” in its modern constitutional sense, wasn’t
uttered again by a Supreme Court Justice until two other cases involving marriage and
544
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Six years later, in Perez v. Lippold (1948), an interracial couple drew shrewd
analogies between Oklahoma’s defunct sterilization policy and California’s
proscription of “marriages of white persons with negroes, Mongolians, members of
the Malay race, or mulattoes.”554 Andrea Perez and Sylvester Davis argued that both
laws pursued “the same result”—eugenic selection; and, as “two decent citizens,”
they asked to be afforded no less “solicitude” than the Skinner Court had shown a
“habitual criminal.”555 “The liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,” they
claimed, “includes the right of the individual to marry. Marriage is a natural right.”556
By a four-to-three vote, the California Supreme Court held that state’s
miscegenation law unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a separate concurrence declaring that
marriage is “grounded in the fundamental principles of Christianity,” Justice
Douglas Edmonds also found a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.557 This last ground, forcefully urged by plaintiffs’ counsel, was
predicated on their shared Roman Catholic faith, whose canonical rules on marriage
formation were indifferent to race.558 It was a weak argument, foreclosed by the
Reynolds decision on Mormon polygamy,559 but it carried a moral if not legal force
that time has understandably obscured. In 1948, Perez and Davis couldn’t have
partaken of the sacrament of marriage—neither its ecclesiastical solemnization nor
its one-flesh union—without the state’s blessing. As Justice Roger Traynor’s
majority opinion perceived, plaintiffs’ claim of religious freedom was more properly
a claim of freedom to marry.560
Conceding marriage’s place among the natural rights of humanity, the State of
California asserted in Perez a prerogative to “interfere with the exercise of [those]
rights” when doing so might avoid “the conception of defective or socially

reproduction. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 504 (1965) (White, J.,
concurring) (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541).
554
Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 18 (Cal. 1948).
555
Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 421, at 31.
556
Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 2, 6, Perez, 198 P.2d 17 (No. 20305) (calling the
challenged law “an interference with [plaintiffs’] natural right to marry”).
557
Perez, 198 P.2d at 34 (Edmonds, J., concurring).
558
Id. at 18 (majority opinion).
559
See supra notes 487–490 and accompanying text.
560
“If the miscegenation law . . . is directed at a social evil and employs a reasonable
means to prevent that evil, it is valid regardless of its incidental effect upon . . . particular
religious groups. If, on the other hand, the law is discriminatory and irrational, it
unconstitutionally restricts not only religious liberty but the liberty to marry as well.” Perez,
198 P.2d at 18. The closing “as well” here suggests that the court, perhaps for reasons of
delicacy and collegiality, shied away from entirely or at least overtly rejecting the free
exercise argument even though the preceding sentence necessarily (but implicitly) excluded
it.
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maladjusted offspring.”561 The State argued that the case should be controlled by
Pace v. Alabama (1882), where the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld a law making
extramarital sex between persons of the same race a misdemeanor while punishing
as a felony identical conduct between blacks and whites.562 Without accepting Pace
as good law, Justice Traynor dismissed the precedent as irrelevant because “adultery
and non-marital intercourse are not, like marriage, a basic right.”563 That right, he
said, encompassed what earlier discussions of natural law had posited rarely or else
tacitly: “the right to join in marriage with the person of one’s choice.”564 At one
point, he even called such choice “the essence of the right to marry.”565 Rebutting
the argument that racial segregation in marriage was no less constitutional than
“segregation in . . . common carriers and schools”—Plessy v. Ferguson, remember,
was still viable precedent in 1948—Traynor deemed the separate-but-equal principle
inapplicable to the case before him because “human beings” are not “as
interchangeable as trains.”566 A man who “find[s] himself barred from marrying the
person of his choice” is denied what “to him may be irreplaceable.”567
Perez, then, left no doubt about the existence of a constitutional right to marry,
nor about the aspect of that right—spousal choice—most acutely constrained by
California’s law against interracial marriage. The ruling was similarly
straightforward about the right’s textual basis in the “liberty” secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment, and about its sufficiency as an independent ground of
decision.568 Moreover, this “fundamental right of free men” triggered heightened
scrutiny not only under the doctrine of “substantive due process” and (à la Skinner)
under the Equal Protection Clause, it also demanded more scrupulous adherence to
the constitutional guarantee of fair notice. In view of the difficulty of precisely
defining and consistently applying the challenged racial classifications (“white,”
“negro,” “Malay,” etc.), the Court concluded that, “even if a state could restrict the
right to marry upon the basis of race alone,” California’s statute would still be “too
vague and uncertain to constitute valid regulation. A certain precision is
essential . . . in regulating a fundamental right.”569
561
Return by Way of Demurrer at 10–11, Perez v. Moroney, 198 P.2d 17 (1948), sub
nom. Perez v. Lippold, Perez v. Sharp; see also Respondent’s Petition for Rehearing at 3,
Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (1948), sub nom. Perez v. Sharp (agreeing that marriage “is a
fundamental right of free men” but denying that this “attribute[] . . . bring[s] it within the
scope of . . . constitutional provisions relating to religious freedom.”).
562
Perez, 198 P.2d at 26 (citing Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883)).
563
Perez, 198 P.2d at 26.
564
Id. at 19. “Since the right to marry is the right to join in marriage with the person of
one’s choice, a statute that prohibits . . . marrying a member of a[nother] race . . . restricts . . .
choice . . . and thereby restricts [the] right to marry.” Id.
565
Id. at 21.
566
Id. at 25.
567
Id.
568
Id. at 19–21, 29.
569
Id. at 27.
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In the nearly two decades between Perez and Loving, the U.S. Supreme Court
refused several opportunities to review decisions upholding interracial marriage
bans.570 But it changed the constitutional law of marriage on other controversial
questions. One line of cases, involving migratory divorce, actually predated Perez.
After Williams v. North Carolina (1942) curtailed what little room states had under
the Due Process Clause to refuse full faith and credit to foreign divorce decrees,571
Sherrer v. Sherrer (1948) and Johnson v. Muelberger (1953) eliminated that
freedom entirely in cases where both spouses had participated in the divorce
proceedings.572 Together these cases allowed married people to decide for
themselves “which jurisdiction would control their marital status”; and in Ann
Laquer Estin’s astute observation, the decisions “fundamentally altered state power
to set the normative boundaries of family life.”573 Divorce by mutual consent, once
the bogeyman of Joseph Story’s concurrence in Dartmouth College, now enjoyed a
degree of constitutional protection. Estin suggests that Williams, Sherrer, and
Johnson located in “the interstices of the Full Faith and Credit Clause” a new,
“individual right” of marital self-determination—and that assessment seems right.574
But to be clear, this right was contingent—not, or not yet, fundamental. Married
couples were still at the mercy of legislative decisions about which divorce grounds
to authorize, what procedures to institute, how long a residency to require, and
whether, indeed, to permit divorce at all.575

570
See, e.g., Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (justifying denial of certiorari by
reference to an insufficient record and an incomplete presentation of relevant issues);
Jackson v. Alabama, 348 U.S. 888 (1954) (denying certiorari without explanation); Monks
v. Lee, 317 U.S. 590 (1942) (denying certiorari due to untimely appeal). Archival research
has revealed another dodge: McLaughlin v. Florida, 377 U.S. 974 (1964), which invalidated
a criminal statute imposing special punishment on interracial couples who cohabited outside
of marriage. In early deliberations on the case, at least five Justices believed it was proper if
not necessary to “reach the anti-miscegenation issue.” See Rebecca Schoff, Note, Deciding
on Doctrine: Anti-Miscegenation Statutes and the Development of Equal Protection
Analysis, 95 VA. L. REV. 627, 646–47 (2009).
571
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (overruling Haddock v. Haddock,
201 U.S. 562, 570 (1906), which had permitted states to ignore foreign divorces obtained by
a party who had “wrongfully” abandoned the shared marital domicile).
572
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) (prohibiting either party to a divorce from
attacking the decree on jurisdictional grounds if both had participated in the proceedings);
Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951) (extending Sherrer’s holding to attacks by third
parties).
573
Estin, supra note 416, at 383.
574
Id. (arguing that these later migratory divorce cases “anticipate[d]” future decades’
“more extensive infusion of constitutional principles into family law”).
575
The last state to introduce divorce was South Carolina in 1949. Kellen Funk, “Let
No Man Put Asunder”: South Carolina’s Law of Divorce, 1895–1950, S.C. HIST. MAG.,
July–Oct. 2009, at 134.
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Compared to the migratory divorce rulings of midcentury, Griswold v.
Connecticut (1965)576 and its harbinger Poe v. Ullman (1961)577 produced a more
memorable but ultimately more fragile shift in marriage’s pre-Loving constitutional
position. Plaintiffs in both cases claimed that it was unconstitutional for Connecticut
to forbid married couples to use contraception.578 Poe avoided the question on
justiciability grounds, with Justices William Douglas and John Marshall Harlan
arguing in separate dissents that the challenged statute violated a “right of
privacy . . . implicit in a free society” and embedded in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.579 When the full Court finally reached the merits in
Griswold, Justice Douglas wrote a majority opinion deriving that privacy right from
“penumbras” of more “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights.”580 Justice Harlan,
now concurring, stayed true to the substantive due process theory he had advocated
in Poe (and that prevailed soon enough in Roe v. Wade).581
On either theory—penumbras or due process—Griswold was a momentous
ruling. Substantively, it was the first Supreme Court case to extend the evolving right
of privacy to matters of sex and reproduction.582 Methodologically, it reaffirmed (or
revived from Lochnerian ignominy) the Court’s “authority to strike down . . .
legislation which . . . violates ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice.’”583
Dissenting in Griswold, Justice Hugo Black decried the majority’s divination of
constitutional rules from “subjective considerations of ‘natural justice’” and
“mysterious and uncertain natural law concepts.”584 The objection pertained to
method, but its irony owed to Griswold’s substance. Like the conceit of “marital
privacy” in which it was enveloped, Griswold’s spousal prerogative to engage in
purposely nonprocreative sex wasn’t one traditionally recognized by natural law.
Classical discussions of natural marriage made as much provision for marital
contraception as they did for marital sodomy—which is to say, none.585 To the extent
576

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
578
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86; Poe, 367 U.S. at 500.
579
Poe, 367 U.S. at 533 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (referring to “the right of ‘privacy’”);
id. at 551 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
580
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483–85, 487.
581
410 U.S. 113, 154, 164 (1973); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J.,
concurring) (relying on substantive due process).
582
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (majority opinion).
583
Id. at 512, 514, 518–19, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice
Goldberg’s concurrence and decrying the Court’s reliance on “natural law due process
philosophy,” “mysterious and uncertain natural law concepts,” and “subjective
considerations of ‘natural justice’”).
584
Id. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting). “Natural law due process philosophy,” though
clunky, was Black’s favored epithet. Id. at 511 n.3, 515, 516, 517 n.10, 524, 527 n.23.
585
For an extremely rare and predictably unsuccessful claim of such a right, see State
v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856, 861 (Conn. 1940) (rejecting defendants’ argument “that people have
a natural right ‘to decide whether or not they shall have children’ and a concomitant right to
use contraceptives”).
577
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the subject was raised at all, using “devices to prevent the birth of children” was
considered “contrary to the natural law.”586
Even as Griswold identified a constitutional right where no natural right had
been, the decision did chime faintly with natural law’s designation of (hetero)sexual
indulgence as a primary purpose of marriage—and one distinct from procreation.
Nature, recall, was said to have instituted marriage not only to order human
procreation but “to remedy and avert loose-living and concupiscence.”587 The
elderly could marry in accordance with nature; and in some circumstances, so could
people unable to beget children for other reasons. Griswold evinced respect for this
dimension of natural marriage. With righteous delicacy, the majority Justices gave
constitutional sanctuary to sex for its own sake—though no further, they all insisted,
than what Justice Douglas called the “sacred precincts of marital bedrooms.”588
Decided two years before Loving by a nearly identical Court,589 Griswold
attests to an intense and perhaps defensive loyalty to the traditional model of natural
marriage. A conventional, conservative, and conjugal ideal was no mere background
assumption in Griswold; it was the decision’s dispositive and limiting principle.
According to Justice Douglas, Connecticut’s law was different from regulations
dealing with “economic” and other “social conditions” because it interfered
“directly” in the “relation of husband and wife,” a relation “intimate to the degree of
being sacred.”590 Reciting Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe, Justice Arthur Goldberg
“found it difficult to imagine what is more private and more intimate than a husband
586

Hafner v. Hafner, 66 N.Y.S.2d 442, 444 (Sup. Ct. 1946). This precept was strongly
associated with Christian and especially Catholic doctrine, whose expositors more than
adequately compensated for the reticence of ostensibly secular jurisprudes. See, e.g.,
GERMAIN GABRIEL GRISEZ, CONTRACEPTION AND THE NATURAL LAW (1964) (arguing that
contraception is immoral because it violates a basic moral principle); Noonan, Tokos and
Atokion, supra note 163.
587
JOSEPH JACKSON, THE FORMATION AND ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE 20 (2d ed.,
1969) (describing Christian teaching on marriage’s “essential function as an institution” in
light of the Pauline admonition that “[i]t is better to marry than to burn”); see also supra
notes 165–168 and accompanying text.
588
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). This sanctuary was cramped.
The majority implied that there was a constitutionally salient difference between statutes
prohibiting marital use and marital purchase of contraceptives, see id. at 485–86, and Justice
Harlan’s dissent in Poe noted that a state could legislate its moral disapproval of marital
contraception through less restrictive means, such as “tax benefits and subsidies for large
families,” rules providing for annulment of “a marriage in which only contraceptive relations
had taken place,” and laws making “use of contraceptives . . . a ground for divorce.” See Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 533, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
589
Justice Abe Fortas replaced Justice Arthur Goldberg about three months after
Griswold was decided. See Arthur J. Goldberg, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/arthur
_j_goldberg [https://perma.cc/3KVX-33UL] (last visited Aug. 5, 2019); Abe Fortas, OYEZ,
https://www.oyez.org/justices/abe_fortas [https://perma.cc/L6DG-UV2Y] (last visited Aug.
5, 2019).
590
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481, 482, 486.
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and wife’s marital relations.”591 Obviously, “marital fidelity” had a claim that
“sexual promiscuity and misconduct” did not: “Adultery, homosexuality and the like
are . . . intimacies which the State forbids . . . , but the intimacy of husband and wife
is necessarily an essential . . . feature of . . . marriage, an institution which the State
not only must allow, but . . . in every age . . . has fostered and protected.”592
For the most part, Justice Harlan didn’t bother to rehearse in Griswold
arguments he had set forth at admittedly “unusual length” four years earlier.593 One
can easily see why. Every member of the Griswold majority seemed to endorse his
characterization of the constitutional harm that Connecticut’s criminal law inflicted:
an invasion of the sole space in which, by that law’s own precepts, “the sexual
powers may be used.”594 Taken at their word, Harlan’s seemed to understand and
agree that the legal structures “confining sexuality to lawful marriage form a pattern
so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine
in this area must build upon that basis.”595
It was not to be.
IV. FROM LOVING TO LAWRENCE
A. Loving’s Natural Right to Marry
During and after Reconstruction, legal challenges to interracial marriage bans
invoked a broad, natural right to contract protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
and specifically enshrined in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.596 In Loving v. Virginia,
that argument barely surfaced. Richard and Mildred Loving’s brief seeking certiorari
from the Supreme Court contained a pithily stated claim, dropped from subsequent
filings, that they were “denied the right ‘to make and enforce contracts.’”597 Except
for a single question at oral argument from Justice Potter Stewart (“You’re arguing

591

Id. at 495 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 551–52 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
“It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-marital sexuality
. . . or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when, having acknowledged a marriage
and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the
details of that intimacy.” Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498–99 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 553
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
593
Poe, 367 U.S. at 523.
594
Id. at 548 (protesting the contraception statute’s intrusion into couples’ “private use
of their marital relations.”); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502–03 (Byron, J., concurring)
(including “the right . . . to be free of regulation of the intimacies of the marriage relationship”
among “the freedoms of married persons”).
595
Poe, 367 U.S. at 545.
596
See supra notes 327–330 and accompanying text.
597
Jurisdictional Statement at 17, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395),
1966 WL 115359 at *17.
592
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complete freedom to contract, aren’t you, under the Due Process Clause?”), an
undifferentiated, Lochner-style freedom of contract did not reappear in the case.598
The Loving plaintiffs had more to say—in substance, certainly, and at one point
in name—about Virginia’s incursion onto the “natural right” to marry.599 Their main
authorities for this “basic [and] fundamental” entitlement were the twentieth-century
cases surveyed in Part III. Mildred and Richard Loving claimed the conjugal
prerogatives of marriage mentioned in Meyer v. Nebraska and Skinner v.
Oklahoma.600 They claimed what the California Supreme Court’s Perez decision had
called “the right to join in marriage with the person of one’s choice.”601 And, more
tentatively, they claimed the right or rights of marital privacy newly minted in
Griswold v. Connecticut.602
In a savvy reversal of conventional wisdom, an amicus brief filed by the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund called “laws against interracial marriage the weakest,
not the strongest, of the segregation laws,” because “they intrude a racist dogma into
the private and personal relationship of marriage,” thereby violating the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.603 The Japanese American Citizens League went further, asserting “that even
under the now-rejected ‘separate but equal’ doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,” the
“vitally personal right . . . to marry” is so “basic,” so “fundamental,” that it “could
not be abrogated” by prohibitions of interracial marriage.604 Invoking not only dicta
from Meyer and Skinner, but also “the right to marry and to found family” named in
598

Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395),
https://viewfromll2.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/loving-v.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4F5L6S6H] [hereinafter Loving Oral Argument].
599
Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 597, at 15–16 (noting that “marriage is such a
basic, fundamental, and natural right . . . that the choice of a mate must be left to one’s own
desires and conscience”).
600
Id. at 16 (invoking Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922) and Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)); Brief of NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.
as Amicus Curiae at 9–10, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395) [hereinafter
NAACP LDF Brief] (same); Brief of Japanese American Citizens League as Amicus Curiae
at 7–9, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395) [hereinafter JACL Brief] (same);
Brief Urging Reversal, on Behalf of Bishop John J. Russell et al. as Amicus Curiae at 6, 20–
21, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395) [hereinafter Catholic Bishops’ Brief]
(same).
601
Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 19 (Cal. 1948); see also Jurisdictional Statement,
supra note 597, at 15 (invoking Perez); Brief for Appellants at 38, Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395) [hereinafter Appellant Brief] (same); NAACP LDF Brief, supra note
600, at 3 (same); Catholic Bishops’ Brief, supra note 600 at 17–18, 21 (same); JACL Brief,
supra note 600, at 9 (same).
602
Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 597, at 3, 17 (invoking Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965)); Appellant Brief, supra note 601, at 38–39 (same); NAACP LDF Brief,
supra note 600, at 9 (same); JACL Brief, supra note 600, at 3, 9 (same).
603
NAACP LDF Brief, supra note 600, at 14–15.
604
JACL Brief, supra note 600, at 9–11.
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, two Roman Catholic organizations and
sixteen southern bishops argued that laws proscribing “marriage between persons of
different race . . . deny to such persons the right to beget children, . . . one of the
chief lawful rights in marriage,” and therefore “contravene a fundamental liberty
guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”605 In their own
briefs, the Lovings cast their right to marry as a “‘liberty’ . . . protected by the due
process clause” and, more speculatively, by some or all of Griswold’s constitutional
potpourri.606
Overall, however, right-to-marry arguments were ancillary to the Lovings’
main grievance against Virginia’s “Racial Integrity Act.” By far the greater part of
their challenge was staked and fought on the terrain of equal protection, as the
couple’s counsel haltingly—and, it would seem, apprehensively—assured the Court
at oral argument. On the heels of Justice Stewart’s question about “complete
freedom of contract . . . under the Due Process Clause,” attorney Bernard Cohen
pivoted back to the Fourteenth Amendment’s “protect[ion] against racial
discrimination,” which he considered his strongest argument.607 He then confessed:
“I do not think that the other arguments are completely invalid. I—I don’t even know
if the Court ever has to reach them.”608 Indeed it did not. By 1967, the Equal
Protection Clause had developed into a crushingly effective weapon against Jim
Crow.609 Anyone following the logic of the Court’s decisions from Brown v. Board
605

“Such persons may have children only if they are willing to pay the penalty of having
them legally denominated as bastards.” Catholic Bishops’ Brief, supra note 600, at 20; see
also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810, art. 16 (Dec. 12, 1948).
606
See Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 597, at 15–17 (citing Griswold and claiming
violations of the “right of privacy,” the “liberty retained by the people” via the Ninth
Amendment, “freedom of association under the First Amendment,” and “penumbras formed
by emanations” of “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights”); Appellant Brief, supra note
601, at 38–39 (citing Griswold and claiming violations of the “right of privacy” and “freedom
of association”); see also Loving Oral Argument, supra note 598, at 6 (invoking Griswold
and claiming a violation of the Ninth Amendment).
607
Loving Oral Argument, supra note 598, at 7.
608
Id.
609
See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 756–57 (1966) (holding that even
minimal state participation in a conspiracy to perpetrate discrimination “[b]y causing the
arrest of Negroes by means of false [criminal] reports” violated the Equal Protection Clause);
Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135, 137 (1964) (holding under the Equal Protection
Clause that arrests by a state deputy acting under his own authority constituted impermissible
state action enforcing segregation); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568–69 (1964)
(interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to require that state legislative districts be equal in
population); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 232 (1964) (concluding that a local
government violated equal protection when it closed public schools for the express purpose
of avoiding desegregation); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (holding that racial
segregation in courtrooms violated equal protection); Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526,
539 (1963) (holding that racial segregation of public parks violated equal protection); Turner
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of Education (1954) to McLaughlin v. Florida (1964) could have predicted that
miscegenation laws’ days were numbered.610 The real question at that point was
whether Loving could be decided on any ground other than equality. No matter who
articulated them—the NAACP, the Catholic bishops, the Japanese Citizens League,
the plaintiffs themselves—claims about Virginia’s infringement of fundamental
liberty invariably devolved into arguments about the arbitrariness and irrationality
of the racial classification employed to constrain the right’s exercise.611
Although the Supreme Court embraced the Lovings’ substantive due process
claim, it too subordinated that rationale to the principle of equality. Chief Justice
Earl Warren’s majority opinion—joined by all but Justice Stewart, who filed a twoline concurrence rejecting any law that makes “the criminality of an act depend upon
the race of the actor”—consisted of two parts.612 The first, comprising roughly ninety
percent of the Court’s analysis, explained why interracial marriage bans are
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.613 The remaining ten percent,
which had been significantly trimmed after several Justices professed to see “no
reason” to include it at all, held that Virginia’s law “also deprive the Lovings of
liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”614 The remainder of the relevant passage is sufficiently
terse to be quoted in full:
The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.

v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 353–54 (1962) (holding that racial segregation in municipal
airport restaurant violated equal protection); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341
(1960) (construing the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit states from drawing electoral
district boundaries to disenfranchise black voters).
610
See Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword, “State Action,” Equal Protection, and
California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 70 n.5 (1967) (calling Loving the
“expectable result” of a “process” begun in Brown). The sense of expectation is palpable, for
example, in Edmund L. Walton, Jr., The Present Status of Miscegenation Statutes, 4 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 28 (1963) and Lee M. Miller, Constitutionality of Miscegenation Statutes –
McLaughlin v. Florida, 25 MD. L. REV. 41 (1965).
611
See supra notes 597–602 and accompanying text.
612
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
613
Loving, 388 U.S. at 7–13.
614
Id. at 12. Responding to an early draft, Justice Hugo Black wrote: “I heartily agree
with the equal protection part . . . but having decided the whole case there I see no reason for
adding what follows. The case comes so fully under equal protection that I think [that] should
end it. Besides there are statements in the due process part with which I would not agree.”
Justice Byron White likewise told the Chief Justice that he saw “no reason to reach the due
process question.” See Hugo L. Black, Draft Opinion (May 31, 1967) (on file with the
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Earl Warren Papers, Box 620); Draft Opinion
Letter from Byron White to Earl Warren (May 31, 1967) (same).
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Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our
very existence and survival. Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). To deny this
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly
subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without
due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom
of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations.
Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the
State.615
Behold how swiftly invidious classification and discrimination reenter the
Court’s discussion.616After declaring an independent violation of the fundamental
“freedom to marry,” the decision “slips right back into equality rationales.”617 Count
one reason, other than sheer brevity, to look askance at this portion of the opinion.
The Court’s use of precedent is another. Citing Skinner and Maynard, respectively
decided under the Equal Protection and Contracts Clauses, Chief Justice Warren
ignored Meyer and Griswold, the only twentieth-century cases in which the Court
had derived substantive marital rights from the Due Process Clause.618 The reference
to Maynard is especially strange. Presumably it was meant to evoke Justice Field’s
deathless pronouncement that marriage has “more to do with the morals and
civilization of a people than any other institution,” as if this statement—and the
affirmation of legislative supremacy that immediately followed it—had not served
for eighty years to shield miscegenation laws from constitutional attack.619
Despite the decision’s oddities, early legal commentary on Loving evinced little
surprise at the Court’s near-unanimous enforcement of an unenumerated,
substantive entitlement pertaining to marriage—just the kind of right that had moved

615

Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
The paragraphs are consistent with Justice White’s advice to the Chief Justice: “If
the statute satisfied the Equal Protection Clause, I would not hold it a violation of due process
as ‘arbitrary.’ On the other hand, since it does not meet equal protection standards, it may
automatically be a violation of due process also.” Letter from Byron White to Earl Warren,
supra note 614.
617
Sasha Volokh, Is Marriage Really a Liberty Right?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 26,
2015), http://reason.com/volokh/2015/06/26/is-marriage-really-a-liberty-r [https://perma.cc/
2DTB-GWK4]; see also Jane C. Atkinson, Califano v. Jobst, Zablocki v. Redhail, and the
Fundamental Right to Marry, 18 J. FAM. L. 587, 594 (1979) (remarking how “easily [one]
could argue that the right to marry is so interrelated with the question of racial classifications
in Loving as to be merely dicta”).
618
Loving, 388 U.S. at 7.
619
See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
616
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the Justices to such passionate disagreement only three years earlier in Griswold.620
To both the Court and its audiences, Loving’s “right to marry” struck a wholly
different note than Griswold’s “right of marital privacy.” One idea was directly
traceable through centuries of legal thought; the other was yesterday’s coinage.
B. Decline and Fall
For all of its doctrinal audacity, Griswold v. Connecticut was premised no less
than Loving on an age-old conception of marriage that lived most pristinely in
natural law. At that conception’s center, the human relationship to which all other
aspects of the right to marry referred, was a tightly circumscribed conjugality.621
This was the “essential” and “sacred” prerogative that Connecticut claimed the
power to “invade” in Griswold.622 This is what Virginia sought to deprive couples
like Richard and Mildred Loving, and why the deprivation was so cruel. The
Lovings’ desire to wed had little if anything to do with government benefits, marital
property rules, or any of civil marriage’s myriad and variable incidents.623 What they
620
Some commentators had forecasted Loving’s due-process holding and, after the fact,
most commentators noted it offhandedly (if they mentioned it at all). For scholarly
anticipations of this portion of the decision, see David E. Seidelson, Miscegenation Statutes
and the Supreme Court: A Brief Prediction of What the Court Will Do and Why, 15
CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 156, 160, 162, 165–66 (1966); Miller, supra note 610, 41, 43–44, n.20,
n.24; Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia’s Anti-Miscegenation Statute in
Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1216 (1966) (noting that the Court had already
described “marriage in terms of a right” in Meyer, Skinner, and Griswold). For examples of
scholarly nonchalance about Loving’s resort to substantive due process, see W.M. Bonesio,
Marriage and Divorce Under the Texas Family Code, 8 HOUS. L. REV. 100, 104 (1970–
1971); Donald W. Merritt, Recent Cases: Constitutional Law—Anti-Miscegenation Statutes
Held to Violate Equal Protection and Due Process, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 507, 511 (1968);
Sidney L. Moore, Constitutional Law—Civil Rights—State Anti-Miscegenation Statutes
Banned, 19 MERCER L. REV. 255, 255 (1968); George Schuhmann, Miscegenation: An
Example of Judicial Recidivism, 8 J. FAM. L. 69, 77 (1968). See also Homer H. Clark, The
New Marriage, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 441, 445 (1975–1976) (including Loving’s
characterization of marriage as a fundamental right among “statements of a traditional kind”
about the institution). For two unusually animated reactions to Loving’s right-to-marry
holding, see Robert F. Drinan, The Loving Decision and the Freedom to Marry, 29 OHIO ST.
L.J. 358, 368 (1968) (asserting the longevity of Americans’ “conviction that the freedom to
marry the person of one’s choice is . . . so basic that no law should restrict or delay its
fulfillment” and speculating that Loving might “stimulate litigation” over “legal restrictions
on th[is] freedom”) and Foster, supra note 366, at 52 (crediting Griswold and Loving with
“challeng[ing]” courts’ longtime deference to regulations of marital status, but doubting that
marriage, qua “status,” is “a constitutional right in the sense that free speech and . . . freedom
of religion . . . are constitutionally guaranteed rights”).
621
See infra Parts I and II(A).
622
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485, 486, 499 (1965).
623
Richard Loving famously advised his attorney, “Tell the Court I love my wife, and
it is just unfair that I can’t live with her in Virginia.” Loving Oral Argument, supra note 598,
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sought was, or then seemed, eternally necessary and unique to the institution: the
right to share a home and a bed, and the opportunity to parent legitimate offspring.624
Hence a federal district court’s determination only six years later that Loving gave
individuals imprisoned for life no basis to challenge regulations forbidding them to
marry: “Those aspects of marriage which make it ‘one of the basic civil rights of
man’—cohabitation, sexual intercourse, and the begetting and raising of children—
are unavailable to [prisoners] in [that] situation . . . .”625
The Lovings’ liberty claim under the Due Process Clause was intelligible in
1967 because the Court and much of its public still imagined civil marriage’s
defining attributes to be those of natural marriage. And so they were, legally, in the
vast majority of states. But the resemblance was fading fast. In 1955, a draft of the
American Law Institute’s much-anticipated Model Penal Code had advocated
“removing adultery and fornication entirely from the area of criminality.”626 State
legislatures began implementing this guidance in 1961,627 repealing prohibitions of
fornication, adultery, and sodomy that, if not totally moribund, were drastically
unenforced. 628 Spurred by rapidly changing moral norms, social practices, and

at 9. For accounts of the Lovings’ relationship, see THE LOVING STORY (Icarus Films 2011);
CHERYL CASHIN, LOVING: INTERRACIAL INTIMACY IN AMERICA AND THE THREAT TO WHITE
SUPREMACY 100–19 (2017); PETER WALLERSTEIN, RACE, SEX, AND THE FREEDOM TO
MARRY: LOVING V. VIRGINIA (2014); Robert A. Pratt, Crossing the Color Line: A Historical
Assessment and Personal Narrative of Loving v. Virginia, 41 HOWARD L.J. 229 (1998).
624
As Michigan’s Attorney General tried to explain in defense of that state’s same-sex
marriage ban, “in Loving, if the couple could not get married, they could not . . . enjoy private
intimacy at all because it was subject to criminal prosecution and jail time.” Transcript of
Oral Argument at 77, Obergefell v. Hodges, 173 S. Ct. 1732 (2015) (No. 14-556).
625
Johnson v. Rockefeller, 365 F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The U.S. Supreme Court
summarily affirmed Johnson in Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974). In Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987), the Court stood by that affirmance but held that prisoners
generally retain the right to marry when “the limitations imposed by prison life” make sexual
relations impossible. On one hand, Turner expressly declined to endorse Johnson’s rationale;
on the other hand, it saw fit to mention that “most inmate marriages are formed in the
expectation that they will ultimately be fully consummated.”
626
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1, n.1 (AM. L. INST., Tent. Draft No. 4), April 25, 1955;
see also MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 145–46 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft), May 4,
1962 (recommending decriminalization of “private homosexuality not involving force,
imposition or corruption of the young”).
627
Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 326 (2007) (discussing law reform based on tentative
drafts of the MPC and the “host of . . . recodifications” that followed the Code’s formal
promulgation in 1962).
628
See MODEL PENAL CODE, Comments on Article 207 – Sexual Offenses 12, 13, 18
(AM. L. INST., Council Draft No. 8) 1955 (finding “no need to retain dead-letter adultery and
fornication statutes”).
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political conditions, this wave of statutory reform only intensified in the decade after
Loving.629
By the time the Supreme Court next held a state law to violate the constitutional
right to marry, that tribunal had done much to help the Sexual Revolution along.
Even as it ruled in Zablocki v. Redhail (1978) that the State of Wisconsin couldn’t
condition a marriage license on applicants’ fulfillment of child-support
obligations,630 the Court’s own recent decisions had drastically undermined the
once-exclusive claim to legitimate sex and procreation that had made license to
marry so crucial. Less than a year after Loving, Levy v. Louisiana (1968) became the
first in a line of cases establishing illegitimacy as a presumptively invidious
classification under the Equal Protection Clause.631 In the same month that
Eisenstadt v. Baird (1971) extended Griswold’s marital privacy right to nonmarital
couples, again under the Equal Protection Clause,632 Boddie v. Connecticut at least
glanced toward—on some readings required—a right, of all things, to divorce.633
And between 1968 and 1978, the Court invalidated a range of gender-based
distinctions in marriage and family law,634 announced a right to abortion,635 and
afforded limited protection to individuals’ choices about whether and with whom to
cohabit.636
629

Robinson & Dubber, supra note 627, at 326; see also Brief of the CATO Inst. as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 16, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No.
02-102) (noting eighteen legalizations of consensual sodomy between 1969 and 1976). The
trend was hardly universal, especially with regard to adultery. See Deborah L. Rhode,
Adultery: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 11 STAN. J. C.R. & C. L. 179 (2015).
630
434 U.S. 375, 406 (1978).
631
391 U.S. 68 (1968).
632
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
633
401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971) (“[A] State may not . . . pre-empt the right to dissolve this
legal relationship without affording all citizens access to the means it has prescribed for
doing so . . . .”); see also Berg, supra note 470 (claiming that Boddie effectively recognized
a “fundamental right to divorce”); Karst, supra note 470 (citing Boddie for the proposition
that divorce implicates “all the values that make marriage a ‘fundamental’ interest” and
suggesting that fault requirements are likely unconstitutional).
634
See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (rejecting a sex-based criterion for
calculating Social Security benefits paid to surviving spouses); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S.
7 (1975) (rejecting different definitions of adulthood based on sex); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (rejecting a sex-based criterion for eligibility to collect
Social Security benefits to support minor children); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (rejecting a sex-based criterion for provision of family benefits to military personnel);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (rejecting a sex-based criterion for choosing the
administrator of an estate).
635
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
636
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973); cf. Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1975) (upholding a singlefamily zoning ordinance, but noting that, since the restriction applied only to groups of three
or more, it reflected “no animosity toward unmarried couples”). Belle Terre has been widely
disparaged as “incompatible with the Court’s modern associational rights jurisprudence.”
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Zablocki invoked some of these fresh precedents, admitting no tension between
them and the scheme of sexual regulation in which Wisconsin’s harsh child-support
law was situated.637 “[I]f appellee’s right to procreate means anything it all,” the
Court stressed, “it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in which the
State . . . allows sexual relations to legally take place.”638 Never mind that judges
were already folding Loving’s right to marry into an “emerging right of privacy”
capacious enough to embrace nonmarital sex.639 Those intrepid rulings would be
vindicated a quarter-century later, in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), whose libertarian
doctrine on “matters pertaining to sex,” said the Court, was “apparent” from a short
line of cases ending in 1977.640 Following the lead of numerous state legislatures
and courts, and ratifying the lived expectations of most Americans, Lawrence
enshrined under the federal Constitution a right to sex without marriage—the precise
antithesis of natural law’s positive right to marry.641
CONCLUSION: AFTER OBERGEFELL
The original meanings of the right to marry have been legally superseded and—
some more than others—widely forgotten. But they aren’t lost in every sense. They
aren’t lost to history. The annals of American legal thought abound in evidence of
the marriage right’s provenance and meaning in natural law. This Article has taken
a first pass at collecting, interpreting, and synthesizing that evidence. It has
developed a vocabulary for classifying and describing the main facets of the natural
right to marry. And it has traced the right’s genealogy in American jurisprudence
over nearly two centuries.
We’ve seen that the natural right to marry was a right, first and foremost, to
marriage—a necessarily and exclusively sexual relationship, potentially
procreative, wherein a man and woman were privileged to share a home and raise a
family. This conjugal structure was “entered through, and only through, the door of
Rigel C. Olivieri, Single-Family Zoning, Intimate Association, and the Right to Choose
Household Companions, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1401, 1404, 1429 n. 177 (2015) (collecting
examples of scholarly criticism); see also Sara L. Dunski, Make Way for the New Kid on the
Block: The Possible Zoning Implications of Lawrence v. Texas, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 847
(2005); John T. Messerly, Roommate Wanted: The Right to Choice in Shared Living, 93
IOWA L. REV. 1949 (2008).
637
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 375, 385 (1978).
638
Id. at 385–86 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1976), Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S 438, 453–54 (1972)).
639
State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 356 (Iowa 1976) (invalidating a sodomy law
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contract,”642 a threshold that natural law guarded with several guarantees of
autonomy. Individuals couldn’t marry except by their own free will. When they did
so, a simple exchange of consent was all the ceremony nature required. In some
quarters it was also thought that, apart from a few limitations imposed by natural
law itself, any eligible man could marry any eligible woman. Then, having entered
the hallowed estate of matrimony, husband and wife were entitled to stay there. A
marriage valid where celebrated was valid everywhere; and the union was
indissoluble, if at all, without at least one party’s fault or consent.
Whether respected or flouted by positive law, the natural right to marry was a
recurrent touchstone in classical deliberations on the practical regulation of civil
marriage. In addition to limited due-process protections against unwarranted
dissolution (developed mainly in litigation over migratory divorce), two natural
rights of marriage, conjugality and mate selection, eventually worked their way into
twentieth-century constitutional doctrine. The first of these was recognized most
prominently in Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942), an equal-protection case that ranked
“marriage and procreation” among “the basic civil rights of man.”643 Loving v.
Virginia (1967) was the case that vindicated a right to marry the person of one’s
choice.
Loving appeared at the dawn of a new era in American family law. Through
statutory and constitutional reform, marriage was stripped in subsequent years and
decades of the exclusive claims to licit sex and legitimate procreation that had
defined the institution since time immemorial. Admittedly, the demise of the
marriage right’s original, conjugal meaning—American law’s renunciation, that is,
of the ideal upon which each and every aspect of the natural right to marry was
founded—doesn’t conclusively prove that its contemporary avatar is philosophically
bankrupt. But it’s hard to imagine stronger evidence to that effect. Were it not for a
Supreme Court that persists in cloaking its decisions in this antiquated doctrinal
garb, who would dream that Loving’s right to marry survives the implosion of its
core content? Essences are not so easily replaced.
The spectral remnant of a defunct legal regime, the constitutional right to marry
is a problem of more than theoretical interest. It has tangible consequences,
beginning with an inherent bias toward the regulatory status quo. Recall the scholars
who hypothesize civil marriage’s abolition in order to test the notion of a positive
right to marry.644 Quite sensibly, those thinkers ask whether the state can “get out of
the marriage business” in order to ascertain what, if anything, that business might
be.645 The tenacious pretense of a constitutional right to civil marriage signals that
642
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there’s a live bird at the end of that goose chase. It sends the chilling (if usually
subliminal) message that, somehow or other, we’re stuck with the institution we
have.
Even as Obergefell v. Hodges dealt the coup de grâce to natural marriage’s
inscription in constitutional law,646 its endorsement of a fundamental right to marry
implicitly warned of limits to further experimentation. Yes, Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s glorification of wedlock was appalling for all of reasons given by
Obergefell’s early, left-of-center critics. But the decision’s sentimental moralism
was more than a regrettable rhetorical choice; it was a discursive mode perfectly
suited to the ruling’s regressive reliance on the right to marry. Surely that doctrinal
fault merits condemnation at least as strong the opinion’s pompous dicta.647 After
all, for all its prestige, the Court is merely a participant in our culture’s ubiquitous
mythology of marriage; but no person or institution bears greater responsibility for
promulgating the myth of the constitutional right to marry.
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Mercifully, Obergefell did hold that prohibitions of same-sex marriage violate
the Equal Protection Clause, not just a “right to marry [that] is fundamental under
the Due Process Clause.”648 Yet Justice Kennedy’s relatively brief discussion of
equality, aside from being interwoven with and muddied by musings on the
“profound . . . synergy” between “the two Clauses,” was not nearly so compelling
or useful as the more straightforward explanations he eschewed:649 why gay
marriage bans unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of sex and sexual
orientation;650 why they deny “equal access” to an important civil (not
constitutional) right;651 why they impermissibly burden individuals’ freedom to
choose same-sex relations and relationships.652 Such missed opportunities are
probably the most immediate and concrete costs of maintaining the illusion of a
constitutional right to marry. When a court invalidates a law on that basis, it perforce
rules incorrectly. When “marriage” has ceased to have any necessary meaning, a
right-to-marry opinion conceals the true moral and legal stakes of a dispute and
stifles development of more suitable doctrine.
Unmoored from its origin in natural law, the fundamental right to marry is
logically and ideologically incoherent. Its continued recitation obscures salutary
developments in family and constitutional law, obstructs further progress, and limits
political imagination about a flawed but mutable institution. Is it not time to give up
this ghost? If we cease scrambling for a definition of what marriage is and must
remain, we might finally begin to learn the freedom that comes without one.
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